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Abstract 
In many complex and dynamic domains, the ability to generate and then select the 
appropriate course of action is based on the decision maker’s “reading” of the situation—
in other words, their ability to assess the situation and predict how it will evolve over the 
next few seconds. Current theories regarding option generation during the situation 
assessment and response phases of decision making offer contrasting views on the 
cognitive mechanisms that support superior performance. The Recognition-Primed 
Decision-making model (RPD; Klein, 1989) and Take-The-First heuristic (TTF; Johnson 
& Raab, 2003) suggest that superior decisions are made by generating few options, and 
then selecting the first option as the final one. Long-Term Working Memory theory 
(LTWM; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), on the other hand, posits that skilled decision 
makers construct rich, detailed situation models, and that as a result, skilled performers 
should have the ability to generate more of the available task-relevant options.   
The main goal of this dissertation was to use these theories about option 
generation as a way to further the understanding of how police officers anticipate a 
perpetrator’s actions, and make decisions about how to respond, during dynamic law 
enforcement situations. An additional goal was to gather information that can be used, in 
the future, to design training based on the anticipation skills, decision strategies, and 
processes of experienced officers. Two studies were conducted to achieve these goals.  
Study 1 identified video-based law enforcement scenarios that could be used to 
discriminate between experienced and less-experienced police officers, in terms of their 
ability to anticipate the outcome. The discriminating scenarios were used as the stimuli in 
Study 2; 23 experienced and 26 less-experienced police officers observed temporally-
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occluded versions of the scenarios, and then completed assessment and response option-
generation tasks.  
The results provided mixed support for the nature of option generation in these 
situations. Consistent with RPD and TTF, participants typically selected the first-
generated option as their final one, and did so during both the assessment and response 
phases of decision making. Consistent with LTWM theory, participants—regardless of 
experience level—generated more task-relevant assessment options than task-irrelevant 
options. However, an expected interaction between experience level and option-relevance 
was not observed.  
Collectively, the two studies provide a deeper understanding of how police 
officers make decisions in dynamic situations. The methods developed and employed in 
the studies can be used to investigate anticipation and decision making in other critical 
domains (e.g., nursing, military). The results are discussed in relation to how they can 
inform future studies of option-generation performance, and how they could be applied to 
develop training for law enforcement officers.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
When individuals make decisions in dynamic and complex environments, 
thinking about the situation and acting in pursuit of a goal are intimately linked (Orasanu, 
1993). To understand skilled performance in highly representative or naturalistic settings, 
it is important to consider the relationship between the external environment, an agent’s 
perception of that environment, and the actions taken to achieve an outcome (Cokely & 
Kelley, 2009; Smith & Hancock, 1995). Although the concept of a perception-action 
cycle is well established (e.g., Neisser, 1976), research on skilled performance in 
dynamic and complex environments has tended to focus on either the perception or the 
action phase of decision making (for state of the science reviews on expertise, see 
Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, & Hoffman, 2006). For instance, there exists on the one 
hand, evidence that experienced performers are better at anticipating and assessing 
situations than their less-experienced counterparts with little reference to the courses of 
action taken (e.g., Calderwood, Crandall, & Baynes, 1990; Ward & Williams, 2003). On 
the other hand, complementary evidence exists that skilled performers generate and/or 
select better responses than less-skilled performers, however, the perceptual skills of 
these performers are rarely considered (e.g., Raab & Johnson, 2007). There is remarkably 
little research that has addressed, directly and empirically, the relationship between the 
perceptual-cognitive (i.e., situational assessment) and action (i.e., response 
generation/selection) phases of decision making in dynamic and complex environments. 
Therefore, the main goal of the current research is to further our understanding of the 
relationship between both phases, and to investigate the extent to which this relationship 
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is affected by skill level. 
To achieve this goal, the current research will investigate situation assessment and 
response generation/selection behavior in complex, dynamic, time pressured, and 
potentially threatening law enforcement situations. The following account illustrates the 
importance of both phases of decision making in law enforcement: 
. . . at dusk one day . . . my partner and I spotted three gang members walking 
down the sidewalk, facing away from us. As we rolled up . . . the subjects’ heads 
start turning all over the place; it was evident they were looking for a place to run. 
The two guys on the ends split . . . . The guy in the middle didn’t know which 
way to go, and he just froze there in front of us. We were right on top of him 
when we stopped—maybe ten feet away. As I was getting out of the passenger 
door of the car, he started digging in his waistband with his right hand. Then I 
could see that he was reaching into his crotch area, then that he was trying to 
reach toward his left thigh area, as if he was trying to grab something that was 
falling down his pants leg. He was starting to turn around toward me as he was 
fishing around in his pants. He was looking right at me and I was yelling at him 
not to move: “Stop! Don’t move! Don’t move! Don’t move!” . . . . As I was 
giving him commands, I drew my revolver. When I got about five feet from the 
guy, he came up with a chrome .25 auto [handgun]. Then, as soon as his hand 
reached his center stomach area, he dropped the gun right on the sidewalk. We 
took him into custody, and that was that. (Klinger, 2004, p. 61) 
As this account suggests, successful performance in law enforcement situations 
depends on an officer’s ability to assess the situation accurately, and predict what will 
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happen next. Previous empirical research in this domain has found that experienced 
police officers took appropriate action (e.g., justifiably shot a gun-wielding suspect) 
significantly earlier than did police recruits, and suggested that successful performance 
was related to an officer’s ability to anticipate situational outcomes (Harris, Tashman, 
Ward, Ericsson, & Eccles, 2006). Similarly, research in other complex and dynamic 
environments has found that experts make predictions frequently and successfully, often 
under temporal and/or informational constraint (e.g., McKenna & Crick, 1994; 
Sulistyawati, Wickens, & Chui, 2011; Williams, Ward, Knowles, & Smeeton, 2002).  
The challenging nature of dynamic law enforcement situations is highlighted by 
the number of police officers killed and assaulted in the line of duty. Between 2002-2011, 
an average of 54 officers were killed feloniously each year in the United States of 
America (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2012, Table 1). Using available data for 
2009, police officers were killed by shooting at a rate of 6.4 per 100,000 officers (derived 
from FBI, 2010a and 2010b); this was substantially greater than the overall (i.e. total US 
population) firearm homicide rate of 3.8 per 100,000 people during 2009 (Kochanek, Xu, 
Murphy, Miniño, & Kung, 2011, Table 17). Typically, training to deal with potentially 
violent confrontations focuses on an officer’s ability to select the appropriate response 
(e.g., shoot/don’t shoot) and demonstrate appropriate tactics (e.g., tactical positioning, 
use of cover). However, little, if any, attention is paid to developing officers’ ability to 
anticipate situational outcomes. Therefore, an additional goal of the current research is to 
gather information that can be used, in the future, to design training based on the 
anticipation skills, decision strategies, and processes of experienced officers (see Ward, 
Suss, & Basevitch, 2009).   
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To achieve the goals of this dissertation, two studies were conducted. The first 
study, consisting of three sub-studies, employed a temporal occlusion paradigm to 
identify video-based law enforcement scenarios that could be used to discriminate 
between experienced and less-experienced police officers, in terms of their ability to 
anticipate the outcome. This study also determined the optimal occlusion point for the 
discriminating trials. The second study—which employed the discriminating trials and 
occlusion points identified via the first study—investigated experienced-based 
differences in police officers’ ability to anticipate and assess situational outcomes, and 
also explored the relationship between these behaviors and response generation/selection.  
Outline of Literature Review (Chapters 2 & 3) 
In Chapters 2 and 3, the literature on the situation assessment and response phases 
of decision making are reviewed independently. To guide the reader, a more detailed 
description of each chapter follows. 
The main focus of Chapter 2 is on research that has considered individual (and not 
team-based) situation assessment in representative and naturalistic settings. This is 
supplemented with research from less-dynamic domains (e.g., problem solving, chess) 
that has also considered relevant aspects of situation assessment. Specific attention is 
paid to the anticipation of situational outcomes. The review is divided into four 
subsections:  
1. Situation assessment in dynamic domains. This subsection (a) introduces the major 
approaches that have addressed situation assessment in dynamic domains (e.g., 
recognition-primed decision making, Klein, 1989; situation awareness, Endsley, 
1995a); (b) describes their conceptualizations of situation assessment; and (c) reviews 
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the associated evidence for skill-based differences in situation assessment. 
Additionally, this subsection points out that situation assessment can be viewed as a 
process of hypothesis generation—a notion that is subsequently explored in greater 
detail.  
2. Hypothesis generation in ill-defined problems. This subsection reviews research that 
demonstrates the utility of hypothesis generation tasks for understanding situation 
assessment. As relatively few empirical studies have examined hypothesis generation 
in naturalistic settings, this section focuses on studies that investigated hypothesis 
generation using text-based descriptions of ill-defined problems (e.g., automobile 
troubleshooting, Mehle, 1982). Aspects of hypothesis generation relevant to situation 
assessment in dynamic situations—such as the number of hypotheses generated and 
factors that stimulate the generation of new hypotheses—are highlighted.  
3. Perceptual anticipation. This subsection (a) describes the concept of perceptual 
anticipation as future-oriented situation assessment in dynamic environments, (b) 
defines the scope of perceptual anticipation for the current study, and (c) reviews 
evidence for skilled perceptual anticipation in complex, time-constrained domains. 
The final part of this section considers theoretically-motivated investigations of skill-
based differences in perceptual anticipation, one of which employed a hypothesis 
generation task to test predictions derived from the recognition-primed decision 
making model (Klein & Peio, 1989).  
In Chapter 3, research is reviewed on the response generation/selection phase of 
decision making. This chapter is structured similarly to Chapter 2, which addressed 
situation assessment. The emphasis is on the processes involved in generating and 
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selecting, or deciding on, an appropriate course of action (rather than the extent to which 
an individual implements a chosen course of action effectively). The review consists of 
four subsections: 
1. Response generation/selection tasks to examine perceptual-cognitive expertise. This 
subsection reviews studies that have employed response selection tasks to examine 
the underlying cognitive abilities that support superior performance. These studies 
typically focus on the quality of the selected response, rather than on the options that 
may have been generated prior to response selection.  
2. Response generation in ill-defined problems. To complement the review of 
hypothesis generation in complex domains, this subsection reviews empirical research 
that has investigated response or “act” generation in ill-defined problems (e.g., 
Gettys, Pliske, Manning, & Casey, 1987). The review of these studies will highlight 
findings that inform a general understanding of processes involved in generating and 
selecting a course of action. 
3. Empirical studies of response-option generation in complex and dynamic domains. 
This subsection reviews empirical research that has employed response option 
generation tasks to investigate skilled performance in complex and/or dynamic 
domains (e.g., Klein, Wolf, Militello, & Zsambok, 1995; Raab & Johnson, 2007). 
These studies typically suggest that decision makers generate “options” during 
response using a strategy that is consistent with the recognition-primed decision 
making model (Klein, 1989) and the Take-The-First heuristic (Johnson & Raab, 
2003). 
4. Option generation/selection in the situation assessment and response phases of 
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decision making. This subsection reviews studies that have examined, specifically, 
the relationship between the options generated during situation assessment and those 
generated during response. Although there are relatively few studies that have 
examined this relationship in dynamic situations, one of the studies reviewed in this 
section is particularly relevant, as it focused on situation assessment and response in 
law enforcement (Ward, Suss, Eccles, Williams, & Harris, 2011). Using verbal report 
data, Ward et al. found that during both phases of decision making, options were 
generated using a strategy consistent with long-term working memory theory 
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). Furthermore, Ward et al. found that option generation in 
assessment and response interacted to produce a successful outcome.  
  
                                                                                                                                          8 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
SITUATION ASSESSMENT IN DECISION MAKING 
In this chapter, I review literature on situation assessment in dynamic domains, 
and then consider the use of hypothesis generation tasks as a means to understand 
situation assessment. The focus then turns to what has been termed the most interesting 
aspect of situation assessment—perceptual anticipation (see Sulistyawati et al., 2011; 
Suss & Ward, in press). 
Situation Assessment in Dynamic Domains 
In realistic situations, the decision making processes that result in the selection 
and implementation of a response are generally preceded by assessment of the situation 
(Wohl, 1981). In complex and dynamic domains, situation assessment is: 
• A major feature of the recognition-primed decision making (RPD) model (Klein, 
1989; Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986)—a descriptive model of expert 
decision making in naturalistic settings (e.g., firefighting, military command and 
control, neonatal intensive care). The RPD model defines situation assessment as “the 
sense of understanding what is going on during an incident” (Klein, 1989, p. 52), and 
describes how situation assessment is related to response selection. 
• A process referred to in Endsley’s (1995a) model of situation awareness (SA) in 
dynamic decision making. SA, the primary construct of the model, is regarded as an 
individual’s state of knowledge about elements in the environment, and forms a major 
input to decision making. In the SA model, situation assessment is defined as “the 
process of achieving, acquiring, or maintaining SA” (Endsley, 1995a, p. 36); 
additionally, a theoretical model is developed to explain how this process works.  
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• Similar to the concept of sensemaking in naturalistic decision making. In the 
data/frame theory of sensemaking, Klein, Phillips, Rall, and Peluso (2007) defined 
sensemaking as “the deliberate effort to understand events . . . .[that] is typically 
triggered by unexpected changes or other surprises that make us doubt our prior 
understanding” (p. 114). The theory explains the characteristics of sensemaking—
such as its role in guiding response—and describes different types of sensemaking 
activities (e.g., building stories to account for data).   
• Related to the use of situational assessment/probabilities in sport. Ward and Williams 
(2003) proposed a model to explain soccer players’ assessments of evolving patterns 
of play, in which players apply their experience to anticipate possible situational 
outcomes, and then assign probabilities to prioritize the anticipated outcomes in terms 
of their likelihood. According to the model, players’ then use these situational 
probabilities, together with other contextual information, to guide their response.   
The following subsections describe situation assessment in the context of each 
model, and briefly review associated studies that provide evidence of skill in situation 
assessment.  
Situation Assessment in Recognition-Primed Decision Making 
The RPD model (Klein, 1989, 1993; see Mueller, 2009 for a computional 
instantiation) is a descriptive model of expert decision making, based largely on domain 
practitioners’ (e.g., fireground commanders, military commanders) accounts of critical 
decision incidents. According to the RPD model, domain practitioners first use their 
experience to recognize problem situations (e.g., a specific pattern/color of flames of a 
fire in an urban setting) as familiar or typical cases. Once recognized, the situation is 
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assessed by activating additional critical cues, plausible goals, expectations about how 
the situation might develop, and typical response actions. This process of recognition and 
situation assessment provides the operator with an understanding of the situation, and 
leads experienced decision makers to identify a single satisfactory course of action.  
While readers may be most familiar with features of the RPD model that relate to 
the selection of a course of action, such as serial generation/deliberation of response 
options, Klein (1989) clearly distinguishes between generating/deliberating about 
possible states of the world during situation assessment and generating/deliberating about 
response options when formulating a course of action. In this section, the focus is on how 
decision makers understand the state of the world during situation assessment; response-
option generation and selection will be addressed separately, in Chapter 3.  
Regarding situation assessment, the RPD model posits that when environmental 
cues are relatively unambiguous, decision makers quickly develop an understanding or 
“take” on the situation (e.g., there is a fire in the laundry chute). Once initial 
classification (i.e., recognition) has occurred, situation assessment serves to develop an 
elaborated understanding of the specific instance by suggesting potential causes, 
identifying critical aspects to be considered, and highlighting potential future states and 
associated consequences. However, in more complex situations where the initial 
environmental cues are relatively ambiguous, or when new, inconsistent cues become 
available over time, decision makers may generate—either concurrently or serially—
several hypotheses about the state of the world. In these relatively uncertain situations, 
each hypothesis represents a different assessment of the situation. Therefore, when 
several hypotheses are generated, decision makers must deliberate—again, either 
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concurrently or serially—between competing hypotheses in an attempt to settle on a 
single hypothesis that represents the most coherent assessment of the situation. RPD 
research has described specific examples of relatively complex situations in which 
decision makers generated, and then deliberated between several hypotheses during 
situation assessment (e.g., Calderwood, Crandall, & Klein, 1987; Klein, 1989).  
RPD-related descriptions of situation assessment stemmed from research that 
employed retrospective interviews (e.g., critical decision method; Klein, Calderwood, & 
Macgregor, 1989) to examine critical incidents that occurred in naturalistic settings. 
Across a variety of domains, studies that employed the critical decision method have: (a) 
provided numerous examples of skilled situation assessment, (b) revealed critical cues 
used by domain practitioners to inform their interpretation of situations, and (c) identified 
some of the strategies employed by individuals engaged in situation assessment (e.g., 
Brezovic, Klein, & Thordsen, 1990; Calderwood et al., 1987; Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 
1993; Kaempf, Klein, Thordsen, & Wolf, 1996).  
For example, Kaempf et al. (1996) interviewed naval officers who had made 
command-and-control decisions. Across 14 unique incidents, a total of 103 instances of 
situation assessment were identified to accommodate the changing dynamics of the 
situation. Two main situation assessment strategies were identified: feature-matching 
(87% of instances) and story building (12% of instances). Feature-matching was used to 
describe assessments of familiar situations based on cues present in the environment. 
When using this strategy, recognition occurred quickly and did not require further search 
for meaning. Story building, on the other hand, occurred when the available cues were 
insufficient for recognition. In these instances, the decision makers constructed plausible 
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stories (i.e., hypotheses) to connect and bring meaning to a series of cues or events. For 
example, an officer who observed enemy fighter jets circling his ship used information 
regarding their flight paths and radar activities to construct two stories: one where the jets 
were preparing to attack, and the second where the jets were only harassing his ship. 
Based on his assessment of the jets’ activities, the officer concluded that it was more 
likely that they were engaged in harassing maneuvers, and were not preparing to attack 
the ship.  
One limitation associated with retrospective interviews is that generally, decision 
makers report on different critical decision incidents. Therefore, this approach is not well-
suited to examine skill-based differences in situation assessment because situation type 
may be confounded with expertise; expert practitioners may deal with different (e.g., 
more complex) situations than novices. To overcome this limitation, Calderwood, 
Crandall, and Baynes (1990) employed standardized building-fire scenarios to compare 
the situation assessments of urban firefighters with low (M = 4.4 years) and high (M = 
11.0 years) levels of command experience. The scenarios were presented using a series of 
pictorial illustrations that included salient visual cues (e.g., type, size, construction, and 
age of the building) and depicted the development of the situation. Each illustration was 
supplemented with maps, narration, and radio communications. At 3–6 predetermined 
decision points per scenario, participants were asked to verbalize their thoughts out loud. 
Overall, experienced commanders generated proportionally more situation assessment 
statements and deliberated over alternate assessments more frequently than the less-
experienced commanders. Moreover, the experienced commanders produced more 
situation assessment statements than action-related statements, whereas the less-
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experienced commanders produced more action-related statements. The authors 
concluded that situation assessment plays a critical role in skilled decision making.  
In summary, Klein and colleagues have provided a description of situation 
assessment and some evidence for skill-based differences in situation assessment. 
Although such research has highlighted different strategies used when assessing 
situations (i.e., feature matching, story building), the RPD model does not offer a more 
detailed explanation for how situation assessment occurs. It has, however, provided 
evidence that situation assessment is a continuous process that begins with detection of a 
problem, and can involve the generation and subsequent evaluation of alternate 
hypotheses for understanding the situation. The notion of situation assessment as 
hypothesis generation/evaluation has been investigated empirically to examine situation 
assessment in complex, but not strictly dynamic, domains (e.g., Gettys & Fisher, 1979; 
Klein & Peio, 1989). This related research will be considered in greater detail in 
subsequent sections.  
Situation Assessment in the Model of Situation Awareness 
According to Endsley (1995a), situation assessment is defined as “the process of 
achieving, acquiring, or maintaining situation awareness (SA)” (p. 36)—where SA is 
viewed as a state of knowledge or a product of situation assessment. More specifically, 
SA is defined as the “perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space [Level 1 SA], the comprehension of their meaning [Level 2 SA], and the 
projection of their status in the near future [Level 3 SA]” (p. 36).  
Research on SA has typically focused on quantifying this construct within 
operators. The most frequently used measure of SA is the Situation Awareness Global 
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Assessment Technique (SAGAT; Endsley, 1988; 1995b). Prior to administration, an a 
priori, goal-directed task analysis is conducted to identify task-critical situational 
information cues; a series of probe questions related to the three SA levels is then 
formulated to elicit participants’ awareness of those cues (see Stanton, Salmon, Walker, 
Baber, & Jenkins, 2005). In a typical study, participants are engaged in simulated 
scenarios that are “frozen” either at random (e.g., Hogan, Pace, Hapgood, & Boone, 
2006) or at critical points (e.g., Hogg, Follesø, Strand-Volden, & Torralba, 1995). At the 
freeze points, participants respond to several text-based SA probes. The simulation is 
then resumed and the procedure repeated until the scenario is complete. Response 
accuracy is measured by comparing the participant’s responses to the state of the 
simulator at the freeze point, and/or by subject-matter expert evaluation. Variants of this 
method have been developed in which the probes are presented without pausing the 
simulator, which also permit response time to be recorded (e.g., Situation Present 
Assessment Method; Durso et al., 1998). 
Although high levels of SA are considered necessary for skilled performance 
(Endsley, 2006), a search of the literature revealed few studies that examined skill-based 
differences in SA using actual domain practitioners. Moreover, researchers have often (a) 
reported a global rather than level-specific SA score (e.g., Hogan et al., 2006), (b) not 
clearly specified which levels are included in the global measure (e.g., Jones & Endsley, 
2000), or (c) have not reported results for all three SA levels (e.g., Endsley, 1995b, 
studies 1 and 2; Strybel, Minakata, Nguyen, Pierce, & Vu, 2009). The following review 
of studies that have examined expert–novice differences in SA describes findings that 
relate to levels 1 and 2 SA (i.e., perception and comprehension); findings related to skill-
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based differences in level 3 SA (i.e., projection) are addressed later, in the section on 
perceptual anticipation, along with other research that has focused on the future-oriented 
aspects of situation assessment.  
Randel et al. (1996) used the SAGAT to assess the SA of 28 naval electronic 
warfare technicians. The technicians interacted with a high fidelity computer simulation, 
in which they observed, identified, and responded to radar signals emitted from 
potentially hostile sources. At two freeze points, technicians were asked to draw, from 
memory, the location and status (i.e., friendly, enemy) of emitters. After the scenario 
ended, the technicians answered questions about the threats they had observed, and their 
own ship’s disposition (e.g., speed, prevailing weather conditions). Post-hoc, an objective 
measure of task performance was used to classify the technicians as novices (n = 6), 
intermediates (n = 13), or experts (n = 9). The experts (M = 83%) were significantly 
better at recalling emitters than the intermediates (M = 69%), who were, in turn, 
significantly better than the novices (M = 46%). The experts also responded correctly to 
more questions about the threats they had encountered than the intermediates and the 
novices. Finally, the experts (M = 4.8 points) were significantly better at answering 
questions about their own ship’s disposition than the intermediates (M = 3.4) and the 
novices (M = 3.0). The authors concluded that experts developed a better model of the 
situation than novices, and were better at assessing the situation from a tactical 
perspective.  
Strater et al. (2001) measured the SA of army officers using the SAGAT and a 
subjective measure of SA—the Situation Awareness Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale 
(SABARS). Seven skilled platoon leaders (i.e., captains) and seven novices (i.e., 
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lieutenants with no platoon leader experience) completed computer-based military 
scenarios. Each officer performed the role of platoon leader, and deployed their forces to 
achieve prescribed mission objectives. SA was measured using the SAGAT at three 
predetermined points in two scenarios. At the freeze points, participants responded to 
SAGAT probe questions, including: (a) Which enemy locations are the strongest? (b) 
Which enemy element is your highest-level threat? and (c) Which friendly forces are 
currently exposed to enemy fire/attack? At the end of each scenario, a retired infantry 
officer—who had been playing the role of the commanding officer in the scenarios—
rated the participant’s performance using the SABARS (20 items). An analysis of the 
participants’ SAGAT responses revealed that the skilled platoon leaders were 
significantly better than the novices at locating enemy troops and their own platoon, and 
at identifying the locations of the strongest enemy and the highest-level threat. The 
novices were significantly better at identifying the location of other friendly forces. A 
factor analysis of the rater’s SABARS data identified four factors that accounted for 67% 
of the variance in the 20 items. Skilled platoon leaders were rated as significantly better 
than novices on two of these factors: gathering information and following procedures, 
and focusing on the big picture. The authors concluded that the skilled platoon leaders 
had better comprehension of the threats posed by enemy forces, and suggested that 
training novices to focus on specific types of cues could lead to improved SA. 
To explain how SA is produced, Endsley (1995a; see also Durso, Rawson, & 
Girotto, 2007) specified Kintsch’s (1988; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) construction-
integration model as the mechanism that underlies situation assessment. In the 
construction-integration model, a constantly updated representation of the current 
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situation is formed—termed a situation model—by integrating situation-specific 
knowledge in long term memory with information currently available in the environment. 
An up-to-date situation model is a dynamic representation that includes the current state 
of the world in terms of the decision maker’s goals, and incorporates the temporal and 
dynamic aspects of the situation (e.g., how fast/slow the situation is developing, and what 
might happen in the future) (Endsley, 2000).  
In summary, the SA model describes situation assessment as a comprehension-
based process, and related research has focused largely on measuring the products of this 
process. Although the concept of SA is popular in human factors research (Durso & 
Sethumadhavan, 2008), only two studies were found that directly addressed the 
relationship between skill level and situational understanding in dynamic domains. Both 
studies assessed SA in adversarial tasks and found that skilled (i.e., better performing, 
more experienced) domain practitioners developed a more comprehensive understanding 
of the situation, especially with respect to their adversaries.  
Although much of the research related to situation assessment in complex and 
dynamic domains stems from the RPD and SA research traditions, studies from other, 
complementary perspectives also address skilled situation assessment. The next section 
presents two additional examples—one from the sensemaking literature, and the other 
related to perceptual-cognitive skill in sport. These studies provide examples of situation 
assessment under more temporally constrained conditions.  
Situation Assessment in Other Complex and Dynamic Domains 
Sensemaking has been defined as “…a motivated, continuous effort to understand 
connections (which can be among people, places, and events) in order to anticipate their 
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trajectories and act effectively” (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006, p. 71). In a study that 
investigated skill-based differences in situation assessment from the sensemaking 
perspective, Zimmerman (2008) examined how police officers assessed a dynamic 
traffic-stop incident. Fifteen novice (i.e., 1-3 years of experience) and 15 experienced 
(i.e., 7-30 years of experience) police officers viewed video footage of an actual traffic-
stop incident. The video depicted a dangerous, escalating situation in which the officer in 
the video questioned the occupants of a vehicle, and subsequently one of the occupants 
produced a gun. The event culminated with the officer shooting one of the occupants. The 
video was presented in four segments, and participants were instructed to observe the 
occupants’ behavior and the officer’s actions. After each segment, participants answered 
a series of questions about what they thought was happening on-screen, the cues they had 
attended to, and the appropriateness of the officer’s actions. Participants’ responses were 
coded using an inductive coding scheme. An analysis of the data revealed that the 
experienced officers referred to and interpreted more danger cues (e.g., the driver’s 
fidgeting hands), made more interpretations about the current situation, and made more 
predictions about impending events than the novice officers.  
To explain how sensemaking occurs in surprising and anomalous events, Klein et 
al. (2007) proposed that data (i.e., cues) are interpreted using frames—explanatory 
structures that connect the data in plausible ways—and described several types of 
sensemaking activities. These activities, which are assumed to be conscious processes, 
include the comparison of multiple frames to determine the best match to the data, and 
changing frames when the existing frame is no longer adequate to explain the data. Note 
the similarity between these generative and evaluative activities and the concurrent and 
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serial evaluation of hypotheses described in the RPD model. Zimmerman (2008) 
presented evidence that participants used a variety of sensemaking activities to process 
information while observing the traffic-stop incident. For example, some participants 
initially observed that the vehicle’s occupants were nervous, and hypothesized that the 
occupants were trying to hide a relatively minor crime (e.g., an unpaid traffic ticket). 
However, as the incident progressed and the occupants became even more nervous, 
participants generated an alternate hypothesis to explain the occupants’ unusual behavior 
(e.g., the occupants were hiding something in the vehicle). Subsequently, when the 
occupants provided contradictory stories about drug paraphernalia that the officer found 
in the vehicle, participants typically abandoned their previous hypotheses and generated a 
different hypothesis to account for the available cues (e.g., the occupants were 
transporting a large quantity of illegal drugs). Once participants realized the seriousness 
of the situation, they generated predictions about what the occupants might do next (e.g., 
try to escape or try to harm the officer). This example demonstrates that in rapidly 
evolving incidents, situation assessment is an ongoing process that involves constructing 
an up-to-date understanding of the current situation based on cues available in the 
environment. Once a coherent understanding has been achieved, situation assessment can 
facilitate the prediction of impending events.  
In fast-paced team invasion sports (e.g., soccer), players must assess the opposing 
team’s developing pattern of play when considering their own defensive or attacking 
options. This type of situation assessment was originally referred to as the “use of 
situational probabilities” (Ward & Williams, 2003, p. 96). From this perspective, 
situation assessment involves the ability to prioritize revelant information, disregard 
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irrelevant information, and identify meaningful patterns of cues in the environment. Ward 
and Williams investigated how skill level and age affected situation assessment in a 
cross-sectional sample of soccer players (n = 137) aged between 9-17 years. Elite 
participants were players who trained for, and competed regularly in high-level national 
competition; sub-elite participants played only recreationally or at school level. 
Approximately 14 elite and 14 sub-elite participants were recruited from each of five age 
groups: 9 years and younger (U-9), U-11, U-13, U-15, and U-17. Participants viewed 
short video clips of attacking soccer play, filmed from the perspective of the defending 
team. Each clip ended approximately 120 ms prior to the attacking player in possession 
of the ball passing to a teammate. At this point, participants highlighted the key attacking 
players who were in position to receive the ball, and ranked the highlighted attackers in 
terms of the threat they posed to the defense. Participants’ responses were compared to 
those selected by a panel of expert coaches. Dependent variables were (a) the percentage 
of key players identified correctly, (b) the percentage of non-key players who were 
identified incorrectly as key players, and (c) a threat-ranking score that was determined 
by the number of correct matches to the coaches’ rankings.  
An analysis of the data revealed that skill groups used different strategies. As the 
age of participants increased from 13 to 18 years of age, elite players primarily reduced 
the number of non-key players they identified as threatening, having identified more key 
players than the sub-elite group from an early age (i.e. 9 years of age). In contrast, while 
the sub-elite players eventually caught up to the elite players by 13 years of age in terms 
of the number of key players highlighted, they did not make a meaningful reduction in 
the number of non-key players identified as age increased. Moreover, while both groups 
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increased their ability to prioritize the threats posed by key attacking players between the 
ages of 9 and 15, the elite group was consistently better at prioritizing threats at each age. 
From these findings, the authors concluded that elite participants were more accurate at 
assessing the situation than sub-elite participants, and that this difference was evident 
from an early age.  
To explain elite players’ superior situation assessment, Ward and Williams (2003) 
(see also McRobert, Ward, Eccles, & Williams, 2011; Ward, 2002) proposed that over 
time, skilled individuals develop extensive, detailed, and domain-specific knowledge 
representations (i.e., prototypical patterns of attacking soccer play) that are stored in 
long-term memory (see also McPherson, 1999). These authors proposed that, to facilitate 
access to these representations in time-constrained situations, skilled individuals develop 
long-term working memory skills (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) that allow for the efficient 
retrieval of knowledge from long-term memory. In parallel to Endsley’s interpretation of 
SA, they proposed that in dynamic situations, skilled individuals then construct up-to-
date situation models (Kintsch, 1988) by integrating contextual information from the 
environment (e.g., the positions and movements of attacking players) with their stored 
knowledge representations. The situation model, therefore, contains situation-specific, 
contextualized knowledge that highlights and prioritizes salient cues while omitting 
irrelevant cues, resulting in accurate situation assessment.  
 Thus far, the overview of situation assessment in dynamic domains has 
demonstrated that the notion of understanding complex situations has informed several 
approaches to the study of skilled performance. However, approaches have varied in their 
conceptualization of situation assessment, which has been described as a set of processes 
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which lead to understanding, and as the state of understanding itself. Additionally, 
situation assessment has been viewed both as something that is necessary only when a 
problem has been detected (e.g., RPD and sensemaking models), and as an ongoing 
monitoring process during routine situations that aids in the detection of problems or 
anomalies (e.g., situation awareness model). These differences are, in part, a product of 
perspective. The RPD model addresses both the situation assessment and response 
components of decision making, often in relation to specific critical or problem incidents. 
Therefore, apart from identifying critical cues used in situation assessment, the RPD 
approach has tried to determine how meaning is constructed in a given situation. SA, on 
the other hand, focuses primarily on the situation assessment component of decision 
making, often in relation to continuous tasks, such as flying, air traffic control, military 
command and control, and electronic warfare. The emphasis in the SA research has been 
on determining the extent to which an individual is situationally aware—or in other 
words, the quantification of SA. This measurement-based approach has been used 
primarily to evaluate display designs and to assess the efficacy of training programs; in 
comparison to these applications, it has only infrequently been used to examine skilled 
situation assessment. 
The exemplar studies related to RPD, SA, sensemaking, and perceptual-cognitive 
skill in sport established that skill level and experience affect the quality of situation 
assessment in complex and dynamic domains—the more experienced practitioners 
developed more accurate and comprehensive interpretations of the situation. Recall that 
the RPD model (Klein, 1989) introduced the notion that when decision makers assess 
relatively complex and uncertain situations, they generate and evaluate hypotheses about 
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the state of the world. A number of researchers interested in understanding how people 
make sense of complex, but not necessarily dynamic, problems have employed 
hypothesis generation tasks as a way to understand the situation assessment process. The 
next section focuses on the utility of hypothesis generation as a tool for investigating 
situation assessment.  
Hypothesis Generation in Ill-Defined Problems 
In complex situations with high levels of information uncertainty (i.e., ambiguous 
cues), decision makers often need to engage in hypothesis generation and evaluation in 
order to settle on a coherent situation assessment (Wohl, 1981). Hypothesis generation 
tasks have been used as a tool for understanding how people assess ill-defined problems. 
This subsection reviews such research to demonstrate the utility of hypothesis generation 
tasks as a method for investigating situation assessment, and highlights findings that are 
relevant to situation assessment in dynamic situations, including (a) conditions that lead 
to new hypotheses being generated, (b) the number of hypotheses generated for a 
problem, and (c) evaluation of alternative hypotheses. This review will focus on studies 
in which participants had to generate their own hypotheses about ill-defined problems—
which closely parallels the generation of hypotheses in naturalistic environments. Studies 
in which participants selected hypotheses from pre-specified lists (i.e., provided by 
researchers) are less representative of situation assessment in the natural ecology, and 
therefore are not considered here. 
Gettys and Fisher (1979) observed that in ill-defined problem situations such as 
medical diagnosis, multiple hypotheses (e.g., diagnoses) were generated in response to 
the available information (e.g., medical test results), and that a set of hypotheses could 
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change in size and/or content when new information became available. This is analogous 
to situation assessment in dynamic domains, where relevant cues are likely to become 
available (or be perceived) in a sequential manner over time. Based on work by Shiffrin 
(1970) and Newell and Simon (1972), Gettys and Fisher assumed that hypotheses are 
generated via a recursive memory search that is directed and controlled by an executive 
process. They proposed that assessments of hypothesis plausibility acted as inputs to the 
executive process and determined whether hypothesis generation should continue, or be 
terminated. Consequently, they predicted that when the plausibility of the correct 
hypothesis being contained within a set of hypotheses is low, at least one new hypothesis 
should be generated that better explains the available information.  
Forty-two undergraduate students were presented with lists of six words, one 
word at a time. For example, one list—beef, fish, aerospace industry, citrus fruit, tourists, 
and Cypress—contained products and industries associated with the state of Florida. In 
this problem, Florida was the target (i.e., to-be-generated) state but the first three words 
were also consistent with an alternate state—Texas. After being presented with the word 
“beef,” participants were asked to generate plausible target states (e.g., Texas, Missouri, 
Nebraska). Next, participants assigned likelihood ratings to each state in their set; 100 
points were assigned to the state they believed was most likely to produce “beef”, and 
then relative likelihood ratings were assigned to the remaining states. Following this, 
participants were presented with the next word: “fish.” They then estimated the 
plausibility (scale: 0-100) that any of their initial set of states could be consistent with 
both words (i.e., “beef” and “fish”). After providing this plausibility estimate, participants 
updated their set of plausible target states for “beef” and “fish” by adding/dropping states 
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to/from their initial set. This procedure was then repeated for the remaining words in the 
list; each participant was presented with three lists. The main dependent variables were 
the plausibility estimates for each hypothesis set, and the likelihood ratings for each 
hypothesis (e.g., state) in the set. The plausibility data revealed that as new words from 
the list were introduced, rather than generating hypotheses at a constant rate for each new 
word, participants were three times more likely to generate new hypotheses when their 
plausibility estimates decreased, compared to when their plausibility estimates increased. 
An analysis of the likelihood ratings revealed that 90% of new hypotheses generated in 
response to the second through sixth list words were rated at least 50% as likely as the 
most likely hypothesis—evidence that participants were not simply guessing or padding 
their hypothesis sets with low-likelihood hypotheses. The authors suggested that these 
data were consistent with use of a heuristic, whereby new hypotheses are only added to 
the hypothesis set if they are strong alternatives to the existing best hypothesis. Although 
participants in this study were prompted (i.e., by the researchers) to evaluate their 
hypothesis sets, the findings suggest that in situations that evolve over time, newly 
perceived information is evaluated in relation to the existing situation assessment(s); an 
alternate hypothesis is then likely to be generated only if the existing situation 
assessment(s) cannot adequately explain all of the available information. 
In a study that was mainly exploratory in nature, Mehle (1982) investigated skill-
based differences in hypothesis generation in an ill-defined task. Based on common sense 
rather than a particular theory or empirical precedent, Mehle expected that skilled 
individuals would generate more hypotheses than less-skilled individuals. Six experts 
(i.e., experienced automobile mechanics) and six novices (i.e., undergraduate students) 
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were presented with text-based descriptions of five automobile problems. For example, 
one problem included the following information: “The car is American with an eight 
cylinder engine and an automatic transmission; it is two years old and due for a tune up. 
The problem is that the car refuses to start. The engine turns over and there is a gas 
smell” (Mehle, 1982, p. 93).  Participants thought aloud while generating all plausible 
hypotheses (i.e., causes) for each problem, and then indicated the probability (scale: 0–
100) that their hypothesis set contained the true (i.e., actual) hypothesis. Overall, experts 
and novices did not differ significantly in the number of hypotheses generated for each 
problem (Mexperts = 3.36, Mnovices = 3.43) or in their assessments of plausibility (Mexperts = 
0.675, Mnovices = 0.692). On average, each participant generated only 19% of the entire 
(i.e., pooled) list of hypotheses generated by all participants. The only skill-based 
difference noted was that the experts generated hypotheses that were more specific than 
those generated by the novices. Note, however, that the quality (i.e., accuracy) of 
hypotheses was not addressed in this study. The findings suggest that in ill-defined 
situations, rather than generating a large set comprising all possible hypotheses, 
individuals interpret the available information in a way that constrains the number of 
hypotheses generated. Mehle suggested that generating only a small number of 
hypotheses might be an adaptation designed to cope with limited working memory 
capacity (see also Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008).    
In ambiguous situations, such as those that can occur in medical diagnosis, the 
number and type of hypotheses generated may also be influenced by the base rates of the 
plausible, underlying disorders. Weber, Böckenholt, Hilton, and Wallace (1993) 
predicted that hypotheses consistent with higher base-rate disorders would be generated 
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more frequently, and would be rated as more likely, than hypotheses consistent with 
lower base-rate disorders. Eighty-four doctors read brief, written descriptions of three 
general-practice cases that contained cues related to one high and one low base-rate 
diagnosis; in all cases, the high base-rate diagnosis was associated with less severe 
clinical consequences than the low base-rate diagnosis. After reading the description, the 
doctors generated plausible hypotheses (i.e., diagnoses), which they then ranked in order 
of likelihood. On average, the doctors generated four hypotheses per case. Hypotheses 
consistent with the high base-rate diagnosis were generated more frequently than the low 
base-rate diagnosis (96% versus 70% of trials, respectively). Hypotheses consistent with 
the high base-rate diagnosis were also ranked as the most likely more frequently than 
those consistent with the low base-rate diagnosis (74% versus 8%, respectively).  
The authors concluded that while the doctors were sensitive to base rate 
information (i.e., listed hypotheses consistent with the high-base rate diagnosis first), they 
typically generated at least one low base-rate (but high-severity) hypothesis in their set. 
The authors suggested that this strategy—of considering at least one severe outcome—
could benefit patients by reducing doctors’ chances of missing a relatively harmful 
disorder. A similar strategy may also be adopted by decision makers in other domains. 
For example, a police officer dealing with a suspect who presents a low level of threat 
(e.g., complies with the officer’s commands) may nonetheless consider the possibility 
that the suspect could become violent—even if the officer believes there is a low 
likelihood of this occurring. Doing so may serve to prime an officer’s response, should 
the suspect actually turn violent. Therefore, when asking police officers to generate 
hypotheses about dynamic law enforcement situations, eliciting likelihood and threat 
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ratings for each hypothesis may be useful in discriminating between different types of 
hypotheses (e.g., low likelihood/high threat versus high likelihood/low threat).  
To summarize, the studies that examined hypothesis generation using text-based 
descriptions of ill-defined problems demonstrated the utility of hypothesis generation as a 
tool for examining situation assessment, and informed our understanding of situation 
assessment in several ways. First, the studies found that individuals generated relatively 
few hypotheses—often less than five—when assessing problem situations. This suggests 
that when assessing a given situation, rather than generating all possible alternative 
explanations, individuals generate only those hypotheses they believe to be most relevant 
(or have the most utility). Second, there is evidence that as more information becomes 
available, individuals update their hypothesis sets by generating new hypotheses that are 
consistent with the totality of the information, and/or dropping unlikely or inconsistent 
hypotheses from their current set. In some situations, however, individuals may benefit 
from retaining at least one low-likelihood (but high-severity) hypothesis. Third, the 
studies by Gettys and Fisher (1979) and Weber et al. (1993) suggest that likelihood is at 
least one dimension by which hypotheses can be ranked, and that likelihood ratings may 
be useful in understanding an individual’s hypothesis generation strategy. The next 
section focuses on what is, arguably, the most interesting aspect of situation awareness—
the ability to predict situational outcomes.  
Perceptual Anticipation 
This section addresses the notion of prediction in dynamic domains, and identifies 
key aspects that will inform the study of skilled performance in law enforcement. It 
begins by providing a brief overview of some constructs related to prediction, and in 
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particular perceptual anticipation, that have been used to assess skilled performance. As 
different terms have been used to describe related phenomena, care is taken to define the 
scope of the term “perceptual anticipation.” Next, evidence of skilled perceptual 
anticipation in three dynamic domains is presented. Rather than provide an exhaustive 
review, the aim here is to demonstrate the relevance of perceptual anticipation for skilled 
perceptual-motor performance, and to emphasize the methods that have been used to 
measure it.  
Perceptual Anticipation: Related Constructs 
When the concept of situation awareness (SA) first emerged in human factors, it 
was used in the context of a “dog fight” between aviation fighter pilots, where one aviator 
tried to “get inside the head of the other”—to predict what their opponent might do 
next—as a means to gain a tactical advantage (R. Hoffman, personal communication). 
Although my intention is not to address the debate over definitions of SA, this early 
definition placed the emphasis close to the position that skilled prediction provides a 
good opportunity for investigating expertise. Using simple laboratory tasks to investigate 
the role of prediction in skilled action, Poulton (1957) coined the term perceptual 
anticipation to refer to the ability to predict the future state of a situation in order to 
coordinate and adjust an appropriate response relative to that future state. Such judgments 
are made, for instance, when the future trajectory or position of a target is not prescribed 
but could be determined from experience or based on statistical properties of the 
environment. 
Poulton’s (1957) definition of perceptual anticipation was primarily concerned 
with situations in which an in-event, adaptive response was required based on changes in 
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the immediate environment (e.g., tracking a target to a predictable location). In this 
dissertation, this definition is extended to include predictions made in situ while adapting 
to dynamic changes in complex environmental events, including when those adaptations 
actively change the environment. Henceforth, the term perceptual anticipation is used as 
a unifying concept to refer to the ability to generate real-time, mental projections about 
how a situation may unfold in the immediate or very near future (e.g., seconds). Although 
some researchers have reserved the term mental projection to refer, primarily, to a 
process in which individuals engage to “figure out” how events could unfold or if a 
course of action might work (e.g., Klein, 1989), one of the main arguments of this 
dissertation is that mental projection can occur “on-the-fly”—in the form of perceptual 
anticipation of situational events—and does not necessarily require individuals to take a 
“time out” to do it (see Kintsch, 1988; Poulton, 1957). 
Although most expertise researchers have focused on aspects of expertise other 
than perceptual anticipation (e.g., memory), the literature is replete with examples of 
skilled performers employing this skill to great effect. For instance, expert pilots have 
been shown to “fly ahead of the plane” (e.g., Doane, Sohn, & Jodlowski, 2004), advanced 
drivers anticipate hazards in the road ahead (e.g., McKenna & Horswill, 1999), athletes 
are highly skilled at “reading the game” (see Williams & Ward, 2007), and police officers 
can anticipate perpetrators’ actions before they occur (Ward et al., 2011). Data from this 
research suggest that superior performers routinely think ahead— in a mode that might be 
called direct apprehension (in contrast with deliberative reasoning)—about what is going 
to happen next. Importantly, they make use of this information to guide their behavior. 
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A number of phenomena related to perceptual anticipation have been studied in 
complex domains under various guises, such as anticipation, anticipatory thinking, 
foresight, hazard perception, prediction, and projection. Each construct has stressed, to 
varying degrees, the importance of perceptual anticipation as a precursor to generating 
courses of action and/or as part of the perception-action cycle (Neisser, 1976; Smith & 
Hancock, 1995). The following subsections review key methods that have been used to 
investigate perceptual anticipation, highlighting how these approaches have informed our 
understanding of the role of perceptual anticipation in skilled performance. 
Perceptual Anticipation in Complex Domains 
While anticipating an opponent’s next move has been an integral part of military 
stratagem since Sun Tzu’s Art of War (Tzu, trans. 1983), in modern times, de Groot 
(1965) was among the first to study the perceptual-cognitive basis of predicting an 
opponent’s intentions using scientific methods. In his seminal research, de Groot used a 
move-selection paradigm as a means to study expert thinking in chess, where expert 
chess players were asked to select their next best move based on the current configuration 
of chess pieces. Compared to less-skilled players, experts chose better moves for 
themselves. Although players did not differ in the depth of their search, experts 
considered higher quality moves in more detail through a process of progressive 
deepening. While subsequent research focused on the debate between recognition and 
search as a mechanism supporting personal move selection (Chabris & Hearst, 2003; 
Gobet & Simon, 1996b), de Groot’s research also highlighted that experts progressively 
deepened their search for better moves in plies (e.g., potential moves for oneself and 
predicted countermoves of their opponent).  
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Quite apart from chess, perceptual anticipation has been investigated as part of 
several distinct research traditions, each approaching the construct from different, yet 
equally informative perspectives. Next, I review research in three main areas: anticipation 
in sport, prediction-specific components of situation awareness in dynamic domains (e.g., 
air traffic control), and hazard perception in driving. Studies in these domains have 
examined perceptual anticipation in complex tasks, where individuals work to achieve 
goals within a limited time window. In light of the dearth of studies related specifically to 
law enforcement, studies in these areas will provide evidence for the relationship between 
perceptual anticipation and skilled performance, and highlight the methods used to 
examine perceptual anticipation in dynamic and complex environments. 
Perceptual anticipation in sport. The study of anticipation skill in a dynamic 
context has a rich history in the sports-expertise and -training literature (e.g., Abernethy, 
1987; Haskins, 1965; for a review see Williams & Ward, 2007). In many sports, 
performers have a very limited time in which to initiate a response. For example, in 1-
player versus 1-player situations in fast ball sports (e.g., tennis serve, soccer penalty kick, 
baseball pitch), to ensure a successful interception of the ball, players are often forced to 
anticipate the outcome of their opponent’s action by interpreting the probabilistic postural 
cues of the opposing player that are available prior to the ball leaving their opponent’s 
racket/bat/limb. Initiating a response after this “contact” point and when other more 
deterministic and confirmatory cues are also available (i.e., ball flight trajectory), on 
average, results in insufficient time to react and intervene successfully (see Williams, 
Davids, & Williams, 1999). 
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In individual and team sport settings, researchers have often used a temporal 
occlusion paradigm to investigate skilled anticipation. For example, Abernethy (1990) 
investigated the extent to which skill level affected squash players’ ability to perceptually 
anticipate the direction and force of an opponent’s squash strokes. Ten skilled (i.e., state-
ranked) and 15 novice (i.e., non-competitive) squash players viewed video simulations, 
taken from a first-person perspective, of an opposing player hitting strokes from different 
positions on the court. The video stimuli were occluded at one of five occlusion points: 
160 or 80ms prior to racket/ball contact, at racket/ball contact, 80 ms after racket/ball 
contact, or after the stroke was completed. Participants observed the stimuli and, at the 
point of occlusion, were required to verbalize both the direction (i.e., down the line/cross 
court) and force (i.e., long/short) of the stroke. Overall, the skilled players were 
significantly more accurate in anticipating the direction and force of strokes, compared to 
the less-skilled players. Further analysis of the data revealed that skilled players’ used 
both early (i.e., between 160 ms and 80 ms prior to racket/ball contact) and late (i.e., 
between 80 ms after contact and stroke completion) cues to anticipate shot direction, 
while less-skilled players were only able to make use of the late cues. These findings 
suggest that the skilled players were attuned to important cues in the environment, which 
they used to perceptually anticipate their opponent’s actions.  
Perceptual anticipation in sport has also been investigated using a reaction time 
paradigm. For example, Williams, Ward, Knowles, and Smeeton (2002) investigated the 
extent to which skill level affected tennis players’ ability to perceptually anticipate tennis 
ground strokes. Eight skilled tennis players with tournament experience and 8 
recreational tennis players (i.e., with no tournament experience) viewed video 
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simulations, taken from a first-person perspective, of an opposing tennis player hitting a 
groundstroke to one of four locations on the court. Participants held a tennis racket and 
began each trial standing on two pressure-sensitive pads. They then viewed the video 
stimuli on a projection screen and simulated their return shot by stepping to intercept the 
shot and swinging their racket. The video was occluded when participants lifted a foot 
from one of the pressure-sensitive pads, and reaction time was measured from the start of 
the clip until the point of occlusion. Anticipation accuracy was determined by whether 
the direction of participants’ movement (i.e., laterally left/right, directly 
forwards/backwards) corresponded with the actual destination of the opponent’s 
simulated groundstroke. Analysis of the data revealed that while skilled and less-skilled 
players did not differ significantly in the accuracy of their anticipations (68.4% versus 
64.5% correct, respectively), the skilled players reacted significantly faster (by 
approximately 140 ms) than the less-skilled players. Analysis of eye movement data 
collected during the trials revealed that skilled players fixated longer on central cues 
related to the trunk/hip and head/shoulder regions, while the less-skilled players fixated 
longer on more proximal cues, including the racket and the ball. This suggests that skilled 
players have developed visual search strategies that enable them to focus on briefly-
available postural cues that are displayed earlier in their opponent’s movement.  
In team game settings, where multiple players interact to produce a coordinated 
outcome, patterns of cues generated by the coordinated movements of multiple players 
are also used to anticipate the outcome of the play. For instance, Williams and Davids 
(1998) created video simulations of 3 versus 3-player soccer plays, filmed from the 
perspective of a fourth, rear defender. Each simulation ended with one of the three 
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attacking players either passing to another attacker on his left or right side, dribbling 
straight toward the rear defender, or shooting at goal (i.e., over the defender’s head).  
First, using a reaction time paradigm similar to that employed by Williams et al. (2002) 
for tennis, skilled and less-skilled soccer players anticipated the direction of the attacker’s 
play. As in the tennis study, while the two groups did not differ significantly in their 
anticipation accuracy, the skilled soccer players initiated their movement significantly 
earlier than the less-skilled players. However, it was not clear whether the skilled players 
were relying more on the postural cues of the player with the ball, or on the actions and 
movements of the other players.  
To examine which cues were more important for anticipation in multi-player 
situations, Williams and Davids (1998) conducted a subsequent experiment using a 
spatial occlusion paradigm. Two versions of the 3 player versus 3 player simulations 
were created by editing the original videos. In one version, a black mask was used to 
occlude everything except for the player with the ball. In the other version, all six players 
were visible. Skilled and less-skilled players viewed masked and unmasked stimuli and 
anticipated the direction of the attacker’s play. Analysis of the reaction time data revealed 
that skilled players reacted faster than the less-skilled players in both occlusion 
conditions. However, skilled players’ anticipation accuracy was significantly degraded 
when information about the other players was occluded, while less-skilled players’ 
accuracy did not differ significantly across the occlusion conditions.  These data suggest 
that skilled players are able to anticipate the intentions of the player with the ball, based 
not only on the postural cues of that player alone but also on the actions and movements 
of other players who form an integral part of the emerging pattern of play. When critical 
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cues are removed from the display, expert anticipation is degraded toward more novice-
like performance (for a review see Williams & Ward, 2007). 
Collectively, the research in sport suggests that mastering the skill of perceptually 
anticipating future events is key to attaining a skilled level of performance in this domain. 
Sports situations that involve interaction with an opponent(s) under constantly evolving 
circumstances are analogous to a range of other societally-relevant situations in which 
highly developed perceptual anticipation is linked to skilled performance. I now review 
how perceptual anticipation has been addressed by researchers in these complementary, 
dynamic domains, under the general guise of situation awareness. 
Projection in dynamic domains. Recall that Endsley’s (1995a) model of 
situation awareness (SA) described the ability of a human actor to anticipate a near future 
state—projection (or level 3 SA)—as the most advanced level of SA. Projection is 
assumed to be built on the lower levels of SA (i.e., perception and comprehension) and to 
precede the decision-making and action components of performance (Endsley, 1995a). 
While the emphasis on projection in SA research has been immensely variable, SA 
probes frequently include questions that allow an assessment of perceptual anticipation 
skill. For instance, Endsley, Sollenberger, Nakata, and Stein (1999) presented air traffic 
controllers with computerized simulations, and using the SAGAT, asked them: (a) Which 
pairs of aircraft will lose separation if they stay on their current (intended) course? (b) 
Which aircraft must be handed off to another sector/facility within the next two minutes? 
(c) Which aircraft will violate special airspace separation standards if they stay on their 
current (intended) paths? and (d) Which aircraft will weather be an impact on in the next 
five minutes along their current course? 
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However, while much research exists, for instance, that compares methods of data 
collection or the effect of display design on SA (e.g., Endsley, 1995b; Endsley et al., 
1999), rather surprisingly, there is a limited amount of research that specifically describes 
the skill-based differences in mental projection and/or the predictive ability of 
experienced/skilled operators. Consequently, despite the use of innovative methods (e.g., 
SAGAT), only a small number of SA-related studies have examined skilled operators’ 
ability to anticipate future states of the system. 
In a study on air traffic control, Durso et al. (1998) examined whether different 
measures of SA and workload could be used as predictors of performance. Experienced 
controllers completed five scenarios; in two of these (one SAGAT, one Situation Present 
Assessment Method) they answered questions about the present (e.g., Which aircraft has 
the lower altitude, aircraft A or aircraft B?) and future (e.g., Will aircraft X and aircraft Y 
be traffic for each other?) state of the system. Workload, and past and present SAGAT 
queries combined to account for 74% of the variance in performance—measured as the 
controller’s efficiency in clearing the airspace. However, their analyses also revealed that 
superior performance was positively associated with the speed and number of correct 
responses to future queries, but negatively related to the number of correct responses to 
present queries. These data suggest that focusing on the future is an important component 
of superior air traffic control performance (but see Durso, Bleckley, & Dattel, 2006). 
In a study that focused on the importance of the projection component of SA, and 
reported these results independently of the global score, Sulistyawati et al. (2011) 
examined experienced fighter pilots’ ability to predict what would happen next in a PC-
based air-combat simulation. Participants were assessed using the SAGAT. The 
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simulation was frozen either 10 seconds after enemy aircraft appeared on radar or when 
the pilot was within 25 nautical miles of enemy aircraft. Immediately after occlusion, 
participants responded to a number of SA probes including two that specifically assessed 
projection: (a) Will you be in a position to take shots at an enemy aircraft in the next 10 
seconds? and (b) Will the enemy aircraft take shots at you within the next 30 seconds? 
The data indicated that participants correctly predicted their own and their enemy’s 
ability to get into a position to shoot 67% of the time, however, the least experienced 
pilots were unable to respond appropriately to either comprehension (i.e., Level 2) or 
projection (i.e., Level 3) assessments. A regression analysis that included each level of 
SA and a measure of overconfidence bias revealed that the ability to project into the 
future, together with less overconfidence, predicted mission performance—the number of 
times the pilots were actually shot at by the enemy aircraft. 
Assessments of SA, including projection, have also been conducted using 
subjective self-report and observer rating scales. In one such study, Matthews and Beal 
(2002) investigated cadet platoon and squad leaders’ SA during a military field training 
exercise. At the conclusion of each exercise, the platoon and squad leaders self-reported 
on their level of SA using the Mission Awareness Rating Scale (Matthews, Beal, & 
Pleban, 2002), and one or two experienced officers or non-commissioned officers rated 
participants’ observable behaviors using the Situation Awareness Behavioral Rating 
Scale (SABARS; Strater et al., 2001). Both scales included a rating of the participants’ 
ability to predict future outcomes. Although the platoon leaders rated themselves as 
significantly better at predicting the outcome of the situation compared to the squad 
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leaders, the experienced observers did not rate platoon and squad leaders differently. 
More objective measures of prediction were not recorded. 
Collectively, SA methods are well-established and, when level 3 probes are used 
and reported separately, are directly applicable to the measurement of perceptual 
anticipation. SA research that has focused specifically on projection in dynamic domains 
indicates that the ability to perceptually anticipate the future status of elements within the 
environment is associated with higher levels of performance, although SA research has 
not delved deeper into phenomena of mental projection on-the-fly. 
Perceptual anticipation has also been examined in automobile driving, where it is 
commonly referred to as hazard perception. Although hazard perception research 
developed quite separately from the research on anticipation in sport and SA in dynamic 
domains, these approaches offer complementary insights into skilled anticipation. Next, I 
briefly review the hazard perception literature, highlighting the methods used to 
investigate perceptual anticipation in driving and noting relevant findings. 
Hazard perception in driving. The ability to perceptually anticipate the 
immediate future state of the world has been studied in the domain of automobile driving 
as a means to understand hazard perception. Hazard perception has generally been 
defined as the ability to “read the road” ahead and to anticipate and identify potentially 
dangerous traffic situations (McKenna & Crick, 1994). It is a useful predictor of accident 
involvement: less-skilled drivers are much more likely to detect hazards late because they 
do not anticipate the road ahead (Horswill & McKenna, 1999; McKenna & Horswill, 
1999; see also Rumar, 1990). 
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A response time paradigm was originally developed to measure hazard perception 
in driving. For instance, McKenna and Crick (1994) developed a hazard perception test in 
which they presented participants with a 30-minute continuous video, comprised of 
sequences of road traffic filmed from a first-person perspective within a car. The video 
contained 35 commonly occurring road hazards to which drivers would have to respond, 
as well as periods where no hazards appeared. While viewing the video, participants 
pressed a response button each time they perceived something that might turn in to a 
dangerous situation. Dangerous situations were defined as those where the participant 
thought an accident or near accident might happen next, and where they considered it 
necessary to take some kind of evasive action (see McKenna, Horswill, & Alexander, 
2006). The results showed that highly experienced police driving instructors (i.e., with 11 
or more years’ driving experience, and who were qualified as Class One Police drivers) 
anticipated the hazards significantly earlier than less-experienced civilian drivers (i.e., 
with 11 or more years’ driving experience) who, in turn, responded earlier than 
inexperienced drivers (i.e., with up to 3 years’ driving experience). Additionally, the 
experienced police driving instructors identified significantly more of the hazardous 
incidents than the inexperienced drivers. These results have been replicated several times 
since the original study (see McKenna & Horswill, 1999; McKenna et al., 2006). 
McGowan and Banbury (2004) adapted McKenna and Crick’s (1994) hazard 
perception test by incorporating the SAGAT to examine the relationship between SA and 
anticipation. Moreover, they examined whether the process of interrupting participants to 
provide SA queries (that included projection probes) affected their ability to anticipate 
the outcome. Throughout the hazard perception video test, which contained 70 hazardous 
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events, participants in an SA query condition were interrupted 32 times when the video 
was paused for 10 seconds while they responded to a multiple-choice SA probe. The 
number of correct responses to SA queries was positively and significantly correlated 
with the ability to anticipate the hazards. Participants in the SA query condition 
anticipated potential hazards on both interrupted and non-interrupted trials approximately 
2 seconds earlier than participants in a control group that anticipated all events without 
interruption. However, on the trials where the SA query group were interrupted, 
participants took slightly (i.e., approx. 0.5 seconds) longer to anticipate hazards 
suggesting that there was a general carry-over effect that benefited anticipation on the 
non-interrupted trials. Although, these authors did not report level 3 SA results or 
examine the relationship between projection and anticipatory performance per se, these 
data provide some preliminary indication that the two measures were convergent in 
identifying anticipation skill. 
Consistent with research on anticipation in other domains, the hazard perception 
research that has assessed skill-based differences in perceptual anticipation indicates that 
skilled drivers are able to predict that dangerous situations are likely to ensue, and are 
better than novices at reading the road ahead (see also McKenna and Horswill, 1999; cf. 
Jackson, Chapman, & Crundall, 2009; Vogel, Kircher, Alm, & Nilsson, 2003). Moreover, 
the available data suggest that when relatively inexperienced drivers are primed to attend 
to aspects of the situation that may develop into hazards, they are better able to anticipate 
dangerous situations (McGowan & Banbury, 2004). 
Overall, the research on anticipation in sport, situation awareness in dynamic 
domains, and hazard perception in driving suggests that perceptual anticipation is an 
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important component of superior performance in complex domains that, similar to law 
enforcement, require decisions to be made in constantly changing and time pressured 
situations. However, while this research described expert–novice differences in 
perceptual anticipation, reasons for these differences were not elucidated. To the best of 
my knowledge, there are few studies that have tested theoretical explanations for skill-
based differences in perceptual anticipation. The next subsection reviews those studies: 
Two of those studies were conducted in a relatively static domain (chess; Klein & Peio, 
1989; Jastrzembski, Charness, & Vasyukova, 2006), and one study addressed anticipation 
in a dynamic domain (soccer; Ward, Ericsson, & Williams, 2012). The Klein and Peio, 
and the Ward et al., studies are especially pertinent in the context of the current proposal, 
as they tested predictions derived from the RPD and LTWM models, respectively. 
Additionally, those studies employed an option-generation paradigm similar to the 
hypothesis generation tasks used in the studies of ill-defined problems.  
Theoretically-Motivated Studies of Skill in Perceptual Anticipation 
Recall that one of the main messages from the RPD model (Klein, 1989) was that 
experts’ superior ability to recognize situations allows them to generate a satisfactory, if 
not a good, course of action as the first one considered. However, in addition to 
explaining how individuals make decisions about what course of action they might take 
themselves, Klein and Peio (1989) suggested that the RPD model would be equally 
relevant during situation assessment, when individuals had to predict (or perceptually 
anticipate) what an opponent might do next. Klein and Peio modified de Groot’s (1965) 
original move-selection paradigm to create a prediction-based, situational option-
generation paradigm in which chess players were asked to predict the next moves of 
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other, expert players. Based on the RPD model, Klein and Peio expected that, compared 
with novice players, proficient players would: (a) generate fewer prediction options per 
trial, (b) select the correct move (i.e., actual move played) as their final prediction more 
frequently, (c) include the correct move in their set of predictions more frequently, and 
(d) generate the correct move earlier in their set of predictions. Twenty-four novice (i.e., 
ELO rating ≤ 1300) and 10 proficient chess players (i.e., ELO rating ≥ 1700) were shown 
a chessboard configuration from an actual expert-level game, with the pieces arranged 10 
moves in. Next, they identified the plausible moves that the opposing expert player might 
make next, and then highlighted the one they thought the expert would actually make. 
Participants then saw the actual move made by the expert and the task was repeated for 
the 20 subsequent moves (i.e., 10 moves for each expert player). Consistent with the RPD 
model, proficient players generated fewer options per trial (Mproficient = 2.2, Mnovice = 2.5), 
and predicted the experts’ actual move significantly more often than the novice players 
did (Mproficient = 38% of trials, Mnovice = 23%). The proficient players also generated the 
correct move in their set of predictions more frequently than the novice players did. 
Finally, when the proficient players correctly predicted the experts’ next move, they 
generated the correct move as their first prediction option a significantly greater 
proportion of the time (Mproficient = 59.5% of trials, Mnovice = 41.3%). The authors 
concluded that the major features of the RPD model (i.e., few options are generated, and 
the first option generated is typically a good option) described option generation during 
situation assessment, and that differences in option generation/selection are associated 
with perceptual anticipation skill. This study also demonstrated the utility of a prediction-
based, situational option-generation paradigm for revealing skill-based differences in the 
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generation and selection of options during perceptual anticipation. 
Jastrzembski et al. (2006) assessed the effects of expertise and age on anticipation 
in chess; my review focuses on the most relevant aspect of that study: the theoretical 
basis for the relationship between expertise and anticipation. According to Gobet and 
Simon’s (1996a) theory of chunks and templates, expert chess players have access to an 
extensive store of chess patterns. Those patterns are thought to include information 
regarding the threat relationships between chess pieces (e.g., how susceptible a king is to 
being placed in “check”). Jastrzembski et al. hypothesized, based on LTWM, that expert 
chess players employ cues—held in working memory—to rapidly retrieve those encoded 
relationships, thus allowing them to anticipate threats faster than novice players. 
Furthermore, they hypothesized that experts would be able to assess threats-of-check as 
quickly as the actual presence of a check. To assess skill-based differences in anticipation 
performance, 20 expert (i.e., ELO ratings of 2,195–2,540), 19 intermediate (i.e., ELO 
ratings of 1,700–2,060), and 20 novice (i.e., with no ELO rating) chess players performed 
two detection tasks. In both tasks, players viewed patterns of chess pieces (i.e., subsets of 
chunks) that were displayed on a computer screen. Each pattern was represented on a 4 
square × 4 square section of a chessboard, and consisted of two chess pieces—one of 
which was a king. On check detection trials, participants determined whether or not the 
king was in check—a relatively simple task in which all of the information required to 
make a decision was contained within pieces displayed. On threat-of-check detection 
trials, participants determined whether, in a single move, the king could be placed in 
check; as the pieces represented only a subset of a chunk, participants needed to mentally 
simulate other parts of the chunk in order to make a threat-of-check determination. For 
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both detection tasks, accuracy and response time were recorded; accuracy was high (i.e., 
> 98%) for all groups. An analysis of response times for the accurate trials revealed a 
significant Skill × Task interaction: expert players’ response times did not differ 
significantly across the two tasks, while the novice’s took significantly longer to respond 
on threat-of-check trials compared to check trials. Additionally, expert players responded 
significantly faster—on both tasks—than did the novices. Jastrzembski et al. concluded 
that the results supported the hypothesis that experts could rapidly access stored 
templates to anticipate possible outcomes, and that their perceptual advantage—evident 
from the speed with which they assessed patterns—was an important component of 
skilled chess play.  
Ward et al. (2012) built on Klein and Peio’s (1989) work by examining option 
generation during perceptual anticipation in a dynamic domain: soccer. Ward et al. 
contrasted hypotheses drawn from the RPD model and Take-The-First heuristic (TTF; 
Johnson & Raab, 2003) with those derived from LTWM theory. TTF, which is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3, offered an explanation for why generating few options and 
selecting the first option (i.e., behaving in accordance with the RPD model) should result 
in better performance: it proposes that there is a negative correlation between the total 
number of options generated, and the quality of the selected option. LTWM theory, on 
the other hand, posits that superior anticipation is the product of a rich, accurate, and up-
to-date situational model. Therefore, based on LTWM theory, Ward et al. expected that 
when multiple task-relevant options exist in the environment, skilled performers would 
generate more of those options, and fewer task-irrelevant options, than would novices. 
Also based on LTWM theory, and in contrast to TTF, Ward et al. expected that the 
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number of task-relevant and task-irrelevant options would be positively and negatively 
correlated, respectively, with the quality of the selected option. Finally, it was expected 
that skilled participants would be better at prioritizing task-relevant options in terms of 
threat.  
In Ward et al.’s (2012) second and third experiments, skilled and less-skilled 
soccer players viewed, from the perspective of a defensive player, short, temporally-
occluded clips of attacking soccer plays. The clips were occluded approximately 120 ms 
prior to the attacking player who possessed the ball either (a) kicking at goal, (b) passing 
to another attacker, or (c) running while maintaining possession of the ball. At the point 
of occlusion, participants first anticipated what the attacker would do next (i.e., shoot at 
goal, pass, or run) and then generated situation assessment options to represent what the 
attacker could (cf. would) do next. After generating assessment options, participants 
ranked those options with respect to the threat posed to the defense. Participants 
completed 18 trials. Correct anticipations were those that matched what the attacker 
actually did after the occlusion point (i.e., if the clip had not be occluded). Expert soccer 
coaches determined the task-relevant options, and optimal threat-ranking of those 
options, for each clip. A threat prioritization score was calculated by comparing 
participants’ rankings to the experts’ criterion rankings.  
As expected, skilled players (M = 15.13) anticipated the actual outcome on 
significantly more trials than did the less-skilled players (M = 10.25). Consistent with 
LTWM theory, skilled players generated significantly more task-relevant, and fewer task-
irrelevant, options than did the less-skilled players. Skilled players also prioritized their 
task-relevant options significantly better than did less-skilled players. Also consistent 
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with LTWM theory, the number of task-relevant and task-irrelevant options were 
positively and negatively correlated, respectively, with anticipation performance. Ward et 
al. (2012) concluded that skilled anticipation performance was supported by LTWM-type 
mechanisms, as opposed to the mechanism proposed by TTF.  
Summary 
In summary, the review of situation assessment in complex and dynamic domains 
provides support for using the ability to anticipate situational outcomes as a principled 
basis for understanding professional expertise in law enforcement by:  
• Describing the role of situation assessment in complex and dynamic domains, and 
presenting evidence of skill in situation assessment.  
• Highlighting the use of option (e.g., hypothesis) generation tasks as a method for 
investigating situation assessment.   
• Emphasizing the importance of perceptual anticipation, as the future-oriented aspect 
of situation assessment, in constantly evolving situations, and presenting evidence of 
skill in anticipating future situational outcomes in sport, dynamic domains, and 
driving.  
• Presenting evidence that skill in predicting situational outcomes in a complex task can 
be understood through the use of a prediction-based, situational option generation 
paradigm.  
Having reviewed literature related to situation assessment, the following section 
provides a complementary review of the response generation/selection phase of decision 
making.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESPONSE PHASE OF DECISION MAKING 
One of the hallmarks of expertise is that skilled performers make better decisions 
about how to respond to situations than less-skilled performers. In the judgment and 
decision-making literature, lab-based studies of decision making have typically employed 
well-defined problems and focused on individuals’ ability to select one option from a list 
of specified alternatives. However, in complex, uncertain, and dynamic situations such as 
those encountered by law enforcement officers, domain practitioners must first generate 
at least one response option for themselves prior to selecting a course of action. Formal, 
decision analytic models such as subjective expected utility and multi-attribute utility 
theory specify methods for selecting one option from among alternatives, but are silent on 
the issue of option generation (Yates, 2001). Other decision theories that do address the 
issue of option generation, such as decision analysis (e.g., Howard, 1968), suggest that 
generating an exhaustive or near-exhaustive set of alternatives is a prerequisite for 
making a high-quality decision. Although decision analysis has been applied with success 
in a variety of domains (e.g., management science, computer science), this method is 
demanding in terms of both the time taken and computational power needed to complete 
such analyses—two resources that are in short supply when police officers are faced with 
dynamic, complex, and potentially life-threatening situations.  
Response Generation and Selection 
Researchers have investigated response-option generation and selection from a 
variety of perspectives. This section provides an overview of three bodies of work, each 
of which informs our understanding of response option generation and/or selection in 
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different ways. First, research in dynamic domains, such as sport, have investigated the 
visual search behaviors and domain-specific knowledge representations that are 
associated with superior response option selection. Second, similar to the studies on 
hypothesis generation in ill-defined problems (e.g., Gettys & Fisher, 1979), researchers 
have used text-based problems to investigate the number, and utility, of options generated 
to solve a problem. Third, researchers in complex and/or dynamic domains (e.g., chess, 
aviation, sport) have examined, from the perspective of the RPD model, the response 
option generation and selection strategies employed by skilled performers. The goal of 
this section is to highlight key methods and findings that contribute to our understanding 
of response option generation and selection.  
Response Generation/Selection Tasks to Examine Perceptual-Cognitive Expertise 
Using dynamic tasks, a number of studies have examined the perceptual and 
cognitive foundations of decision making by presenting participants with representative 
task stimuli and asking them to enact responses. Typically, these studies have focused on 
the quality of the selected response, and not on the response options that the individual 
may have considered prior to selection. For example, Helsen and Pauwels (1993) used a 
response generation/selection task to investigate the relationship between performance 
and visual search patterns in soccer. Fifteen skilled soccer players with at least 10 years 
of competition experience, and 15 novice players with limited competition experience, 
observed video clips of soccer play from the perspective of one of the on-field attackers. 
The clips were projected onto a solid wall; participants wore a head-mounted eye tracker 
and stood with a soccer ball at their feet.  At a point in each clip, an attacking player in 
the video passed the ball toward the camera, and the participant enacted a response by 
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either: (a) kicking the ball at the goal, (b) dribbling the ball to simulate moving around a 
defender, or (c) passing the ball toward an on-screen team mate. A panel of soccer 
experts determined the correct response choice (i.e., shoot, dribble, or pass) for each clip. 
An analysis of the data revealed that the skilled players selected the correct response 
significantly more frequently (M = 91.76%) than the novice players (M = 82.23%). 
Additionally, the skilled players were significantly faster in initiating movement and 
making foot/ball contact compared with the novice players. Analysis of the eye 
movement data for passing situations revealed significant skill-based differences in the 
number and location of fixations: skilled players made fewer fixations than the novice 
players, and primarily fixated the pass receiver, the free defending player, and the free 
space. Novice players looked at the same cues, but also attended to other, less-relevant 
cues, including the attacking players, the goal, and the ball. The authors concluded that 
the skilled players selected more correct responses because they selectively attended to 
the most meaningful cues, paid little attention to less informative cues, and processed 
information faster than the novice players. 
McPherson & Kernodle (2003) investigated the link between tennis players’ 
response selections, including shot execution, and their underlying knowledge 
representations. Based on previous research (e.g., McPherson, 1999), McPherson and 
Kernodle predicted that skilled performers would employ a refined set of rule-based 
actions to guide their responses, and would use situational information gathered in-event 
(e.g., opponent’s tendencies and strengths/weaknesses) to adapt their responses to the 
current game situation. Participants were six professional tennis players with tournament 
experience and six novice players with no tournament experience. Players within each 
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skill group were paired randomly, and each pair played one tennis match. Following each 
point in the second set, players provided immediate retrospective verbal reports of their 
thinking. After completion of the matches, which were videotaped, three tennis experts 
rated the appropriateness (i.e., high/low quality) of each player’s response selection for 
all serves and shots. Analysis of the response selection data revealed that the professional 
players made significantly more high-quality selections for serves (M = 96.5%) and for 
shots (M = 95.1%) than the novice players (M = 64.7% and M = 65.0% respectively).  
The verbal report data were coded to identify the type, variety, and sophistication 
of players’ concepts. Skilled players’ verbalized significantly more situation assessment 
concepts (i.e., concepts related to the conditions under which they should respond) than 
novices, and updated these concepts as the match progressed based on their opponent’s 
tendencies, strengths, and weaknesses. They also demonstrated more tactical behavior in 
that their situation assessment concepts were directly associated with specific responses 
(i.e., the direction, speed, and placement of the participant’s own responses). On the other 
hand, novices verbalized situation assessment concepts that focused on aspects of their 
own (rather than their opponent’s) play, and their response concepts often lacked 
specificity. McPherson and Kernodle (2003) concluded that skilled players’ ability to 
select high-quality responses was supported by a conceptual knowledge base that was 
more varied, sophisticated, and interrelated than that used by novices. 
The studies by Helsen and Pauwels (1993) and McPherson and Kernodle (2003) 
are representative of a large body of research in sport that has highlighted the link 
between perceptual-cognitive skills and skilled performance. As in the case of the two 
studies reviewed here, research in sport that has assessed participants’ ability to select 
                                                                                                                                          52 
 
 
and execute response actions has typically focused on the appropriateness, or quality, of 
selected responses. Measures of response selection quality have primarily been used to 
provide evidence of skill-based differences in performance which, in turn, provided a 
basis for comparing process measures, such as visual search characteristics and in-task 
cognitions. However, while such research has employed innovative methods to elicit and 
assess response selections, such as requiring participants to enact responses during actual 
and simulated task performance, it has rarely addressed the option generation and 
selection strategies used by skilled performers (but see Johnson & Raab, 2003; Raab & 
Johnson, 2007).  
In other domains, research that has investigated, specifically, aspects of response 
option generation has done so from two main perspectives. One perspective suggests that 
in order to select a high-quality response option, the decision maker must first generate 
most, if not all, of the potential response options (e.g., Engelmann & Gettys, 1985). 
Studies of response option generation from this “more is better” perspective have 
employed text-based descriptions of ill-defined problems to examine the number, 
breadth, and utility of response options generated as potential problem solutions. A 
different perspective, based on one of the main findings of the RPD model, suggests that 
skilled decision makers can select a satisfactory, if not a very good, response option as 
the first one they consider (e.g., Klein, 1989). According to the latter perspective, there is 
no advantage to be gained by generating a large number of alternate response options. 
Studies from this “less is better” perspective have investigated the response-option 
generation and selection strategies used by skilled performers in a range of complex and 
dynamic tasks. The next sections review research related to each perspective, 
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highlighting the methods used to elicit response options and describing findings related to 
the characteristics of response option generation and selection. 
Response Option Generation in Ill-Defined Problems 
Similar to the studies that examined hypothesis generation in ill-defined problems 
(e.g., Gettys & Fisher, 1979; Mehle, 1982), researchers have also investigated the 
generation of response options (i.e., potential solutions) to problem situations. For 
example, Engelmann and Gettys (1985) associated superior option generation 
performance with the ability to generate all possible responses, and examined response 
option generation and its relation to divergent thinking ability.  In one experiment, 
undergraduate and graduate university students were presented with a fictional problem 
concerning a foreign student who was attending a US university, but had no money for 
housing. Participants generated as many response options as possible that the foreign 
student could take to secure housing, and then estimated the number of reasonable 
options remaining (i.e., those they had not generated). To assess the completeness of 
option generation performance, the authors pooled the participants’ responses and 
structured a hierarchical tree that contained nine major option categories and a total of 67 
reasonable options (i.e., those with positive utility). On average, the graduate students 
generated significantly more options (M = 17.75) than did the undergraduate students (M 
= 10.58). However, participants in both groups underestimated the number of reasonable 
options they had not generated; estimates generally ranged between 4–5 options. 
Additionally, both groups’ response options represented only a subset of the nine major 
option categories (Mgraduates = 5.0, Mundergraduates = 3.4).  
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Although Englemann and Gettys (1985) regarded participants’ response option 
generation performance as less than ideal, they suggested that a more appropriate 
measure of performance was the extent to which participants generated the high-utility 
portions of the hierarchical tree. A subsequent analysis using previously established 
utility values for the foreign student housing problem revealed that both the 
undergraduate and graduate students’ best (i.e., highest utility) two response options were 
equal in value to the two highest-utility options in the tree. When option sets of 
increasing size (i.e., 3–5) were considered, the graduate students generated higher-utility 
response options than did the undergraduate students. Across all participants, divergent 
thinking ability accounted for 24% of the variance in response option generation 
performance, and graduate students scored significantly higher on a test of divergent 
thinking than did the undergraduates. The authors concluded that while all participants 
were able to generate at least one high-utility option, failure to generate a complete set of 
response options could be detrimental in more serious problem situations where selecting 
a sub-optimal option has serious consequences. Note that although the authors compared 
students who had different levels of tertiary education—ostensibly to examine the effects 
of experience/knowledge on option generation—this comparison was not a major focus 
of the study. 
In a separate study using similar, ill-defined problems, Gettys et al. (1987) again 
found that while all participants generated at least one high-utility response option, they 
generated relatively few options compared with the total number of pooled options. 
Gettys et al. hypothesized that participants’ failure to generate more complete option sets 
may have been attributable to a lack of motivation. This notion was tested in a follow-up 
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experiment, in which sixty undergraduate students were randomly allocated to one of 
three incentive conditions. In the two treatment conditions, participants were paid based 
on either the quality or quantity of response options they generated; participants in the 
control condition received no incentive. In this experiment, participants generated 
response options to solve their university’s shortage of car parking spaces, and then 
estimated the number of options they had not generated. The responses were pooled and 
then organized into a hierarchical tree with seven major option categories. Analysis of the 
data indicated that incentive condition did not significantly affect the quantity or quality 
of options generated; all participants generated approximately 8–9 options, including at 
least one high-utility option. Across all three conditions, participants generated an 
average of 3.7 of the seven major option categories. Additionally, as in the Engelmann 
and Gettys (1985) study, participants overestimated the completeness of their option sets.  
Although Engelmann and Gettys (1985) and Gettys et al. (1987) regarded 
participants’ inability to generate near-complete sets of response options as problematic, 
their findings actually suggest that it is not necessary to generate all possible options in 
order to generate a good (i.e., high quality) option. Note, however, that these studies did 
not address the relationship between the quality of response options and their order of 
generation. Participants may have generated relatively few response options because 
those options were generated in order of descending quality. If the decision maker’s goal 
is to generate a high-quality option and if higher-quality options are generated before 
lower-quality options, then there is little reason to engage in extensive response option 
generation—the first option generated should be a high-quality option. Recall that this 
notion is one of the main claims of the RPD model with regard to making decisions about 
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courses of action: experts’ superior ability to recognize situations allows them to generate 
a satisfactory, if not a good, course of action as the first one considered—thereby 
obviating the need for extensive option generation. This view is also consistent with 
Simon’s (1956, 1990) notion of bounded rationality, which gives rise to satisficing (cf. 
optimizing) behavior due to limitations in the decision maker’s ability to process 
information (e.g., fallible memory, limited capacity) and the ecological constraints on 
decision making (e.g., limited time, the cost of acquiring additional information). The 
next section reviews studies that have tested aspects of this claim in a variety of complex 
and dynamic domains.   
Empirical Studies of Response Option Generation in Complex and Dynamic 
Domains 
Early studies that applied the RPD model examined the frequency with which 
decision makers generated a single, good response option. For example, Calderwood, 
Crandall, and Klein (1987) conducted critical decision method (CDM) interviews to 
examine the response-option generation and selection strategies employed by 
experienced urban firefighters. Twelve firefighters with substantial command experience 
(i.e., experts) and 12 firefighters with limited command experience (i.e., novices) were 
asked to recount a challenging fire incident and identify the points at which they made 
decisions. For each decision point, the researchers used a series of probe questions to 
ascertain the number of response options generated, and in cases where multiple options 
were generated, whether commanders evaluated those options serially or concurrently. 
Analysis of the interview protocols revealed that both the experienced and novice 
commanders generated a single response option in approximately 70% of decision points. 
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When multiple response options were considered, the experienced commanders 
employed both serial (18%) and concurrent (12%) evaluation, while novice commanders 
employed only a concurrent evaluation strategy (30%). The authors concluded that in 
dynamic and complex domains, skilled decision makers typically select the first response 
option they generate, and that expert decision makers rarely engage in the direct 
comparison of multiple alternatives. However, because each participant reported on a 
different critical incident, it is possible that the number of options generated may have 
been dependent on the characteristics of the situation (e.g., complexity).  
In one of few experimental tests of the RPD model, albeit in a relatively static 
domain, Klein, Wolf, Militello, and Zsambok (1995) used an option-generation paradigm 
to compare medium- and highly-skilled chess players’ ability to generate and select the 
next best move. Participants viewed a chess board configuration from a real game, 
generated all possible next moves they could take, and then selected their final move 
from those generated. Based on the ratings of Grand Master chess players, all chess 
players considered acceptable moves first, generally chose as their final move one of the 
moves that were generated earlier in the sequence of options, and generated only a 
relatively small number (i.e., 3–5) of the possible legal moves. The key point is that for 
the more experienced players, the first option generated was often a very good option. 
However, skill groups did not differ much in their option-generation behavior.  
Stokes, Kemper, and Kite (1997) investigated the relationship between pilots’ 
domain-specific knowledge and their decision strategies. Twelve expert pilots (i.e., with 
> 1,500 hours’ flight time) and 12 novice pilots (i.e., with < 50 hours’ flight time) 
observed, but did not interact with, a computerized instrument panel that displayed a pre-
                                                                                                                                          58 
 
 
programmed flight scenario. The scenario consisted of periods of routine, incident-free 
flight interspersed with problem situations. In a subset of the problem situations, the 
pilots were prompted, on-screen, to (a) list all relevant cues, (b) enter all plausible 
response options, and then (c) select the best response option. Expert raters (i.e., high 
flight-time pilots) evaluated the quality of participants’ selected response options, and 
determined cue relevancy. An analysis of the data revealed that the expert pilots 
generated 30% more response options than the novices; they also selected response 
options that were significantly higher in quality than those selected by the novices. When 
pilots generated multiple response options, the expert pilots selected their first-listed 
option more frequently than did the novices (71% versus 53% of cases, respectively). The 
expert pilots also listed significantly more (M = 15.4) relevant cues than the novices (M = 
8.9), and although both groups listed similar numbers of irrelevant cues, the expert pilots 
listed proportionally fewer (39.1%) irrelevant cues than the novices (59.0%). Further 
analysis revealed that the best predictor of decision-making performance was the number 
of relevant cues listed. The findings of this study provide mixed support for the RPD 
model: while the model would predict that as expertise increases the number of response 
options generated should decrease, the expert pilots actually generated more response 
options than the novices. However, in support of the RPD model, the expert pilots 
selected their first-generated response option in a majority of cases. The fact that the 
expert pilots reported more relevant cues and proportionally fewer irrelevant cues than 
the novices suggests that a more detailed and accurate understanding of the situation 
facilitates the generation of a range of response options.  
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Johnson and Raab (2003) used a similar option-generation paradigm to that 
employed by Klein et al. (1995) and Stokes et al. (1997) to assess decision-making 
strategies in a dynamic task. Their research was designed to test specific predictions of 
the Take-The-First heuristic, which is built on the premise that in some dynamic, 
uncertain, time-constrained situations (e.g., invasion sports)—where there is little 
opportunity to deliberate between options—generating fewer, rather than more, options 
results in better decisions. This heuristic was developed specifically based upon empirical 
data from the study of skilled performance in handball; the implication was that it may 
extend to other similar environments. Take-The-First heuristic—like other fast and frugal 
heuristics—emphasizes the adaptive nature of decision making, and assumes that use of 
the heuristic depends on the fit between the structure of the environment and the nature of 
the decision maker (see Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC 
Research Group, 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). Consistent with the RPD model, 
Johnson and Raab suggested that individuals should generate only few options and then 
select one of the initial options as the best option because of a hypothesized negative 
relationship between the number of options generated and the quality of a decision. 
According to advocates of the Take-The-First heuristic, not adopting an RPD-type 
strategy (i.e., selecting the first option generated) would increase the likelihood of 
making a poorer decision. 
In their study, Johnson and Raab (2003) asked moderately-skilled handball 
players to watch, from the perspective of the attacking team, 10-second video clips of 
high-level handball games that ended with an attacking player in possession of the ball in 
front of the goal. The final frame was frozen on-screen for 45 seconds while participants 
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imagined themselves as the player with the ball and: (a) named, as quickly as possible, 
the first decision that intuitively came to mind; (b) named as many additional options 
they could conceive; and (c) selected the best option from those they had generated. 
Expert coaches rated the participants’ options for each clip using a 5-point scale. On 
average, players generated between 2–3 response options. Analysis of the data supported 
the hypothesis that decision quality was negatively correlated with the number of options 
generated. When players generated fewer options they were more likely to choose a 
better option as their final choice. Moreover, the first option generated was rated of 
higher quality than the second option, and the second option was rated of higher quality 
than the third, etc. Johnson and Raab’s original hypotheses were supported by data from a 
subsequent study of the option-generation strategies of skilled and less-skilled handball 
players (Raab & Johnson, 2007). The effect of skill was similar to that observed by Klein 
and Peio (1989): skilled players generated the highest-quality move as their first option, 
and selected that option as their final option more frequently than did the less-skilled 
players.  
Moxley, Ericsson, Charness, and Krampe (2012) examined whether chess 
players’ decisions are based solely on fast, intuitive processes (e.g., TTF) or whether 
move quality is improved after a period of slower deliberation. Thirty-seven expert chess 
players (MELO rating = 2194, SD = 130) and 34 tournament players (MELO rating = 1836, SD = 
92) thought aloud while selecting the next move for 15 chess problems. The analysis 
focused on the six problems (2 easy, 2, medium, 2 hard) for which there was a clearly 
defined best move. The authors hypothesized that if players’ decisions were based on 
intuitive processes, there would be little difference in move quality between the first, 
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intuitive move mentioned and the final move selected after a period of slow deliberation. 
Alternatively, if mechanisms that support slower, deliberative processing—such as 
LTWM—are an important component of skilled decision making in chess, the final move 
selected should be of higher quality than the first move mentioned. The analysis revealed 
that, as expected, the expert players’ first-mentioned and finally-selected moves were of 
higher quality than those of the tournament players. However, both groups benefitted 
from additional deliberation time: their final (i.e., selected) moves were of higher quality 
than their first-mentioned moves. The improvement in move quality after deliberation 
was evident at each level of problem difficulty, but was greatest for the hard problems 
(Cohen’s d = 0.94). Additionally, problem difficulty affected players’ choice of final 
move: both groups were significantly more likely to select their first-mentioned move as 
their final move for the easy problems, than for the hard problems. The authors concluded 
that although experts did make better intuitive decisions than less-skilled players, 
engaging in slower, deliberative processing resulted in improved move quality, regardless 
of skill level and problem difficulty.  
To summarize, research that has investigated response option generation and 
selection has found that, regardless of skill level, performers typically (a) generate a 
small number of options, (b) generate at least one good option, (c) generate higher-
quality options earlier in a sequence than lower-quality options, and (d) select their first-
generated option. When skill-based differences have been observed in time-constrained 
situations, skilled performers have generally selected higher-quality options and selected 
their first-generated option more frequently than less-skilled performers. In some studies, 
accurate response selection was found to be related to individuals’ ability to prioritize 
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task-relevant cues while disregarding task-irrelevant cues, assess their opponent’s 
tendencies and actions, and associate responses with specific conditions—all of which are 
factors associated with situation assessment. While this supports a close relationship 
between the situation assessment and response phases of decision making, relatively few 
studies have investigated, empirically, the relationship between the generation/selection 
of options in the situation assessment and response phases of decision making. The next 
section reviews research that has examined this relationship. 
Option Generation/Selection in the Situation Assessment and Response Phases of 
Decision Making 
A comprehensive search of the literature revealed only two studies that have 
investigated the relationship between the situation assessment and response phases of 
decision making by focusing on the generation and selection of options. Note that both 
studies did not elicit options directly—rather, options were extracted from either 
concurrent or retrospective verbal reports.  
Using the campus car parking problem (see Engelmann & Gettys, 1985), 
Adelman, Gualtieri, and Stanford (1995) investigated the relationship between the 
situation assessment and response phases of decision making by varying the information 
contained in the problem description. Twenty graduate students were randomly assigned 
to one of four causal conditions. In the control condition, the problem description 
included only basic information about the car parking situation on a university campus. 
The other three causal conditions contained additional information about either: (a) rapid 
growth of the university’s population, (b) inefficient use of existing car parking spaces, or 
(c) both rapid growth and inefficient usage. In each condition, participants thought aloud 
                                                                                                                                          63 
 
 
as they considered the problem and then presented their recommended course of action. 
An analysis of the think-aloud data revealed that the causal information affected the types 
of options that participants generated and selected in both the situation assessment and 
response phases of decision making. For example, participants who received information 
about the inefficient use of existing car parking spaces generated proportionally more 
response options designed to improve efficiency than those who received information 
about rapid growth or those in the control condition. However, the authors noted that the 
results were not as strong as expected, and attributed this, in part, to participants’ relative 
lack of experience with the problem situation. They subsequently suggested that expertise 
in a given domain may affect the strength of the relationship between option 
generation/section in situation assessment and response.  
Ward et al. (2011) examined the option generation strategies employed by police 
officers during complex and dynamic situations. Rookie and experienced police officers 
were equipped with a replica handgun and interacted with video simulations of high- and 
low-frequency law enforcement incidents, some of which required a lethal (i.e., shoot 
response). Successful performance on the lethal trials required officers to perceptually 
anticipate and act upon the eventual situational outcome (e.g., a suspect who draws a gun 
and shoots at the officer). Officers provided retrospective verbal reports about their 
reasoning after several key trials. Based on Long Term Working Memory theory 
(LTWM; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), the authors expected that successful performance 
would be supported by a detailed situation model that would include a range of 
situational outcomes. Therefore, they predicted that successful performers would 
generate more task-relevant situation assessment options than less-successful performers. 
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They also predicted that having a more detailed understanding of what could happen 
during situation assessment would allow officers to adopt a TTF-like strategy (i.e., 
generate relatively few options) during the response phase of decision making. 
Consequently, they predicted a negative relationship between the number of options 
generated in the two decision phases.  
Following the experiment, the verbal report data for three lethal trials were 
segmented and coded as either situation assessment or response options. Contrary to 
expectation, an analysis of the data revealed that the number of options generated during 
situation assessment was positively related to the number generated during the response 
phase of decision making. Additionally, the number of options generated in the situation 
assessment and response phases were both positively related to successful performance. 
Furthermore, compared with the rookies, experienced officers generated a significantly 
greater number of task-relevant situation assessment and response options. The authors 
concluded that an option generation strategy based on LTWM theory (i.e., generating 
more, rather than fewer, relevant options) could support option generation in both the 
situation assessment and response phases of decision making.   
Although these studies provide some preliminary evidence about the relationship 
between the situation assessment and responses phases of decision making, use of an 
option-generation paradigm—rather than inferring options from verbal report data—
might permit a greater understanding of the mechanisms supporting superior 
performance. Moreover, an option-generation paradigm would allow some of the current 
and most dominant theoretical descriptions of expertise (e.g., LTWM, RPD, Take-The-
First) to be contrasted experimentally.  
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Summary 
In summary, this section considered ways in which response generation and 
selection tasks have been used to investigate skilled performance. Studies that used 
response selection tasks in dynamic domains primarily established that superior response 
selection is driven by perceptual-cognitive skill. Studies that employed response 
generation tasks to investigate performance in ill-defined problems demonstrated the 
utility of response option generation tasks and established that people tend to generate 
relatively few of the plausible response options—although their generated options 
typically include at least one high quality response. The empirical studies of response 
option generation in complex and dynamic domains highlighted theoretical perspectives 
on option generation. Both the RPD and TTF approaches suggest that individuals 
generate few response options, and that better options are generated first. According to 
these perspectives, skilled decision makers should tend toward generating a single, good 
option. Finally, it was demonstrated that option generation tasks can be used to 
investigate the situation assessment and response phases of decision making 
simultaneously. One study, from the law enforcement domain, found evidence that that 
contradicts the RPD/TTF account of option generation; skilled performers generated 
more, rather than fewer, task-relevant options in both phases of decision making. The 
next chapter summarizes the main hypotheses that can be drawn from LTWM theory, 
RPD, and TTF, and provides a brief outline of the studies described in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL HYPOTHESES AND OUTLINE OF STUDIES 1 AND 2 
General Hypotheses 
Based on the literature review, two perspectives on option generation can be 
identified: LTWM theory, which focuses on the situation assessment phase of decision 
making, and RPD and TTF, both of which focus on the response selection phase of 
decision making.  
In general, LTWM theory posits that superior performers generate a detailed, up-
to-date, and accurate representation of the situation, and that this facilitates their ability to 
anticipate the situational outcome. Based on the Ericsson and Kintsch’s (1995) original 
description of LTWM, Ward et al. (2012) developed quantitative hypotheses related to 
option-generation behavior. Ward et al. asserted that when multiple, task-relevant options 
are present in the environment, more of those options will be encoded in the 
representations of superior performers, compared to lower-level performers’ 
representations. Consequently, Ward et al. hypothesized that superior performers not only 
could, but would, generate more task-relevant options than lower-level performers. 
Furthermore, as superior performers have a refined ability to anticipate situational 
outcomes, Ward et al. expected that the number of task-relevant options generated would 
be positively correlated with prediction quality. Ward et al. suggested that the 
relationship between task-relevant assessment options—in terms of the relative threat 
associated with each option—would form an integral part of the information encoded in 
the situation model. Therefore, superior performers should be better than lower-level 
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performers at prioritizing task-relevant assessment options in terms of the threat posed by 
each option. The data from the Ward et al. study supported these hypotheses. Henceforth, 
reference to LTWM hypotheses will relate to the hypotheses outlined by Ward et al. 
As a corollary, it is possible that generating more task-relevant options during 
assessment—painting a detailed picture of the situation—could facilitate a TTF-like 
mechanism during response selection. That is, the ability to anticipate the situational 
outcome could enable experienced decision makers to generate, as their first response 
option, a satisfactory, if not a very good, response, without the need for generating more. 
Such a finding would permit some degree of complementarity between LTWM and 
TTF—both could be at play, albeit in different phases of decision making. As noted, 
however, preliminary evidence from Ward et al. (2011) did not find support for this 
hypothesis. I explore this further in this dissertation using an option generation paradigm. 
With respect to the response phase of decision making, both RPD and TTF 
suggest that individuals generate fewer, rather than more (cf. LTWM theory) response 
options, and then select one of the first options generated. To explain this finding, TTF 
posits that the number of response options generated is negatively correlated with the 
quality of the final decision—because better options are generated first. However, while 
LTWM theory makes the distinction between task-relevant and task-irrelevant options 
(i.e., during situation assessment), neither RPD or TTF make such a distinction. For 
instance, the negative relationship hypothesized by TTF is between the total number of 
response options generated, and the quality of the final decision. 
Outline of Studies 1 And 2 
Collectively, the purpose of Studies 1 and 2 is to extend the work of Ward et al. 
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(2011) by using a prediction and option-generation paradigm to investigate situation 
assessment and response selection in dynamic and complex law enforcement situations. 
Study 1, which is methodological in nature, employs converging approaches to identify 
video-based law enforcement scenarios that could discriminate between experienced and 
less-experienced police officers, in terms of their ability to anticipate the culminating 
event. Study 1 also serves to identify a criterion occlusion point in each discriminating 
scenario: the point that maximized the experienced-based difference in anticipation 
performance. Study 2 then employs those discriminating scenarios to test specific 
hypotheses derived from LTWM theory and TTF (and to a lesser extent, RPD) that relate 
to outcome measures of assessment and response selection performance, and the option 
generation processes that underlie superior performance.  
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 1 
Perceptual anticipation—the ability to utilize environmental information cues to 
anticipate how a situation may unfold in the immediate future—is a hallmark of expertise 
(Suss & Ward, in press). One method that has been employed to investigate perceptual 
anticipation is the temporal occlusion paradigm. In video-based temporal occlusion 
studies, participants typically view video stimuli depicting dynamic action sequences 
(e.g., an opposing tennis player’s serve, a developing play in soccer). The stimuli are 
occluded unexpectedly (i.e., the screen turns black) at a specific point(s) during the 
developing sequence, and participants are asked to predict the outcome of the situation 
(e.g., the future location of an opponent’s tennis serve; the intention of a soccer player—
shoot at goal, pass to another player, or continue running with the ball).  
Temporal occlusion studies typically seek to identify the time point, or time 
window, during which experts demonstrate an advantage in their ability to use perceptual 
information to correctly anticipate the outcome. In sport-related studies that have 
employed the temporal occlusion paradigm, occlusion point(s) have often been 
determined by objective ecological events, such as the point of ball-racket contact in 
racket sports (e.g., Abernethy & Russell, 1987), foot-ball contact in soccer (e.g., 
Savelsbergh, Onrust, Rouwenhorst, & Van Der Kamp, 2006; Ward et al., 2012), ball 
release in cricket (e.g., Mann, Abernethy, Farrow, Davis, & Spratford, 2010), or weapon 
impact in fencing (e.g., Hagemann, Schorer, Canal-Bruland, Lotz, & Strauss, 2010). For 
example, Ward et al. (2012) occluded clips of soccer plays approximately 120 ms prior to 
foot-ball contact.  These “events” are typically deterministic and governed by the laws of 
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physics (e.g., direction and velocity of a “pass” is determined by kinematic and kinetic 
variables that precede it). In addition, more probabilistic information is available to 
dis/confirm predictions made from this deterministic information, such as the preceding 
and/or co-occurring movements and locations of their teammates relative to other 
opposing players, team mates, and the goal. 
In other real-world, dynamic situations—such as law enforcement 
confrontations—physically deterministic events are often less informative with regards to 
the ultimate outcome of any given action. For instance, deterministic perceptual cues may 
be available to tell the observer that a perpetrator is reaching in to his/her pocket, but not 
what the perpetrator will take out (e.g., a weapon versus driver’s license). Likewise, in 
sport, the number of possible outcomes for any given action is often highly constrained 
by the rules of the game (e.g., shoot, pass, retain possession of the ball) whereas in 
complex domains that have fewer constraints the possible outcome of any given action is 
relatively unlimited. Consequently, observers have to rely more on probabilistic 
information cues to predict the outcome. Accordingly, to measure participants’ perceptual 
anticipation skill, the point of occlusion has to be based on these probabilistic events.  
The overarching goals of this study were methodological: (i) identify dynamic 
law enforcement scenarios that could discriminate between experienced and less-
experienced police officers’ ability to perceptually anticipate the outcome, and (ii) 
determine the optimal occlusion point that maximizes the skill-based difference in 
anticipation. Rather than choose occlusion points for each scenario at random, Studies 
1A, B, and C were conducted to generate empirical data that converged on specific 
ecological cues and occlusion points. These data allowed for the generation of some 
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preliminary hypotheses that the identified occlusion points could be used to differentiate 
between skill groups in terms of their ability to predict the outcome. Accordingly, I first 
present the method employed in each study and then present the combined analysis of all 
three studies together.  
STUDY 1A 
In this preliminary study, a single occlusion point—selected by the 
experimenter—was assessed for each scenario. In addition to the main goal of assessing 
the occlusion points, a secondary goal was to test the experimental tasks and procedures 
that would be used in Study 2 to investigate option-generation during the assessment- and 
response-selection phases of decision making. Therefore, although the primary focus of 
Study 1A was on participants’ ability to anticipate the outcome of each scenario—which 
requires participants to generate only a single option (i.e., the anticipated outcome)—the 
experimental tasks were designed to elicit this information using an option-generation 
paradigm (partly as a means to refine it for use in Study 2). The option-generation 
paradigm differs from an anticipation paradigm (as used in Studies 1B and 1C) in four 
important ways: (i) instead of generating a single anticipation (i.e., what they think will 
occur next), participants can generate multiple assessment options (i.e., what they think 
could occur next); (ii) participants are asked to rate each option in terms of its likelihood 
of occurring, (iii) the anticipated outcome is assumed to be the assessment option rated 
highest in likelihood; and (iv) in addition to generating assessment options (e.g., courses 
of actions that could be taken by the perpetrator or others in the scenario), participants are 
also asked to generate response options (e.g., personal courses of action that could be 
enacted by a police officer in response to a perpetrator’s actions).  
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Method – Study 1A 
Participants 
Experienced participants were 11 male, SWAT-qualified law enforcement 
officers with a median of 9 years of experience (range: 6–18 years) and an average of 
2082 hours (SD = 724) of accrued training time. Fourteen less-experienced participants 
were male law enforcement recruits who were near completion of a 21-week training 
program. Twelve of the less-experienced participants had logged an average of 174 (SD = 
48) hours observing police officers on patrol (i.e., during “ride-alongs”); the remaining 
two had not logged any observation time. Three of the less-experienced participants—
including the two who had not logged any observation time—had served in the military; 
two served in reserve units for approximately three years, and one served full-time for 4.5 
years.  
Materials and Stimuli 
Twenty interactive, video-based law enforcement scenarios (IES Interactive 
Training: Ann Arbor, MI) served as the basis for the experimental stimuli (see Appendix 
A). The scenarios, ranging from 19.34–93.88 seconds in length, depicted high and low 
frequency events encountered by officers in the line of duty (e.g., disturbance call, 
potential suicide, domestic assault, traffic stop, suicide bomber; see Appendix B for 
exemplar scenarios). Fourteen escalating scenarios culminated in the suspect simulating 
an attack (e.g., swinging a baseball bat, shooting firearm, striking with a rock, detonating 
an improvised explosive device). Six de-escalating scenarios culminated in the suspect(s) 
surrendering or calming down.  
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To create stimuli that allowed participants to generate assessment and response 
options, a critical turning point for each clip was first identified. A turning point was 
defined as a change in the dynamics of the unfolding events that is marked by a positive 
shift in ecological validity (i.e., when task-relevant contextual information becomes 
available that provides a basis for predicting the outcome of the scenario) (Suss & Ward, 
in press). For example, in the Blow Up scenario (see Appendix C), the critical turning 
point occurred when the boy bent down to pick up the bomb’s actuator from the ground 
(i.e., after he had dropped it, but prior to detonating the device). In each scenario, the 
turning point typically occurred within three seconds of, and presaged, the culminating 
event.  
Next, a specific occlusion point was identified—the earliest point where sufficient 
information was available to allow experienced participants to accurately predict the 
culminating event. For example, in the Blow Up scenario, the point at which the boy 
raised his hand to strike the bomb’s actuator (i.e., after picking up the actuator from the 
ground) was selected as the occlusion point. Identification of the occlusion point in each 
scenario was based on (a) formal and informal reviews of performance and retrospective 
verbal report data from previous research that employed the same scenarios (Tashman et 
al., 2006; Ward, Harris, Ericsson, Eccles, & Tashman, 2007; Ward et al., 2011), (b) pilot 
testing of the experimental tasks which was conducted with 10 law enforcement officers, 
(c) conversations with several law enforcement trainers, and (d) personal intuition, based 
on previous military and security experience.  
After the occlusion point was identified, each scenario was digitally edited to end 
at that point (i.e., was replaced by black screen), thus creating the video stimuli. Each 
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video stimulus began with a brief (i.e., approximately 10 s), audio-only “radio message” 
describing the situation to which the officer was being dispatched (see Appendix E). Each 
video stimulus was inserted into a Microsoft PowerPoint 2010 presentation, which also 
included prompts for the subsequent assessment and response option generation tasks.  
Option Generation Tasks 
Assessment option generation task. In this task, participants were required to 
generate assessment options—events that could occur in the environment (e.g., courses of 
actions that could be taken by the perpetrator or others in the scenario) at the point of 
occlusion. To elicit assessment options, participants responded verbally to the following 
textual prompt, which was displayed on the screen: “What could happen next on the 
screen in the next few seconds?” The prompt was displayed together with a 10-second 
countdown timer and a single text box. Participants were required to verbalize their first 
option before the timer reached zero; the experimenter transcribed the option into the text 
box. This process was repeated using a new slide/timer for each additional option, until 
the participant indicated that they had verbalized all of the assessment options that were 
heeded at the point of occlusion.  
To ensure that participants reported only those options heeded at the point of 
occlusion, and to prevent them from deliberating about options while completing the 
option generation tasks, preparatory instructions were provided during a practice trial. 
Specifically, participants were instructed to (a) list, rapidly, only those assessment 
options that they were considering at the point of occlusion; (b) verbalize all of the 
assessment options under consideration, even if participants believed a specific option(s) 
to have a low likelihood; and (c) refrain from engaging in reflective option generation 
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(e.g., reporting options that were generated only after reflecting on the scenario, 
generating options solely for the sake of increasing the number of options generated, etc.)  
After the participant finished verbalizing their assessment options, the rating tasks 
were administered. To facilitate rating, the complete set of transcribed options was 
displayed on a single screen; a small text box next to each option was used to record the 
ratings. Participants first rated the likelihood that each of their generated options would 
actually happen after the occlusion point, using a scale that ranged from 0 (not at all 
likely) to 100 (very likely). To prevent a participant’s likelihood ratings being subadditive 
or superadditive, the likelihood ratings were required to sum to 100. To assist participants 
in this task, a “remainder” box at the bottom of the screen displayed the number of to-be-
allocated likelihood points; this number was adjusted automatically each time the 
experimenter transcribed a likelihood rating next to its corresponding option. 
 Next, using a new screen with blank rating boxes, participants rated how 
threatening each option was to their own personal safety, using a scale from 0 (not at all 
threatening) to 100 (very threatening). As participants may have generated more than one 
option that they regarded as very low/high threat, they were instructed to assign threat 
ratings for each option independently (i.e., without regard to the sum of the individual 
threat ratings).  
The set of assessment options displayed on the likelihood- and threat-rating 
screens were presented in a shuffled order, and not in their order of generation. This step 
was implemented to reduce the possibility of participants simply rating options according 
to their serial position on-screen (e.g., assigning a high likelihood to the first option 
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generated, and a lower likelihood to the next option, etc.). Note, however, that the serial 
order of option generation was recorded for later analysis. 
Response option generation task. Participants completed a similarly structured 
response option generation task by answering the question, “How could you respond in 
the next few seconds?” Participants were reminded to follow the preparatory instructions 
(e.g., report only those options heeded at the occlusion point). After verbalizing their 
response options, participants first rated their likelihood of pursuing each option, 
employing the same likelihood rating scale and procedure described for the assessment 
option generation task. Next, they rated the quality of each option independently, using a 
scale that ranged from 0 (not at all good for my own/innocent bystanders’ immediate 
safety and survival) to 100 (very good for my own/innocent bystanders’ immediate safety 
and survival).  
Procedure 
After providing their written informed consent, participants completed a 
biographical questionnaire, including questions about their law enforcement training, 
qualifications, and employment, as well as the number of times they had participated in 
law enforcement training using video-based simulations. Participants wore their standard 
duty uniform and equipment belt, and were equipped with a replica handgun, inert Taser, 
inert chemical spray, real baton, and a radio. Participants also wore a lapel microphone 
(Sony WCS-999) that was connected wirelessly to a video camera (Canon VIXIA HF 
M300); the camera recorded the participant’s physical actions and verbal communication, 
as well as the projected video stimuli. 
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The video stimuli were displayed on a large projector screen (experienced 
participants: 212 cm x 157 cm; less-experienced participants: 245 cm x 192 cm). 
Participants began each trial standing directly in front of the screen (experienced 
participants: 330 cm from screen; less-experienced participants: 520 cm from screen), but 
were free to move from this position once the video started. The experimenter instructed 
participants to interact with each video stimulus as if they had been dispatched to the 
situation while on patrol (e.g., observe, issue verbal commands, move, communicate via 
radio, deploy the appropriate tactical force option). Participants then interacted with one 
practice trial; after the occlusion point, the experimenter introduced the assessment and 
response option-generation tasks. Specifically, the experimenter instructed participants 
to: (a) list, rapidly, only those assessment/response options that they were considering at 
the point of occlusion; (b) verbalize all of the assessment/response options under 
consideration, even if participants believed a specific option(s) to have a low likelihood; 
and (c) refrain from engaging in reflective option generation (e.g., reporting options that 
were generated only after reflecting on the scenario, generating options solely for the 
sake of increasing the number of options generated, etc.). Participants then completed the 
assessment and response option-generation tasks for the practice trial.  
After the practice trial, participants completed the 19 test trials in a randomized 
order. Participants always completed the assessment option-generation task followed by 
the response option-generation task. After completing the two option-generation tasks in 
a given trial, participants indicated whether they had seen that scenario with/out that 
particular ending previously in their law enforcement training. Participants did not 
receive feedback on their performance (i.e., they were never told nor shown how the 
                                                                                                                                          78 
 
 
scenario culminated after the occlusion point). After each trial, the data (i.e., options and 
ratings) were automatically written to a text file for later extraction and analysis. 
Participants were tested individually; each testing session lasted approximately 2 hours. 
At the conclusion of each testing session, the experimenter debriefed the participant and 
thanked them for their participation.  
Data Preparation 
For each scenario, the anticipated outcome was the assessment option that 
participants rated highest in likelihood. Note that as participants were not instructed 
specifically to provide unique likelihood ratings, there were some cases in which they 
assigned the highest likelihood rating to more than one option (e.g., 50/50, 20/40/40, 
33.33/33.33/33.33). In such cases, the anticipated outcome was deemed the assessment 
option with the highest likelihood rating that was generated earliest in the generation 
sequence. 
STUDY 1B 
In Study 1A, the experimenter selected the occlusion point for each scenario 
based on extensive pilot testing. In Study 1B, the occlusion points were identified via a 
cognitive task analysis conducted with experienced police officers. I will first describe 
the cognitive task analysis, and then the subsequent study.  
Method – Cognitive Task Analysis 
Participants 
The participants were four experienced police trainers from a large police 
department. The trainers had a median of 21.25 years’ (range: 21.00–25.25) law 
enforcement experience.  
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Materials and Stimuli 
Seventeen of the 20 interactive, video-based law enforcement scenarios used in 
Study 1A were used for the cognitive task analysis; three additional escalating scenarios 
were also included (see Appendix A). The video scenarios were presented in their 
entirety and were not temporally occluded at any point.  
Procedure 
The video scenarios, with a frame rate of 29 frames per second, were played using 
KMPlayer software (http://www.kmpmedia.net/) and projected onto a screen (267 cm x 
149 cm) using an Optoma TW1692 projector. The trainers observed the scenarios 
passively (i.e., without interacting) from a seated position, 4.13 m from the screen. The 
experimenter instructed the trainers that their goal was to identify the earliest point in 
each video scenario at which they believed experienced law enforcement officers should 
be able to correctly anticipate the outcome. The trainers first observed a video scenario in 
its entirety, played at normal speed. Subsequently, the trainers directed the experimenter 
to replay the video—using the slow motion and pause functions where necessary—until 
the trainers determined the optimal occlusion point. The trainers were allowed unlimited 
time to scrutinize the videos, and could re-watch the videos until they were satisfied with 
their selected occlusion point. The experimenter recorded the exact time point/frame 
number that corresponded with the selected occlusion point. Each trainer was consulted 
individually; depending on the trainer, their review of the videos lasted between 1 and 4 
hours. Due to time constraints, each trainer viewed a subset of the 20 scenarios (see Table 
1). Sixteen scenarios were viewed by at least two trainers. 
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Table 1 
Occlusion Points Selected by Experienced Police Trainers in Study 1B (Cognitive Task 
Analysis) 
 
  
 Time (s) of selected occlusion point 
      
      
Scenario Trainer 1 Trainer 2 Trainer 3 Trainer 4 Experimenter 
      
      
Bara 56.79 56.72 56.90 57.55 57.59 
Blow upa 33.07 33.24 33.79 30.90 33.17 
Blue dodge 30.62 – 30.66 30.72 30.62 
Bus lady – – – – – 
Convenience store 39.62 – 39.62 39.66 39.76 
Domestic babya 61.10 61.10 61.17 61.17 61.10 
Domestic puncha 28.79 30.48 28.66 28.76 28.72 
Drunk – 42.79 – – – 
Greenwood park - 8.41 10.97 11.07 10.93 
Gun graba 41.79 39.72 41.52 40.76 44.79 
Hey Mr Wilson – 63.07 62.90 66.07 66.03 
Hospital incident 40.90 – – – – 
Hotel 58.55 – – – – 
Larceny – – – – – 
Men in blacka 30.79 28.93 30.55 30.69 30.55 
Miami – – – – – 
Rock n rolla 29.24 29.62 30.45 32.83 29.31 
School hostagea 38.31 38.03 38.10 38.24 38.24 
School shootinga 49.07 49.03 49.14 49.14 49.07 
Subwaya 32.48 32.76 32.72 32.24 32.45 
Suicide by cop 73.34 – 76.62 – – 
Suicide waitress – 59.76 59.93 59.72 60.17 
Video store 35.52 – – – – 
 
     
Note. Videos were screened at 29 frames per second; each video frame was approximately 0.03 s in 
duration. Dashes indicate that a scenario was not evaluated by a trainer.  
aScenarios included in the ICC analysis. 
  
Reliability Analysis – Cognitive Task Analysis Data 
An analysis of inter-rater reliability was conducted on the 10 scenarios that were 
rated by all four trainers (see Table 1). The average length of the 10 scenarios included in 
the analysis was 42.62 s (SD = 10.84). Across the 10 scenarios, the average difference 
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between the earliest and latest occlusion point identified by the trainers was 1.40 s (SD = 
1.23). This provides some initial evidence that the four trainers identified a similar point 
in each scenario as the ideal occlusion point. A more formal assessment of inter-rater 
agreement across the 10 scenarios was conducted by calculating an intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). In contrast to inter-rater reliability measures 
that are calculated based upon the number of agreements/disagreements between the 
raters (e.g., kappa; Cohen, 1960), an ICC provides a measure of reliability for ratings 
made on a continuous scale (e.g., time). Using occlusion-point time as the continuous 
dependent variable, the ICC(2, 4) coefficient was 0.999, with a lower 95% confidence 
interval bound of 0.997. An ICC of 1.0 represents perfect agreement, and an ICC above 
0.8 represents near-perfect agreement.  
To determine the extent to which the experimenter’s judgment could serve as an 
additional rating (e.g., for scenarios which were not scrutinized by all four trainers), the 
experimenter also completed, independently, the same task as the trainers. When the 
experimenter’s data were included in the reliability analysis for the 10 scenarios, the 
ICC(2, 5) coefficient was also 0.999, with a lower 95% confidence interval bound of 
0.997. This result represents near-perfect agreement amongst the trainers’ and 
experimenter’s selected occlusion points.  
Then, to identify the criterion occlusion point to be used for each scenario in the 
subsequent study, I selected the median of the trainers’ occlusion points. Three of the de-
escalating scenarios from Study 1A were not scrutinized by any trainers due to time 
limitations; as a substitute, the experimenter scrutinized each of these scenarios and 
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determined the criterion occlusion point.  The criterion occlusion point times are listed in 
Appendix D. 
Method – Performance Data 
Participants 
Forty-two law enforcement officers were recruited to participate in this study. All 
officers were from the same police department in an urban metropolitan area of western 
USA. In this department, police academy graduates initially serve as correctional officers 
in jails, where they often work for several years before being assigned to a regular, street 
patrol role. Amongst the officers recruited for this study, there was a broad range of 
experience levels: officers had between 0.12 and 26.02 years’ total law enforcement 
experience, and between 0.00 and 24.43 years’ patrol experience. The frequency 
distributions for participants’ total years of law enforcement experience and years of 
patrol experience were negatively skewed. To create two main groups that differed 
substantially in their level of experience, the sample was divided into three groups: 
experienced, intermediate-experience, and less-experienced using the following criteria: 
(a) a mean difference of at least 5 years’ total law enforcement experience between the 
experienced and less-experienced groups, (b) maximize the size of the experienced and 
less-experienced groups, and (c) minimize the size of the intermediate-experience group. 
The intermediate group (n = 11) was not included in the subsequent analysis, and will not 
be described further.  
Experienced participants. Experienced police officers (n = 16; 0 females, 16 
males) were those who had at least 12 years’ total law enforcement experience (M = 
17.96, SD = 5.09, range: 12.34–26.02) and some street patrol experience (M = 9.37 years, 
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SD = 5.55, range: 3.25–24.43). At the time of testing, the experienced officers were 
serving in a variety of roles, including patrol sergeant, detective, and recruit training 
officer. The mean age of the experienced officers was 42.19 years (SD = 4.81, range: 35–
55). 
Less-experienced participants. Less-experienced officers (n = 15; 2 females, 13 
males) were those who had less than 5 years’ total law enforcement experience (M = 
2.54, SD = 1.83, range: 0.12–4.75) and were still serving as correctional officers in jails 
(i.e., had no street patrol experience). The mean age of the less-experienced officers was 
32.13 years (SD = 7.11, range: 24–45). 
The remaining 11 officers (3 females, 8 males), who had between 5 and 12 years’ 
total law enforcement experience (M = 7.09, SD = 2.17, range: 5.17–11.07), completed 
the experiment but were excluded from the data analysis.  
Materials and Stimuli 
Twenty-three interactive, video-based law enforcement scenarios (IES Interactive 
Training: Ann Arbor, MI) served as the basis for the experimental stimuli (see Appendix 
A). Using the criterion occlusion points determined by the cognitive task analysis, the 
scenarios were edited to create temporally-occluded stimuli. To prompt participants to 
verbalize their anticipation, a short, audible tone was digitally added to the video 
immediately after the occlusion point and a textual prompt (i.e., What happens next on 
the screen?) was displayed on the screen. 
Procedure 
After providing their written informed consent, participants completed a 
biographical questionnaire, including questions about their law enforcement training, 
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qualifications, and employment, as well as the number of times they had participated in 
law enforcement training using video-based simulations. Participants wore their standard 
duty uniform and equipment belt, and were equipped with a replica handgun, inert Taser, 
inert chemical spray, real baton, and a radio. Participants also wore a lapel microphone 
(Sony WCS-999) that was connected wirelessly to a video camera (Canon VIXIA HF 
M300); the camera recorded the participant’s physical actions and verbal communication, 
as well as the projected video stimuli. 
The video stimuli were displayed on a projector screen; the testing sessions were 
conducted at several locations and employed differently-sized screens (minimum screen 
size: 141cm x 100 cm; maximum screen size: 222 cm x 156 cm). Participants began each 
trial standing directly in front of the screen (minimum distance: 330 cm; maximum 
distance: 480 cm), but were free to move from this position once the video stimulus 
started. The experimenter instructed participants to interact with each video stimulus as if 
they had been dispatched to the situation while on patrol (e.g., observe, issue verbal 
commands, move, communicate via radio, deploy the appropriate tactical force option). 
At the point of occlusion, participants were asked to verbalize what they anticipated 
would happen next in the video, if it were to continue. Participants then interacted with 
one practice trial, and practiced verbalizing their anticipation as quickly as possible after 
the occlusion point. After the practice trial, participants completed the 22 test trials in a 
randomized order. After completing the anticipation task in a given trial, participants 
indicated whether they had seen that scenario previously in their law enforcement 
training. Participants did not receive feedback on their performance (i.e., they were never 
told, nor shown, how the scenario culminated after the occlusion point). Participants were 
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tested individually; each testing session lasted approximately 60 minutes. At the 
conclusion of each testing session, the experimenter debriefed the participant and thanked 
them for their participation.  
Data Preparation 
To prepare the data for scoring, participants’ verbalized anticipations were 
transcribed from the video recordings into an Excel spreadsheet.  
 
STUDY 1C 
A preliminary analysis of the data from Study 1B revealed that across all 
scenarios, the experienced group performed significantly better than the less-experienced 
group. However, across all scenarios the mean percentage of experienced participants 
who anticipated the outcome correctly was below 50%. Recall that the objective of the 
trainers’ cognitive task analysis was to identify the occlusion point at which all—or at 
least a majority—of experienced officers should be able to anticipate the outcome 
correctly. There are at least three explanations for the relatively poor level of anticipation 
performance demonstrated in Study 1B: (i) some scenarios may not contain cues that are 
sufficiently salient to facilitate anticipation, (ii) the occlusion points determined by the 
trainers occurred prior to salient cues becoming available, and (iii) participants’ 
interaction with the video scenarios affected their ability to anticipate the outcome of the 
scenario.  
Therefore, to gain a more detailed understanding of anticipation performance in 
each scenario, an online, computer-based study was conducted with three occlusion 
points per scenario. There were two main objectives: to identify which scenarios were 
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discriminating of experience level, and to determine the optimal occlusion point for those 
discriminating scenarios. To remove any possible effects of physical interaction on 
anticipation performance, participants in Study 1C observed the video scenarios passively 
(i.e., from a seated position).  
Method 
Participants 
Experienced participants. A link to the online study was distributed to 
experienced law enforcement officers via police training agencies, state tactical officer 
associations, and law enforcement web sites. Fifty-two experienced law enforcement 
officers completed the experiment. Complete demographic and law enforcement 
experience data were obtained for 42 (2 females, 40 males) of the 52 experienced 
officers. The 42 officers had an average of 14.18 years’ (SD = 8.54, range: 1–34) law 
enforcement experience; their average age was 39.57 years (SD = 10.04, range: 21–64).   
Less-experienced participants. Sixty-five police recruits (9 females, 56 males) 
were recruited via an informational flyer posted at a regional police academy. Their 
average age was 28.26 years (SD = 7.42, range: 19–47). Although 16 recruits had served 
in the military, none had any civilian policing experience.   
Materials and Stimuli 
Based on a preliminary analysis of the data from Studies 1A and 1B, the 
experimenter identified three occlusion points for each of the 22 test video scenarios (see 
Appendix D). For example, in Study 1A the Blow Up scenario was temporally occluded 
immediately prior to the suspect detonating the improvised explosive device. At that late 
point in the scenario, all of the experienced participants anticipated the outcome 
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correctly, as did 71% of the less-experienced participants. In Study 1B, the Blow Up 
scenario was temporally occluded at an earlier point—when the improvised explosive 
device had just become visible under the suspect’s shirt. At that relatively early point, 
only 18.75% of experienced participants and 13.33% of less-experienced participants 
anticipated the outcome correctly. Based on these data, and assuming that anticipation 
performance would only improve over the period between the early and late occlusion 
points, it was reasonable to hypothesize that the point of maximum discriminability 
would occur during the time period between those two occlusion points. Therefore, the 
experimenter identified three intermediate occlusion points, each of which corresponded 
with the onset of a critical cue in the video (see Appendix C). Occlusion points in the 
remaining scenarios were identified using a similar process. Note that for several 
scenarios, at least one occlusion point selected for Study 1C corresponded with an 
occlusion point used in Studies 1A or 1B.  
Three temporally-occluded versions of each scenario (i.e., one version for each 
occlusion point) were created in WMV format using Windows Movie Maker 2.6 
(Microsoft); these videos were then converted to SWF (i.e. Flash video) format using 
Hamster Free Video Converter 2.0 (www.hamstersoft.com). The edited videos were 
inserted into a web-based experiment using Qualtrics Online Survey Software 
(www.qualtrics.com). The experiment comprised: (a) an informed consent form, (b) a 
web-browser check, (c) demographic and law enforcement experience questionnaires, (d) 
detailed video-based instructions and a single practice trial, (e) test trials, and (f) a debrief 
and “thank you” note.  
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Procedure 
Experienced participants completed the experiment at their convenience (e.g., at 
work or at home). Less-experienced participants completed the experiment in a computer 
lab at the police academy. Participants viewed one version of each of the 22 test trials 
(i.e., one of the three occlusion points for each trial) in a randomized order. As the 
primary purpose of this study was to determine the optimal occlusion point for each 
scenario—and not to conduct a within-participant analysis of the effect of occlusion point 
on performance—the test trials were not blocked by version (i.e., occlusion point 
number). Instead, the version of a given scenario that was presented to the participant was 
determined by the software, which was programmed to balance—within each experience 
group—the number of participants who viewed each version of a scenario. By 
programming the experiment in this way, version-type was essentially randomized 
together with scenario-presentation order, and therefore there was no need to 
counterbalance for order effects associated with version-type. Across the 22 test trials, 
participants viewed an average of approximately 7.33 scenarios (SD ≈ 2.00) at each of the 
three occlusion points.  
After viewing the temporally-occluded scenario in each trial, participants typed 
their anticipated outcome into a text box on the screen and then indicated whether they 
had seen that scenario previously in their law enforcement training. Participants did not 
receive feedback on their performance (i.e., they were never told nor shown how the 
scenario culminated after the occlusion point).   
Data Preparation 
The data were downloaded from the Qualtrics web site as an SPSS data file, and 
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were then cleaned and exported to Microsoft Excel for scoring.  
DATA ANALYSIS FOR STUDIES 1A–C  
Data Screening  
If participants indicated that they had seen a scenario before (i.e., during their law 
enforcement training), their response for that scenario was deleted from the data set. 
None of the participants in Studies 1A or B indicated that they had seen any of the 
scenarios before.  Of the 2482 data points collected in Study 1C, 44 (1.78%) were 
deleted.  
Anticipation Scores 
The criterion anticipation for each scenario was the final action carried out by the 
suspect after the occlusion point (e.g., detonating the improvised explosive device, 
placing the knife on ground and surrendering). Anticipations were scored as “correct” if 
they matched the criterion. 
Analyses Employed 
Three types of analyses across the three studies were used to identify scenarios 
that discriminated between the experience groups, and to identify the optimal occlusion 
point. These analyses were performed for each scenario separately and provide 
converging evidence regarding the usefulness of each clip for assessing anticipation 
performance. 
Cumulative probability plots. For each scenario, the procedure used to 
determine the time point of maximum difference between the experienced and less-
experienced participants was based on the 2-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (e.g., 
Goodman, 1954); a similar procedure has been used previously to identify expert–novice 
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differences in a card-sorting task (Wolf, Dougherty, & Kortemeyer, 2012).  
As a first step toward generating the cumulative probability plots required for this 
analysis, the log of the odds ratio (i.e., number of correct anticipations divided by the 
number of incorrect anticipations) for experienced and less-experienced participants was 
calculated at each occlusion point. In instances where there was zero correct or zero 
incorrect anticipations, a correction was made by adding 0.5 to both numbers (Agresti, 
2002). These log odds ratios (y axis) were plotted against occlusion-point time (x axis), 
centered around the mean occlusion-point time. A linear trend line was then fitted to each 
group’s data. Using the slope and intercept of each line, the probability of a correct 
anticipation was calculated across the time period bounded by the earliest and latest 
occlusion points, in increments of 0.01 s. The cumulative probability for the experienced 
and less-experienced groups was then plotted against time and the time of maximum 
difference (in favor of the experienced group) was identified and recorded as the optimal 
occlusion point.  
To ascertain the impact of combining the data from the three studies in one 
analysis, this process was repeated using only the three occlusion points from Study 1C; 
the results did not differ from those obtained using the five occlusion points from Studies 
1A–C.  
2 x 2 Pearson’s chi-squared tests of independence. To detect whether the 
number of correct anticipations generated by the experienced and less-experienced 
groups were independent of each other, Pearson’s chi-squared tests of independence were 
conducted on the data at each occlusion point. Fisher’s exact test was calculated when 
expected cell frequencies were less than 5.  
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Pearson’s chi-squared goodness-of-fit tests. When chi-squared tests of 
independence are conducted using small sample sizes—such as those that characterize 
the number of participants at each occlusion point—the type II-error rate can be inflated 
(Neyman & Pearson, 1933). For example, the power to detect a difference between 
proportions-correct of .5 (e.g., less-experienced group) and .7 (e.g., experienced group) 
with a total sample size of 30 is approximately .20; to detect the same difference with a 
power of .80, a total sample size of 186 would be required. Furthermore, the power to 
detect a significant difference between proportions increases as the proportions diverge 
from 0.50. For example, for a fixed sample size, the power to detect a significant 
difference between proportions of .50 and .70 is less than the power to detect the 
difference between proportions of .10 and .30, even though the difference in proportions 
(i.e., .20) is the same. This is problematic, because in the current study the difference 
between .50 and .70 is more interesting (i.e., one group performs better than chance) than 
the difference between .10 and .30 (i.e., both groups performing below chance). 
However, using a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test (cf. chi-squared test of 
independence), researchers can assess differences between observed data and a 
theoretically-derived expected value. In this analysis, the observed values within each 
experience group were compared to a distribution in which 50% of participants 
anticipated the outcome correctly. Fifty percent was selected as the theoretical 
comparison value as this represents the most conservative comparison value for 
anticipating at chance levels. Although there is clearly more than one incorrect 
anticipation that participants could generate, using a lower theoretical comparison value 
for chance anticipation (e.g., 20%) could result in a low—and potentially uninteresting—
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proportion of correct anticipations appearing to be a significant departure from the 
theoretical expected value (e.g., when greater than 20% but less than 50% of participants 
anticipate correctly). Using the goodness-of-fit test with the expected value set to 50% of 
the number of observations, the ideal situation would be the detection of an occlusion 
point at which the proportion of correct anticipations generated by experienced 
participants is above, and significantly different from 50%, and the proportion of correct 
anticipations generated by less-experienced participants is not significantly different from 
50%.  
Identification of Discriminating Scenarios 
Each scenario was initially classified as discriminating or non-discriminating 
using the cumulative probability data. Discriminating scenarios were those for which, at 
any time point(s): 
• The experienced group’s probability of anticipating the actual outcome was greater 
than .5, and 
• The difference between the experienced and less-experienced groups’ probabilities 
was greater than .1.  
Of the 23 scenarios, six were classified as discriminating and were retained for further 
analysis (see Table 2); the 17 non-discriminating scenarios were not subjected to further 
analysis. 
Using the cumulative probability data for each discriminating scenario, the time 
point was located that corresponded with the maximum difference between the 
experienced and less-experienced groups’ probabilities. This time point was then 
compared to the occlusion points used in each study, and the temporally-closest occlusion 
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point was identified. The occlusion point was classified as optimal if:  
• The Pearson’s chi-squared test of independence was significant at p < .05, and/or 
• When more than half of the experienced and less-experienced participants anticipated 
the outcome correctly, the Pearson’s chi-squared goodness-of-fit test for the 
experienced group indicated that the proportion of correct anticipations was 
significantly greater than 50% and the goodness-of-fit test for the less-experienced 
group indicated that the proportion of correct anticipations was not significantly 
different than 50%, and/or 
• More than half of the experienced participants, but fewer than half of the less-
experienced participants anticipated the outcome correctly.  
Using these criteria, all six occlusion points (i.e., one for each discriminating 
scenario) were classified as optimal. Table 2 displays the optimal occlusion point and 
results of the classification criteria for the discriminating scenarios.  
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Effect Size Calculation 
For each discriminating scenario, a measure of effect size for anticipation 
performance was calculated using Cohen’s index h for proportions (Cohen, 1988, 
equation 6.2.2) (see Table 3). Cohen defined small, medium, and large effects as h values 
of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively. Across the six scenarios, the overall sample-weighted 
mean h was 0.75.  
 
Table 3 
Effect Size (Cohen’s h) Measures for the Discriminating Scenarios  
and the Overall Sample-Weighted Effect Size 
 
    
Scenario Cohen’s h Total n Weighted h 
    
    
Blow up 1.43 25 35.76 
Domestic punch 0.48 35 16.74 
Gun grab 0.94 37 34.60 
Hey Mr Wilson 0.32 31 9.98 
Subway 0.61 36 22.12 
Suicide waitress 0.85 35 29.90 
    
    
  Σ = 199 Σ = 149.09 
    
    
Overall sample-weighted h: 0.75   
    
 
 
SUMMARY OF STUDIES 1A–C  
The goals of Study 1 were to identify video-based law enforcement scenarios that 
could discriminate between experienced and less-experienced police officers’ ability to 
perceptually anticipate the outcome, and determine the optimal occlusion point that 
maximized the skill-based difference in anticipation. Three studies, all employing a 
temporal-occlusion paradigm, were conducted to achieve these goals. Across the three 
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studies, an iterative approach was taken to the selection of occlusion points. In Study 1A, 
the experimenter selected the occlusion point. In Study 1B, a cognitive task analysis, 
using experienced police trainers, was conducted to identify the criterion occlusion point. 
Then, based on the data from Studies 1A and 1B, Study 1C employed three different 
occlusion points in a between-subjects design.  
The data from the three studies were analyzed collectively using converging 
methods. Of the 23 scenarios that were examined, the analysis revealed six scenarios to 
be discriminating of experience level. For the six discriminating scenarios, an optimal 
occlusion point—which maximized the difference between experienced and less-
experienced participants in terms of their anticipation performance—was determined. 
The discriminating scenarios—occluded at their respective optimal occlusion points—
served as the experimental stimuli in Study 2.  
Note that a secondary goal of Study 1A was to assess the option-generation 
paradigm for use in Study 2. In general, the option-generation paradigm was effective in 
eliciting the data required for testing hypotheses related to option generation during the 
assessment and response phases of decision making. Several minor modifications that 
could improve the paradigm were identified (e.g., forcing participants to assign a unique 
likelihood rating [e.g., 51% and 49%, rather than 50% and 50%] to each option in a set); 
the revised paradigm was employed in Study 2.  
Finally, the methods and analyses employed in Study 1 provide an example of a 
procedure that can be used to determine occlusion points for temporal-occlusion studies, 
especially in domains where the ultimate outcome of a given action is not presaged solely 
by physically deterministic events (e.g., biomechanical properties of action), but instead 
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could also include probabilistic information (e.g., pulling a gun, versus a wallet, out of a 
pocket).   
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CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 2 
 Recall that the main goal of this research is to further our understanding of the 
relationship between the situation assessment and response phases of decision making, 
and to investigate the extent to which this relationship is affected by skill level. An 
additional goal was to gather information that can be used, in the future, to design 
training based on the anticipation skills, decision strategies, and processes of experienced 
police officers.  
Study 1 succeeded in identifying six escalating scenarios—and optimal occlusion 
points—that discriminated between experienced and less-experienced officers, in terms 
of their ability to anticipate the outcome of the scenario. Using these scenarios, Study 2 
was designed to test specific hypotheses about option generation during the situation 
assessment and responses phases of decision making. The hypotheses, which are derived 
from LTWM theory and the RPD/TTF model, focus on the number and type (i.e., task-
relevant versus task-irrelevant) of options generated, the serial position of the “selected” 
(i.e., final) option, and the relationship between the number of options generated and 
decision quality. To collect data (i.e., options, ratings of options) that could be used to 
test these hypotheses, Study 2 employed a prediction and option-generation paradigm 
(similar to that described for Study 1A), in which participants viewed temporally 
occluded scenarios, and then generated assessment and response options.  
Although it was expected that the option-generation and ratings data would 
provide a detailed insight into officers’ thinking at the point of occlusion, these data alone 
do not provide a comprehensive understanding of information processing during these 
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dynamic scenarios. For example, an examination of the options generated at the occlusion 
point does not—in and of itself—provide information about other, additional options that 
participants may have generated earlier in the scenario but then discounted prior to the 
occlusion point. Similarly, it would be interesting—especially for the future design of 
training—to gain an understanding of what led participants to generate the options they 
did. Therefore, to supplement the option generation and rating data collected at the 
occlusion point, additional information about participants’ thinking was elicited via two 
cognitive task analysis techniques: retrospective verbal reports of thinking, and 
stimulated recall using probe questions. The data elicited via these techniques were 
expected to validate the option generation and ratings data, and provide information 
about cues heeded, and inferences and options generated, prior to the occlusion point.  
Hypotheses 
 Hypotheses 1 and 2 relate to outcome measures of performance.  
Hypothesis 1: Based on the review of studies of perceptual anticipation, it was expected 
that experienced participants would anticipate the culminating event more frequently than 
less-experienced participants.  
Hypothesis 2: Based on the review of response-option generation and selection studies, it 
was expected that experienced participants would select the best response option more 
frequently than less-experienced participants.    
Hypotheses 3–8 relate to the option-generation process.  
Hypothesis 3. Based on previous studies that employed an option-generation paradigm 
(e.g., Johnson & Raab, 2003; Klein & Peio, 1989; Klein et al., 1995; Raab & Johnson, 
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2007; Ward et al., 2012), it is expected that in general, participants would generate few 
(i.e., less than five) assessment and response options.  
Hypothesis 4: Based on LTWM theory, Ward et al. (2011) proposed that possessing a 
detailed representation of the situation (i.e., generating more assessment options) should 
facilitate the generation of a single, good response option. Although these authors did not 
find support for this hypothesis, methodological differences between this and other option 
generation studies could explain their results. Accordingly, it was still expected that in 
the current task environment the total number of assessment options would be negatively 
correlated with the total number of response options. 
Hypothesis 5: Recall that Ward and Williams (2003) found that skilled youth soccer 
players generated more task-relevant options than task-irrelevant options, and that 
compared with less-skilled players, they generated fewer task-irrelevant options. To 
explain this finding, Ward & Williams proposed that over time, skilled players develop 
extensive, detailed, and domain-specific knowledge representations, which they can 
access via retrieval cues in LTWM. In dynamic situations, skilled players create up-to-
date situation models by integrating information from the environment with their 
knowledge representations. The situational model aids in identifying meaningful patterns 
of cues in the environment, while disregarding irrelevant information. Less-skilled 
players generated more irrelevant information because they had not developed rich 
knowledge representations, nor did they possess the LTWM skills needed to integrate 
such knowledge with the information available in the environment. Based on this 
explanation, Ward et al. (2011) hypothesized that skilled police officers would generate 
more task-relevant assessment options than task-irrelevant assessment options, and that 
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they would generate less task-irrelevant assessment options that less-skilled officers. The 
data, which was extracted from verbal reports, supported this hypothesis. Interestingly, 
although this hypothesis relates specifically to options generated during assessment of a 
situation, the same pattern of results was also found for response options—despite the 
more general claim by proponents of TTF and RPD that experts would generate fewer 
total response options during decision making (e.g., Johnson & Raab, 2003; Klein & 
Peio, 1989). Based on Ward & Williams, and Ward et al., it was expected that 
experienced police officers will generate more task-relevant options than task-irrelevant 
options, and that they will generate fewer task-irrelevant assessment options than less-
experienced officers during both assessment and responses phases of decision making.  
Hypothesis 6: Recall that Ward and Williams (2003) and Ward et al. (2012) found that 
skilled soccer players were better at prioritizing—by threat level—their task-relevant 
assessment options. This ability was attributed to skilled players’ superior domain-
specific knowledge representations and LTWM skills. Based on this finding, it is 
expected that compared to less-experienced officers, experienced police officers will be 
better at prioritizing their task-relevant assessment options by threat (i.e., danger posed to 
the officer and innocent bystanders).  
Hypothesis 7: Based on LTWM theory, Ward et al. (2011, 2012) hypothesized that the 
ability to generate more of the task-relevant assessment options—when they are available 
in the environment—would result in better anticipation performance. In other words, 
having a detailed and up-to-date situation model would allow participants to accurately 
anticipate the actual outcome. Conversely, Ward et al. hypothesized that generating more 
task-irrelevant assessment options would result in poorer anticipation performance. 
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Indeed, the data supported these claims. Therefore, it is expected that the number of task-
relevant assessment options generated will be positively correlated with the number of 
times participants correctly anticipate the situational outcome. It is also expected that the 
number of task-irrelevant assessment options will be negatively correlated with the 
number of times participants correctly anticipate the situational outcome. Additionally, it 
is expected that the total number of options (i.e., task-relevant plus task-irrelevant) will 
not be correlated with anticipation performance, since the underlying positive and 
negative relationships will nullify each other, resulting in no significant relationship.  
Hypothesis 8: According to TTF, the total number of response options should be 
negatively correlated with decision quality. Although Johnson and Raab (2003, Raab & 
Johnson, 2007) found support for this notion, Ward et al. (2011) suggested that LTWM 
theory could provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the 
number of response options generated, and the quality of the final decision. Accordingly, 
Ward et al. found that the number of task-irrelevant response options generated was 
negatively correlated with decision quality, but that the number of task-relevant response 
options was positively correlated with decision quality. Based on the opposing 
relationships observed during assessment and response, Ward et al. also found that the 
total number of response options was not significantly correlated with decision quality. 
Thus, if a TTF-like mechanism underlies response-option generation, it is expected that 
the total number of response options will be negatively correlated with the number of 
times participants select the best response option. If, on the other hand, a LTWM-type 
mechanism underlies response-option generation, it is expected that the number of task-
103 
 
 
irrelevant and task-relevant options will be negative and positively correlated, 
respectively, with the number of times participants select the best response option.  
Method 
Power Analysis 
To determine the sample size required for Study 2, an a priori power analysis was 
conducted using G*Power 3.1.5 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), with 
α set at .05 and β set at .80. The option to input effect size as Cohen’s h was selected, and 
the sample-weighted mean proportion of correct anticipations for the less-experienced 
group in Study 1 (i.e., .51) was entered as the lower expected proportion. G*Power 
estimated the sample size required to detect an effect size of h = 0.75 (i.e., the overall, 
sample-weighted effect size from Study 1) under these conditions to be 46 (i.e., 23 per 
experience group) (see Appendix F).  
Participants 
Experienced participants (n = 23, 1 female, 22 males) were law enforcement 
officers from a metropolitan police department who had accrued at least 5 years’ law 
enforcement experience (M = 15.29, SD = 4.62) and were, at the time of testing, serving 
in an active role (e.g., street patrol, special response team member, undercover officer). 
These officers had completed one week of refresher training per year of service, as 
mandated by their department. Additionally, eight of the officers had served in the 
military; four of those served in combat-related roles. The median age of the experienced 
officers was 40 years (range: 33–59). Apart from the 23 officers who were included in the 
sample, four other experienced officers participated in the experiment but were excluded 
from the experienced group because they had either: (a) accrued less than 5 years’ law 
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enforcement experience (n = 2), (b) retired from law enforcement (n = 1), or (c) recently 
returned to working street patrol after working in administrative roles for more than 10 
years (n = 1).  
Less-experienced participants (n = 26, 6 females, 20 males) were law enforcement 
trainees who were in the process of completing (n = 20), or had recently completed (n = 
6), their initial law enforcement training. Their median age was 22 years (range: 21–40). 
The trainees had not yet begun working as fully-fledged police officers, but had spent at 
least 176 hours either observing an experienced police officer on duty (n = 20) or 
carrying out police duties whilst under the supervision of an experienced police officer (n 
= 6). Three other trainees completed the experiment, but were excluded from the less-
experienced group because they had prior law enforcement, military, and/or security 
experience.  
Materials and Stimuli 
Ten interactive, video-based law enforcement scenarios (IES Interactive Training: 
Ann Arbor, MI) served as the basis for the temporally-occluded experimental stimuli. 
One escalating scenario was used as the practice trial; this was the same practice trial 
used in Study 1. Six test scenarios were the escalating scenarios from Study 1 that 
discriminated between skill groups on anticipation performance. The test scenarios were 
temporally occluded at the optimal occlusion point determined by the analysis of the 
Study 1 data. Three de-escalating scenarios served as catch trials. The catch trials, and 
appropriate occlusion points, were selected by a subject-matter expert (SME) in police 
use-of-force who identified scenarios from Study 1 in which a responding officer would 
be justified in placing their hand on their holstered firearm while questioning the 
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suspect(s), but would not be justified in using any force (i.e., drawing a firearm/shooting, 
drawing a baton/striking, drawing chemical spray/spraying, or employing empty-hand 
strikes/physical restraint techniques). The subjective judgments of the SME were 
consistent with the use-of-force continuum that forms the basis of current law 
enforcement practice and training for these kinds of decision-making scenarios.  
Each scenario was digitally edited to end at the occlusion point (i.e., replaced by 
black screen), thus creating the video stimuli. An audible tone was inserted immediately 
after the occlusion point; this served to prompt participants to begin the subsequent 
option generation tasks. As in Study 1, each video stimulus began with an audio-only 
“radio message”, describing the situation to which the officer was being dispatched. Each 
video stimulus was inserted into a Microsoft PowerPoint 2010 presentation, which 
included prompts for the subsequent assessment and response option generation tasks.  
Option Generation Tasks 
Assessment option-generation task. In this task, participants were required to 
generate assessment options—events that could occur in the environment (e.g., courses of 
actions that could be taken by the perpetrator or others in the scenario) at the point of 
occlusion. To elicit assessment options, participants responded verbally to the following 
textual prompt, which was displayed on the screen: “What could happen next on the 
screen in the next few seconds?” The prompt was displayed together with a 10-second 
countdown timer and a single text box. Participants were instructed to verbalize their first 
option as quickly as possible, and that their response time would be measured, starting 
from the occlusion-point tone. The experimenter transcribed the option into the text box. 
This process was repeated using a new slide/timer for each additional option, until the 
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participant indicated that they had verbalized all of the assessment options that were 
heeded at the point of occlusion. To minimize the extent to which participants deliberated 
about options prior to verbalization, the experimenter emphasized—during the practice 
trial—that participants should: (a) list, rapidly, only those assessment/response options 
that they were considering at the point of occlusion; (b) verbalize all of the 
assessment/response options under consideration, even if they believe a specific option(s) 
to have a low likelihood; and (c) refrain from engaging in reflective option generation 
(e.g., reporting options that were generated only after reflecting on the scenario after it 
had been occluded, generating options solely for the sake of increasing the number of 
options generated, etc.). 
Then, to facilitate the subsequent rating tasks, the complete set of transcribed 
options was displayed on a single screen; a small text box next to each option was used to 
record the ratings. Participants first rated the likelihood that each of their generated 
options would actually happen after the occlusion point, using a scale that ranged from 0 
(not at all likely) to 100 (very likely). To avoid potential subadditivity or superadditivity 
of the likelihood ratings, and to facilitate a subsequent analysis of entropy (i.e., 
information value), the likelihood ratings were required to sum to 100. To assist 
participants in this task, a “remainder” box at the bottom of the screen displayed the 
number of to-be-allocated likelihood points; this number updated automatically each time 
the experimenter transcribed a likelihood rating next to its corresponding option.  
Next, using a new screen with blank rating boxes, participants rated how 
threatening each option was to their own personal safety (i.e., if they were actually 
dealing with the incident) using a scale from 0 (not at all threatening) to 100 (very 
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threatening). As participants could have generated more than one option that they rate as 
very low/high threat, the threat rating for each option was made independently (i.e., 
without regard to the sum of the individual threat ratings). 
To facilitate identification of the most-likely and most-threatening options during 
data analysis, participants were instructed to provide unique likelihood ratings and unique 
threat ratings. For example, in the case where two options were generated, participants 
were required to assign likelihood ratings that differed by at least one point (e.g., 51 and 
49, instead of 50 and 50).  
The set of assessment options displayed on the likelihood- and threat-rating 
screens were presented in a shuffled order, and not in their order of generation. This step 
was implemented to reduce the possibility that participants would simply rate options 
according to their serial position on-screen (e.g., assign a high likelihood to the first 
option generated, and a lower likelihood to the next option, etc.). Note, however, that the 
serial order of option generation was recorded for later analysis. 
Response option generation task. Participants completed a similarly structured 
response option generation task by answering the question, “How could you respond in 
the next few seconds?” After verbalizing their response options, participants first rated 
their likelihood of pursuing each option, employing the same likelihood rating scale and 
procedure described for the assessment option generation task. Next, they rated the 
quality of each option using a scale that ranged from 0 (not at all good for my own 
immediate safety and survival) to 100 (very good for my own immediate safety and 
survival). Similar to the threat ratings for assessment options, the option-quality ratings 
108 
 
 
were made independently for each response option. Participants were required to assign 
unique likelihood ratings and unique quality ratings to their response options.  
Post-Option-Generation Cognitive Task Analysis 
As the occlusion points for the test trials occurred relatively late in the scenarios, 
it was possible that participants—especially those in the experienced group—would find 
the outcome of the situation to appear obvious. In such cases, participants may verbalize 
only one assessment option and one corresponding response option. However, prior to the 
occlusion point, those participants may have generated (and then discarded) other 
assessment/response options. Therefore, to provide a possible explanation for cases in 
which a single assessment/response option is generated at the occlusion point, and to 
gather information that could inform the design of decision-making training in the future, 
two cognitive task analysis (CTA) techniques (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006)—
elicitation of retrospective verbal reports (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) followed by 
stimulated recall of in-event option generation—were used to supplement the option-
generation and ratings data.  
Use of the retrospective verbal report technique was intended to provide an 
objective record of participants’ thinking while they watched the video stimulus during 
the test trials. The aim of the subsequent stimulated recall was to elicit additional 
information about (a) cues heeded, (b) associative inferences generated, (c) specific 
assessment- and response-options generated that were not reported during the 
experimental tasks or in the retrospective report, and (d) prior knowledge and/or 
experience that might have influenced the participant. Due to the time-consuming nature 
of these techniques, they were administered to each participant on two of the six test 
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trials. Across all participants/trials, approximately eight participants from each 
experience level completed the post-option-generation cognitive task analysis for each 
test trial; the number of participants (i.e., ≈ 8 at each experience level) varied slightly 
between trials due to a difference in the number of experienced and less-experienced 
participants who completed the experiment, and the subsequent exclusion—post data-
collection—of several participants from each group. 
Retrospective verbal reports. Due to the limited time that was available for data 
collection, abbreviated verbal reporting instructions were administered that were 
consistent with Ericsson and Simon (1993, pp. 375–379). Specifically, the experimenter 
instructed participants to (i) recount each thought they recalled having, in the order they 
had them, from the beginning of the scenario until the occlusion point, starting with the 
first thought they could specifically remember having; (ii) report only those thoughts that 
they could specifically recall thinking while the video was playing; and (iii) refrain from 
explaining, describing, or reflecting on their thinking after the fact.  
Stimulated recall of in-event option generation. Following elicitation of the 
retrospective verbal report, the stimulated recall procedure was used to reveal otherwise 
unreported instances of assessment- and/or response-option generation, and to stimulate 
recall of cues heeded, inferences made, and prior knowledge used during the scenario, but 
prior to the occlusion point. The video acted as a timeline of events that served to cue 
participants about what they were thinking at a specific point. Prior to replaying the video 
stimulus, the experimenter instructed participants to say “Stop” when they identified a 
point in the video at which they recalled noticing something in the situation that they 
attended specifically and/or a specific action or course of action they contemplated 
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pursuing. When the participant indicated such a point, the experimenter paused the video 
and administered probes that were adapted from those described by Crandall, Klein, and 
Hoffman (2006, p. 79).  
Specifically, to identify specific cues that the participant heeded, the experimenter 
asked, “What were you paying attention to at this point?” To elicit evaluations and 
associative inferences that the participant generated, the experimenter asked, “You said 
that you were paying attention to X. What did that mean to you at this point? What was 
your understanding of the situation at this point?” Given that level 1 and 2 verbal reports 
had already been elicited via the retrospective reports, prompting participants to provide 
level 3-type reports (e.g., reflective, interpretative, etc.) during this subsequent CTA task 
did not contaminate their original memory for the events. Although it might not be 
scientifically defensible to use the latter data to generate causal explanations for 
participants’ behavior, they have much value in generating potential hypotheses about the 
underlying cognitive process and/or representation that could be tested in future research 
(see de Groot, 1965).  
To elicit the participant’s anticipations about the assessment outcome, the 
experimenter asked, “At this point, what did you think would happen in the next few 
seconds?” To elicit information about response options considered, the experimenter 
asked, “What course(s) of action were you considering at this point? What led you to 
consider that option, or reject other options? Was there a rule that you followed that led 
you to consider that option?” To identify prior knowledge and/or experience used by the 
participant to guide their assessment/decision making, the experimenter asked, “What 
prior knowledge or personal experience influenced your thinking at this point?” After the 
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participant answered the probes, the experimenter continued the replay-pause-probe 
sequence until the end of the video stimulus (i.e., pausing at multiple points, as directed 
by the participant).  
Procedure 
After providing their written informed consent, participants completed a 
biographical questionnaire, including questions about their law enforcement training, 
qualifications, and employment, as well as the number of times they had participated in 
law enforcement training using video-based simulations. Participants sat 2 m from a large 
projector screen, and wore a lapel microphone (Sony WCS-999) that was connected, 
wirelessly, to a video camera (Canon VIXIA HF M300). The camera recorded the 
participant, the experimenter’s and the participant’s verbal communication, as well as the 
projected video stimuli. 
The experimenter instructed participants to observe silently (i.e., not interact with) 
each video stimulus from the perspective of an officer responding to the incident. 
Participants then viewed the practice trial; after the occlusion point, the experimenter 
introduced the assessment and response option-generation tasks. Participants then 
completed the assessment and response option-generation tasks for the practice trial. 
After the practice trial, participants completed the six test trials and three catch trials in a 
randomized order. To control for task order effects, the order in which participants 
completed the assessment and response option-generation tasks was counterbalanced 
within each experience group. Each participant followed the same task order (i.e., either 
assessment/response or response/assessment) across all trials, including the practice trial. 
After completing the option-generation tasks in a given trial, participants indicated 
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whether they had seen that specific video scenario previously in their law enforcement 
training. Finally, on selected trials, participants completed the post-option-generation, 
cognitive task analysis.  
Participants did not receive feedback on their performance (i.e., they were never 
told nor shown how the scenario culminated after the occlusion point). After each trial, 
the transcribed data from the option-generation tasks was automatically written to a text 
file, and saved for later extraction and analysis. Participants were tested individually; 
each testing session lasted approximately 120 minutes. At the conclusion of each testing 
session, the experimenter debriefed the participant and thanked them for their 
participation. Participants were requested to refrain from discussing the scenarios—and 
the options they generated—with other potential participants.  
Data Analysis 
None of the participants indicated that they had seen any of the video scenarios 
previously in their law enforcement training; therefore, all data were retained for analysis. 
Signal detection analysis. As a preliminary step, a signal detection analysis was 
employed to determine whether participants were biased toward using lethal force (i.e., 
drawing and/or shooting their gun) and could discriminate between trials. A SME 
classified all scenarios as either those in which a shooting/draw gun response was 
justified (n = 4 test trials) or unjustified (n = 5; 2 test trials, plus the three catch trials). For 
each trial, participant’s most likely response option was coded as either drew gun/shot 
(1), or did not draw gun/shoot (0). After pooling the data within each experience level, 
the proportions of hits, misses, correct rejections, and false alarms were calculated. This 
approach (i.e., pooling the data, rather than calculating proportions for each participant), 
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was suggested by Macmillan and Creelman (2005) as appropriate for situations in which 
there were few data points—here there were nine—for each participant. Then, using the 
formulae described by Stanislaw and Todorov (1999), parametric d′ and non-parametric 
A′ were calculated as measures of sensitivity; parametric β, c (the deviation of β from an 
ideal observer, measured in standard deviation units), and non-parametric B′′ were 
calculated as measures of response bias.     
The parametric measures d′ and β were interpreted using the guidelines described 
by Proctor and Van Zandt (2008): A d′ of 0.0 is characteristic of performance at the 
chance level (i.e., completely insensitive), and a d′ of 2.33 represents near-perfect 
sensitivity. A β of 1.0 represents an unbiased response, a β that is greater than 1.0 
represents a conservative response, and a β that is less than 1.0 represents a liberal 
response. The additional, parametric bias measure c was interpreted using the guideline 
described by Stanislaw and Todorov (1999): a c value of 0 represents an unbiased 
response, a positive c value represents a bias toward a no (i.e., conservative) response, 
and a negative c value represents a bias toward a yes (i.e., liberal) response. 
The non-parametric measures were interpreted using the guidelines described by 
Stanislaw and Todorov (1999): An A′ of .5 is characteristic of performance at the chance 
level (i.e., completely insensitive), and an A′ of 1 represents near-perfect sensitivity. A B′′ 
value of 0 represents an unbiased response, a B′′ value of −1 represents an extremely 
liberal response, and a B′′ value of 1 represents an extremely conservative response. 
Dependent variables to test the experimental hypotheses. The tests of the 
experimental hypotheses focused on the data from the six test trials. The following 
dependent variables were defined.  
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Total number of assessment/response options. This variable was defined as the 
total number of assessment/response options generated across the test trials.  
Type of information: Number of task-relevant and -irrelevant options. To 
calculate the frequency of task-relevant and -irrelevant options generated across the test 
trials, and to assess the participants’ ability to prioritize the task-relevant assessment 
options, authoritative ratings of each assessment/response option were elicited from a 
SME (i.e., a civilian expert who had extensive experience investigating police use-of-
force incidents). The SME: 
1. Viewed each video stimulus in the same manner as the participants (i.e., until the 
point of occlusion).  
2. Subsequently viewed the culmination of the scenario (i.e., the events after the point of 
occlusion).  
3. Reviewed any part of the scenario they wished, using the rewind, pause, and slow 
motion functions.   
4. Completed the assessment/response option-generation and rating tasks based on the 
information available up until the occlusion point. Steps 2 and 3 were implemented so 
that the SME could carry out this step with a comprehensive, contextualized 
understanding of the events observed up until the occlusion point. 
5. For each scenario, reviewed a compiled list of all of the unique assessment/response 
options generated by participants. Then, using their own options/ratings as a guide, 
the SME assigned likelihood/threat ratings to each assessment option on the list, and 
likelihood/goodness ratings to each response option. Effectively, this process allowed 
the SME to identify any additional assessment options that he had not generated 
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himself, but considered, nonetheless, to be likely and threatening to some degree. 
Similarly, the SME could identify additional response options that he considered 
likely and good courses of action to pursue.  
The SME completed these steps after the data collection phase of Study 1A. The 
SME viewed the occlusion points from Study 1A, and reviewed compiled lists of 
assessment/response options generated by the participants in Study 1A. Note that the 
SME provided ratings for four of the six test trials used in the current study; two 
scenarios—Hey Mr Wilson and Suicide Waitress—were included as stimuli only after 
the conclusion of Study 1A.   
Task-relevant assessment options were defined as the options generated by the 
SME during step 4, and any options from the compiled list that the SME judged as 
possible (i.e., likelihood >0%) and potentially threatening (i.e., threat >0%). Task-
irrelevant assessment options were options from the compiled list that the SME rated as 
not at all likely and/or not at all threatening (i.e., 0% likely and/or 0% threatening). Task-
relevant and irrelevant response options were defined by applying the same criteria to the 
likelihood/goodness ratings.  
To determine a measure of inter-rater reliability, the experimenter subsequently 
reviewed the compiled lists of assessment/response options that were presented to the 
SME in step 5. Based on the occlusion points used in the current study, the experimenter 
indicated whether each option was task-relevant or task-irrelevant. For the four test trials 
rated by the SME and the experimenter, inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa) was .72 
and .77 for assessment and response options, respectively; according to Landis and Koch 
(1977), these values signify substantial agreement. Based on the experimenter’s 
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familiarity with the occlusion points used in the current study, and the knowledge 
accumulated as a result of conducting CTAs of these scenarios with several other SMEs 
(see Study 1B), the experimenter’s ratings of task relevance were used as the criterion 
ratings. The experimenter also determined the criterion task-relevance ratings for the two 
test trials not included in Study 1A.  
Prioritization of task-relevant assessment options. Participants’ ability to 
prioritize the task-relevant assessment options in each test trial was measured based on 
the SME’s threat rating for each task-relevant option. Although SME and participant 
threat ratings were elicited using a continuous scale, the threat rating data were first 
converted to threat ranks (i.e., most threatening, second-most threatening, etc.). This step 
was taken to reduce the impact of subjective differences—between participants, and 
between the participants and the SME—in the absolute threat ratings. The threat ranks 
encapsulated the pertinent information: the relative differences in perceived threat 
amongst the options generated.  
Based on the method described by Ward et al. (2012), a weighted threat 
prioritization score was calculated for each participant in each trial. If participants 
generated the SME’s most-threatening option as their first assessment option, and also 
ranked it as their most-threatening option, they received five points. If they generated the 
SME’s second-most threatening option as their second assessment option, and then 
ranked it as their second-most threatening option, they received four points, etc. For each 
deviation from the SME’s rank—in terms of serial position of generation and threat 
ranking—participants were penalized one point. If participants failed to generate one of 
the SME’s task-relevant options, they received zero points for that option. For each trial, 
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the number of points awarded for each of the SME’s task-relevant options was summed, 
and the sum was then divided by the number of possible points, to yield a prioritization 
score with a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 1.  
Predict the first assessment option as the outcome. This variable was defined as 
the number of times that the first assessment option generated was rated as the option 
most likely to happen, irrespective of whether this corresponded with the culminating 
event or the most threatening option. 
Predict the culminating event. This variable was defined as the number of times 
that the culminating event was the option that was rated as most likely to occur next, 
irrespective of the serial position of option generation.  
Predict the culminating event first. This variable was defined as the number of 
times that the culminating event was generated as the first option and predicted to be the 
most likely to happen next.  
Take the first response option. This variable was defined as the number of times 
that the first response option generated was rated as the option most likely to be pursued, 
irrespective of how the SME rated that option and of how they, the participant, rated the 
quality of that option.  
Take the best response option. This variable was defined as the number of times 
that the best option identified via the SME ratings was taken by the participant (i.e., rated 
as the likely one they will pursue), regardless of serial position and their ratings of 
quality.  
Take the best response option first. This variable was defined as the number of 
times that the best option identified via the SME ratings was taken by the participant (i.e., 
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rated as the likely one they will pursue) and generated as their first option, regardless of 
their ratings of quality.  
Tests of the experimental hypotheses. To test the hypotheses, the following 
analyses were conducted. Note that as a preliminary step, all analyses were conducted 
with task order (i.e., assessment task first or response task first) as an additional between-
subjects factor. Across all analyses, there was no significant main effect of task order, nor 
any significant interactions that included task order. As there was no theoretical reason to 
include task order as a factor of interest, it was dropped from all analyses and will not be 
referred to further. P was set at .05.  
Hypothesis 1: Effect of experience on the ability to predict the actual 
culminating event. Independent samples t-tests were used to assess whether experience 
affected participants’ ability to predict the actual culminating event, and to predict the 
culminating event first.  
Hypothesis 2: Effect of experience on the ability to take the best response 
option. Independent samples t-tests were used to assess whether experience affected 
participants’ ability to take the best response option, and to take the best response option 
first.  
Hypothesis 3: Few assessment/response options generated. The total number of 
assessment/response options was compared to those found by previous researchers (e.g., 
Johnson & Raab, 2003; Klein & Peio, 1989; Klein et al., 1995; Raab & Johnson, 2007; 
Ward et al., 2012). No formal statistical tests were conducted for this hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 4: Negative relationship between the total number of assessment 
and response options. A correlational analysis was used to assess the relationship 
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between the total number of assessment options and the total number of response options. 
Hypothesis 5: Differences in the numbers of task-relevant and task-irrelevant 
options generated.  A 2 × 2 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to 
assess the effects of experience (between-subjects factor) and type of information 
(within-subjects factor) on the numbers of assessment and response options generated. 
Significant multivariate effects were followed up using separate univariate analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) for assessment/response options separately.  
Hypothesis 6: Threat prioritization of task-relevant assessment options. An 
independent samples t-test was used to assess whether experience affected participants’ 
ability to rank their task-relevant assessment options by threat.   
Hypothesis 7: Relationship between the number of task-relevant/irrelevant 
assessment options and the ability to predict the culminating event. Note that for a 
given scenario, the culminating event was, by definition, one of the task-relevant 
assessment options. For this analysis, counting the culminating event as a task-relevant 
option could result in a spurious positive correlation between the number of task-relevant 
options and the number of times participants predicted the culminating event. Therefore, 
prior to the analysis the number of task-relevant options was adjusted as follows: if 
participants predicted the culminating event in a given trial, their number of task-relevant 
options was reduced by one.  
A multiple linear regression was conducted to determine whether the numbers of 
task-relevant and -irrelevant assessment options were positively and negatively correlated 
with the ability to predict the culminating event, respectively. To check whether 
participants’ experience accounted for any additional variance—over and above that 
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explained by the numbers of task-relevant and task-irrelevant options—experience level 
was added to the model in a second block. A separate linear regression was used to assess 
the relationship between the total number of assessment options and the ability to predict 
the culminating event; experience level was added to the model in a second block. 
Hypothesis 8: Relationship between the number of response options and the 
ability to take the best response option. For a similar reason to that described for 
Hypothesis 7, the number of task-relevant response options was reduced by one when 
participants took the best response option.   
A linear regression was used to assess the relationship between the total number 
of response options and the ability to take the best response option; experience level was 
added to the model in a second block. A separate linear regression was conducted to 
assess the relationship between the numbers of task-relevant/irrelevant response options 
and the ability to take the best response option. To check whether participants’ 
experience accounted for any additional variance—over and above that explained by the 
numbers of task-relevant and task-irrelevant options—experience level was added to the 
model in a second block.  
Supplementary, exploratory analyses on the option generation/rating data. In 
addition to the tests of the experimental hypotheses, two exploratory analyses were 
conducted on the option generation/rating data for the six test trials.  
Take the first option. The number of times that participants rated their first 
assessment/responses option as most likely (i.e., the participant chose the first option as 
the anticipated actual outcome or best decision) was counted, and expressed as a 
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proportion of the number of test trials. The values were compared, descriptively, with 
those reported by Johnson and Raab (2003).  
Entropy. Shannon (1948) introduced the concept of entropy, H, as a measure of 
information uncertainty, where:  
H =  −�𝑃(𝑥𝑖) log𝑏�𝑃(𝑥𝑖)�𝑛
𝑖=1
                                      (1) 
Based on equation 1, information uncertainty generally increases as additional 
options are generated, and as the likelihood ratings become more evenly distributed 
amongst the generated options. For example, in the current study, when a participant 
generated a single assessment option, they had to rate it as 100% likely to happen next. 
Such a case signifies a total lack of uncertainty about the culminating event, and H is 
equal to zero. If a participant generated two options and rated one option as much more 
likely than the other—for example, 90% versus 10%—they display greater uncertainty 
compared with the single-option case, and H is equal to 0.47. Consider a more extreme 
case of uncertainty, in which a participant generates two options and rates one 51% likely 
and the other 49% likely. In this situation there is near-total uncertainty about the 
culminating event, and H is approximately equal to 1.   
Entropy scores were calculated for each test trial using participant’s 
assessment/response likelihood ratings. The effect of experience on participants’ mean 
entropy scores during assessment/response were assessed using independent samples t-
tests.  
CTA data. Recall that for each test trial, CTA data was collected from 
approximately 16 participants (i.e., eight experienced, eight less-experienced). The 
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retrospective verbal reports, and the reports elicited via stimulated recall, were 
transcribed from audio recordings. Subsequently, each participant’s reports were 
segmented using natural speech and other syntactical markers. 
Retrospective verbal report data. The number of words in each participant’s 
report was counted, and an independent samples t-test was used to determine whether 
experience level affected the number of words verbalized. Similarly, the number of 
statements (i.e. segments) in each participant’s report was counted, and an independent 
samples t-test was used to determine whether experience level affected the number of 
statements. 
Statements were coded inductively as one of five thought types (i.e., monitored 
event, inference, evaluation, prediction, action) using procedures outlined in Ericsson 
(1975, cited in Ericsson & Simon, 1993). These five thought types were a subset of those 
employed by Ward et al. (2011) (see Appendix G). To determine whether experience 
level affected the number of times each thought type was reported, an independent 
samples t-test was conducted for each thought type; a Mann-Whitney test was employed 
when thought-type data were non-normally distributed.  
 Data elicited via stimulated recall. Based on the probe questions employed 
during the stimulated recall procedure, the segmented data were coded as one of five 
thought types (i.e., cue heeded, evaluation/inference made, prediction/response option 
generated, knowledge used). To facilitate a fine-grained analysis of the data based on 
events within a scenario, the test trials were scrutinized by the experimenter, who 
identified 2–3 distinct phases in each scenario. The onset of a new phase represented a 
change in environment (e.g., from being outside a house to entering a house) or an 
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observable change in a suspect’s behavior (e.g., from sitting, silently, on the ground to 
standing up and being verbally aggressive toward the police). Using a timeline of events 
in each scenario as a reference, each statement was coded by scenario phase (i.e., first 
phase, second phase etc.). 
Quantitative analysis. Although a 2 (experience level) × 3 (scenario phase) × 4 
(thought type) mixed ANOVA was planned to analyze these data, a preliminary 
exploration revealed the existence of non-normal distributions and unequal variances in a 
substantial number of cells. In light of this, the median values for each thought type were 
tabulated, and the data are interpreted descriptively.  
Qualitative analysis. Recall that the purpose of the stimulated recall procedure 
was to elicit additional information that might be useful in explaining experience-based 
differences in the option-generation and rating data. Therefore, each participant’s data 
were reviewed and summarized in an attempt to capture the gist of their thinking. This 
involved highlighting and linking statements that appeared to explain and/or justify the 
participant’s response option(s).  
Then, using the option-generation and rating data for each test trial, the 
participants in each experience group who completed the stimulated recall procedure 
were categorized according to whether they predicted the culminating event and whether 
they took the best response option. This yielded eight possible categories—two categories 
in each of four cells—as depicted in Table 4.  
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Table 4 
Performance Categories as Functions of Experience Level, Ability to Predict the 
Culminating Event, and Ability to Take the Best Response Option  
 
     
  Took the best response option 
   
   
Predicted the culminating event  Yes  No 
     
     
Yes  a. Experienced b. Less-experienced 
 c. Experienced 
d. Less-experienced 
     
No  e. Experienced f. Less-experienced 
 g. Experienced 
h. Less-experienced 
     
 
Within each category, the summaries of participants’ explanations were compared 
in order to identify any common themes. Additionally, most of the cells contained some 
experienced, and some less-experienced, participants; essentially, for a given scenario, 
there were some experienced participants who predicted/responded incorrectly, and some 
novices who predicted/responded correctly. This general phenomenon—of some 
experienced performers acting like less-experienced performers, and vice versa—is not 
uncommon. For example, across numerous studies of skilled anticipation and decision 
making in sport, there have been few, if any, instances of experts outperforming novices 
on every trial (e.g., Williams, Ford, Eccles, & Ward, 2011). This is particularly the case 
when experienced performers’ abilities do not closely match the task demands, and when 
mere domain experience (i.e., in the absence of deliberate practice) does not lead to 
improved performance (Camerer & Johnson, 1991; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Shanteau 
& Stewart, 1992), which may be the case in this study. Therefore, when cells contained 
experienced and less-experienced participants, the summaries of both groups were 
contrasted to seek evidence of underlying, experience-based differences. Finally, the 
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theme(s) in each category/cell were compared with those in the other categories/cells, and 
any differences were identified. Observed differences were then described qualitatively.  
Results 
Signal Detection Analysis 
The proportions of hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections for 
experienced and less-experienced groups are described in Table 5; there were very few 
false alarms.  
 
Table 5 
Proportion of Times that Participants Drew/Did Not Draw their Gun by Trial Type and 
Experience Group 
 
 
Experienced Group  Less-experienced Group 
Trial Type Drew gun 
Did not  
draw gun 
 
Drew gun 
Did not 
draw gun 
      
Draw gun: Justified .42 Hit 
.58 
Miss  
.39 
Hit 
.61 
Miss 
      
Draw gun: Unjustified .02 False alarm 
.98 
Correct rejection  
.01 
False alarm 
.99 
Correct rejection 
      
 
The measures of sensitivity and bias calculated from these data are reported in 
Table 6. The signal detection analyses revealed that experienced and less-experienced 
participants were very sensitive to differences in trial type: they were good at 
discriminating between trials in which a “draw gun” response was justified, versus 
unjustified. Although the d′ values indicated that the less-experienced group was slightly 
more sensitive than the experienced group, the A′ values were not different; collectively, 
these results indicate that if the groups did actually differ in terms of sensitivity, the 
difference was not meaningful. The signal detection analyses also revealed that 
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experienced and less-experienced participants responded conservatively; participants in 
both groups drew their gun on less than half of the occasions that they were justified in 
doing so. The β values indicate that, compared to the experienced group, the less-
experienced group were substantially more disinclined to draw their gun; the values for c 
and B′′ indicate similar trends.  
 
Table 6 
Measures of Sensitivity and Bias by Experience Group 
 
  Sensitivity  Bias 
Experience Group  d′ A′  β c B′′ 
Experienced  1.92 .84  9.11 1.15 .87 
Less-experienced  2.15 .84  18.17 1.35 .94 
Note. d′, β, and c are parametric measures; A′ and B′′ are non-parametric measures.  
 
Tests of the Experimental Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Effect of experience on the ability to predict the actual 
culminating event. It was hypothesized that experienced participants would predict the 
actual culminating event more frequently than less-experienced participants. An 
independent samples t-test demonstrated no significant difference in participants’ ability 
to predict the culminating event, t(47) = 0.17, p = .866, d = 0.05. On average, participants 
predicted the actual culminating event in slightly more than half of the six test trials 
(Mexperienced  = 3.87, SDexperienced = 1.14; Mless-experienced  = 3.81, SDless-experienced = 1.39). 
It was possible that experienced officers’ advantage lay in their ability to predict 
the actual culminating event as their first assessment option. However, an independent 
samples t-test also demonstrated no significant difference in participants’ ability to 
predict the actual culminating event first, t(47) = 0.06, p = .949, d = 0.02. The groups’ 
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means were nearly identical to their means for predicting the actual culminating event, 
indicating that when they predicted the actual culminating event, they typically generated 
it as their first assessment option.   
Hypothesis 2: Effect of experience on the ability to select the criterion 
response. It was hypothesized that experienced participants would take the best response 
option, as identified by the SME, more frequently than less-experienced participants. An 
independent samples t-test revealed that experienced participants (M = 2.74, SD = 1.36) 
took the best response option significantly more frequently than less-experienced 
participants (M = 1.65, SD = 1.16), t(47) = 3.02, p = .004, d = 0.88. Recall that there were 
six test trials; amongst those six trials, experienced participants made, on average, one 
more correct—and potentially life-saving—decision than did the less-experienced 
participants.   
It was also hypothesized that experienced participants would take the best 
response option—and generate that as their first response option—more frequently than 
less-experienced participants. An independent samples t-test also revealed that 
experienced participants (M = 2.52, SD = 1.20) took the best response option first 
significantly more frequently than less-experienced participants (M = 1.58, SD = 1.10), 
t(47) = 2.87, p = .006, d = 0.84. 
Hypothesis 3: Few assessment/response options generated. It was 
hypothesized that participants—regardless of experience level—would generate 
relatively few assessment and response options. On average, participants generated 1.77 
(SD = 0.47) assessment options and 1.53 (SD = 0.42) response options. These numbers 
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are similar to those reported in other studies that have employed option-generation 
paradigms (e.g., Johnson & Raab, 2003; Klein & Peio, 1989; Ward et al., 2012).  
Hypothesis 4: Relationship between the total number of assessment and 
response options. It was hypothesized that the total numbers of assessment and response 
options would be negatively correlated. Contrary to this hypothesis, but consistent with 
Ward et al. (2011), the total number of assessment options was positively, and 
significantly, correlated with the total number of response options, rs = .50, p < .001. This 
appeared to be driven by an underlying significant, positive correlation within the 
experienced group (rs = .48, p = .019) that was not present in the less-experienced group 
(rs = .24, p = .233).  
Hypothesis 5: Differences in the numbers of task-relevant versus task-
irrelevant options generated. It was hypothesized that experienced participants would 
generate more task-relevant, and fewer task-irrelevant options than less-experienced 
participants. The mean numbers of task-relevant and task-irrelevant options generated 
across the six test trials are presented in Figure 1.  
Using Wilks’s statistic, the 2 (Experience level: experienced, less experienced) by 
2 (Type of information: task-relevant option, task-irrelevant option) MANOVA revealed 
a significant main effect of type of information, Λ = 0.40, F(2, 46) = 34.55, p < .001, 𝜂p2 = 
.60. The main effect of skill approached statistical significance, Λ = 0.88, F(2, 46) = 3.02, 
p = .058, 𝜂p2 = .12. The Experienced Level × Information Type interaction was not 
significant, Λ = 0.91, F(2, 46) = 1.61, p = .211, 𝜂p2 = .07.  
The multivariate analysis was followed up using separate univariate ANOVAs for 
assessment and response. During assessment, participants—regardless of experience 
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level—generated significantly more task-relevant (M = 1.16, SD = 0.27) than task-
irrelevant options (M = 0.61, SD = 0.40), F(1, 47) = 61.57, p < .001, 𝜂p2 = .57. The 
number of assessment options generated was marginally affected by experience level, 
F(1, 47) = 3.57, p = .065, 𝜂p2 = .07. The Experience Level × Information Type interaction 
was not statistically significant, F(1, 47) = 0.04, p = .843, 𝜂p2 = .00. 
 
Figure 1. The mean number of task-relevant and task-irrelevant assessment/response 
options generated, by experience group, for the six test trials. Error bars are ±1 SE.  
 
For response options, there were significant main effects of experience level and 
type of information. Experienced participants (M = 1.38, SD = 0.45) generated 
significantly fewer response options than less-experienced participants (M = 1.66, SD = 
0.36), F(1, 47) = 5.67, p = .021, 𝜂p2 = .11. Additionally, participants—regardless of 
experience level—generated significantly more task-relevant (M = 0.88, SD = 0.30) than 
task-irrelevant (M = 0.65, SD = 0.30) options, F(1, 47) = 16.48, p < .001, 𝜂p2 = .26. The 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
Task-
relevant
Task-
irrelevant
Task-
relevant
Task-
irrelevant
M
ea
n 
nu
m
be
r o
f o
pt
io
ns
 g
en
er
at
ed
 
Assessment Options                                                            Response Options 
Experienced
Less-experienced
130 
 
 
Experience Level × Information Type interaction was not conventionally significant, F(1, 
47) = 3.10, p = .085, 𝜂p2 = .06.    
This pattern of results is partly consistent with the hypothesis. As expected, 
participants generated more task-relevant than task-irrelevant options. However, the 
expected interaction between experience level and type of information was not observed 
during the assessment phase of decision making, and only approached significance during 
the response phase.   
Hypothesis 6: Threat prioritization of task-relevant assessment options. It 
was hypothesized that experienced participants would be better than less-experienced 
participants at prioritizing their task-relevant assessment options. An independent 
samples t-test demonstrated no significant difference in participants’ ability to prioritize 
their task-relevant assessment options, t(47) = −0.55, p = .587, d = −0.15. Recall that the 
maximum threat prioritization score was 6 points; experienced participants recorded a 
mean score of 1.90 (SD = 0.33), and less-experienced participants recorded a mean score 
of 1.97 (SD = 0.54).  
Hypothesis 7: Relationship between the number of task-irrelevant/relevant 
assessment options and the ability to predict the culminating event. Based on LTWM 
theory, it was hypothesized that the numbers of task-irrelevant and task-relevant 
assessment options would be negatively and positively correlated, respectively, with the 
ability to predict the culminating event. The multiple linear regression indicated that the 
numbers of task-irrelevant and task-relevant options explained 51.0% of the variance in 
the number of correct predictions made, F(2, 46) = 23.93, p < .001. As expected, the 
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number of task-irrelevant assessment options was negatively, and significantly, correlated 
with the number of correct predictions (see Table 7).  
 
Table 7 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting the Number of 
Correct Predictions Made during Assessment (n = 49) 
 
Variable    B  SE B        β        p  
         
Step 1         
 Constant 5.54 0.28      
 Task-irrelevant assessment options −0.18 0.06  −0.34 .002 
 Task-relevant assessment options −0.33 0.07  −0.54 <.001 
      
Step 2      
 Constant 5.05 0.44    
 Task-irrelevant assessment options −0.19 0.06  −0.36 .002 
 Task-relevant assessment options −0.35 0.07  −0.57 <.001 
 Experience 0.37 0.26  0.15 .165 
       
Note. R2 = .51 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .02 (p = .165).  
 
However, contrary to expectations, the number of task-relevant assessment 
options was also negatively, and significantly, correlated with the number of correct 
predictions. Note that the strength of this negative association was larger in magnitude 
than the negative association between the number of task-irrelevant options and 
anticipatory performance. The inclusion of experience level as an additional predictor did 
not significantly improve the model; experience level was not a significant predictor of 
the number of correct predictions.  
Since the relationships between anticipatory performance and the number of task-
irrelevant and task-relevant options generated, respectively, were expected to be in 
opposing directions (i.e., negative and positive, respectively), it was also hypothesized 
that the total (i.e., task-irrelevant plus task-relevant) number of assessment options would 
not be significantly correlated with the ability to predict the culminating event. Contrary 
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to this hypothesis, a regression indicated that the total number of assessment options was 
negatively, and significantly, correlated with the number of correct predictions made, R2 
= .49, F(1, 47) = 44.37, p < .001, B = −0.25, SE B = 0.04, β = −0.70. The inclusion of 
experience level as an additional predictor did not significantly improve the model, ΔR2 = 
.02, p = .212, B = 0.34, SE B = 0.27, β = 0.14.  
Hypothesis 8: Relationship between the number of task-irrelevant/relevant 
response options and the ability to take the best response option. Based on LTWM 
theory, it was hypothesized that the numbers of task-irrelevant and task-relevant response 
options would be negatively and positively correlated, respectively, with the ability to 
take the best response. The regression indicated that the numbers of task-irrelevant and 
task-relevant options explained 25.2% of the variance in the number of best response 
options chosen, F(2, 46) = 7.75, p < .001. As expected, the number of task-irrelevant 
response options was negatively correlated with the number of correct responses; 
however, this relationship was not statistically significant (see Table 8).  
 
Table 8 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting the Number  
of Times Participants Took the Best Response Option (n = 49) 
 
Variable     B  SE B    β   p 
        
Step 1        
 Constant 3.66 0.46     
 Task-irrelevant response options −0.15 0.10  −0.19  .145 
 Task-relevant response options −0.30 0.09  −0.42  .002 
       
Step 2       
 Constant 4.25 0.58     
 Task-irrelevant response options −0.08 0.10  −0.11  .426 
 Task-relevant response options −0.25 0.09  −0.36  .009 
 Experience −0.64 0.39  −0.24  .105 
        
Note. R2 = .25 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .04 (p = .105).  
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However, contrary to expectations, the number of task-relevant response options 
was negatively, and significantly, correlated with the number of correct responses. The 
inclusion of experience level as an additional predictor did not significantly improve the 
model; experience level was not a significant predictor of the number of correct 
responses.  
Based on TTF, it was hypothesized that the total (i.e., task-relevant plus task-
irrelevant) number of response options would be negatively correlated with the ability to 
take the best response option. In support of this hypothesis, a regression indicated that the 
total number of response options was negatively, and significantly, correlated with the 
number of times participants took the best response option, R2 = .24, F(1, 47) = 14.46, p 
< .001, B = −0.23, SE B = 0.06, β = −0.49. The inclusion of experience level as an 
additional predictor did not significantly improve the model, ΔR2 = .04, p = .126, B = 
−0.60, SE B = 0.39, β = −0.22.  
Supplementary analysis 1: Take the first option. On average, participants took 
(i.e., rated as most likely) their first-generated assessment and response options on 83.0% 
and 87.4% of test trials, respectively. For assessment, an independent samples t-test 
revealed no significant difference between the frequency with which experienced (M = 
5.09, SD = 1.08) and less-experienced (M = 4.88, SD = 1.14) participants took their first 
option, t(47) = 0.63, p = .529, d = 0.19. Similarly for response, there was no significant 
difference between the frequency with which experienced (M = 5.35, SD = 0.83) and 
less-experienced (M = 5.15, SD = 0.73) participants took their first option, t(47) = 0.87, p 
= .389, d = 0.25. 
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Supplementary analysis 2: Entropy. Recall that entropy scores reflect 
information uncertainty in relation to participants’ likelihood ratings: higher entropy 
scores indicate that participants are more uncertain of which option is most likely. For 
assessment options, an independent samples t-test revealed no significant difference 
between experienced (M = 0.48, SD = 0.32) and less-experienced (M = 0.64, SD = 0.30) 
participants’ level of information uncertainty, t(47) = −1.84, p = .073, d = −0.54. For 
response options, experienced participants’ (M = 0.26, SD = 0.26) had significantly less 
information uncertainty than the less-experienced participants (M = 0.49, SD = 0.27), 
t(47) = −3.07, p = .004, d = −0.90. 
Analysis of the CTA Data 
Recall that the purpose of conducting the CTA procedure was to collect 
information that could help provide potential explanations about the differences observed 
in the option-generation and rating data that could serve as testable hypotheses for the 
future. As revealed by the tests of the experimental hypotheses, experienced participants’ 
advantage lay in their ability to take the best response option. Therefore, analysis of the 
CTA data focused on explaining differences in participants’ ability to take the best 
response option.  
Also recall that each participant completed the CTA procedure for two of the six 
test trials, and that those trials were determined, and assigned to each participant, a priori; 
on average, 16 participants completed the CTA procedure for each test trial. Therefore, 
the first step was to identify trials that contained sufficient data to permit the most 
meaningful contrast: experienced and successful participants (i.e., those who took the 
best response option) compared to less-experienced and unsuccessful participants (i.e., 
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those who did not take the best response option). To facilitate this first step, the number 
of participants in each contrast group was tabulated for each of the six test trials (see 
Table 9).  
 
Table 9 
Number of Participants in Each Contrast Group for the Six Test Trials 
  Contrast group 
   
Scenario 
 Experienced and  
successful participants 
 Inexperienced and 
unsuccessful participants 
     
     
Blow up  0  4 
Domestic punch  3  4 
Gun grab  6  1 
Hey Mr Wilson  2  5 
Subway  3  1 
Suicide waitress  5  3 
     
 
For each scenario, the number of participants per contrast group was relatively 
small, and in some cases, unbalanced. The scenarios most suitable for analysis were those 
that maximized the possibility of identifying a consistent theme within each contrast 
group—in other words, those with a higher, and balanced, number of participants per 
contrast group. On this basis, two scenarios—Domestic Punch and Suicide Waitress—
were identified as most suitable for analysis; for these scenarios, each contrast group 
contained at least three participants.  
After examining the Suicide Waitress data, it was evident that there was only a 
minor difference between the contrast groups. Participants in both groups generally 
indicated that they would have aimed their gun at the waitress, who was about to run at, 
and attack the officer using a knife; successful participants also indicated that they would 
shoot the waitress next, while unsuccessful participants did not—at that stage—explicitly 
136 
 
 
say that they would pull the trigger in the next few seconds. However, the stimulated 
recall data revealed that the unsuccessful participants were prepared to shoot, and would 
have shot immediately when the waitress took one more step toward them. In the 
experimenter’s opinion, there were no meaningful differences between participants in 
these categories; they had all decided to shoot the waitress if she attacked, and there was 
no evidence that unsuccessful participants were reluctant to defend themselves by 
shooting the waitress. In light of this, the Suicide Waitress scenario was not subjected to 
further analysis; a detailed analysis of the CTA data focused on the Domestic Punch 
scenario. To provide context for the qualitative and quantitative analyses of the 
retrospective and stimulated recall data, the Domestic Punch scenario is described in 
Figure 2.   
Radio message  
“You are answering a call to a domestic dispute and are about to enter the house.” 
 
Approach phase (1)  
View of a house, from the sidewalk. The front door is open, and a loud argument between a 
male and female is audible. Upon approaching the front door, a loud slap can be heard and then 
a female voice cries out in pain.  
 
Spousal dispute phase (2)  
Upon entering the front door, there is a short entry hall; a staircase leading to a second floor is 
visible. The camera immediately pans to the left to reveal a female sitting on a couch, 
cowering, while a male stands over her, pointing his finger at her and telling her to shut up. 
When the female notices the police, she says that her husband hit her, and then she gets up and 
exits the room while cowering away from male.  
 
Confrontation phase (3) 
As the female exits the room, the male steps away from couch and turns to face the police. He 
stands with his hands on hips, and his right shirttail is untucked. He takes a step toward the 
police and, while gesturing with his arms, says, “What are you guys doing here?” The male 
then takes another step toward the police and, using his right index finger to punctuate his 
speech, says, “I didn’t ask you to come into my house! Turn around and get out of my house!” 
As the male finishes his proclamation, he takes another step toward the police while clenching 
his right hand into a fist, and draws that hand back—at shoulder height—to punch.  
 
Figure 2. Description of the phases of the Domestic Punch scenario.  
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Analysis of the retrospective verbal report data (Domestic Punch scenario).  
Length of reports. On average, experienced participants’ (M = 83.78, SD = 37.22) 
retrospective verbal reports contained more words than the reports of less-experienced 
participants (M = 71.29, SD = 34.96). This difference was not significant, t(14) = 0.68, p 
= .505; however, it did represent a small-sized effect, d = 0.37.  
Number of statements. On average, experienced participants’ (M = 13.33, SD = 
5.17) reports contained more statements than the reports of less-experienced participants 
(M = 10.57, SD = 6.24). This difference was not significant, t(14) = 0.97, p = .349; 
however, it did represent a medium-sized effect, d = 0.52. 
Types of statements. The numbers of monitored event, evaluation, inference, 
prediction, and action statements are described in Table 10.  
 
Table 10 
Central Tendency Measures of Statement Types Elicited via Retrospective Verbal Report 
(Domestic Punch Scenario) 
 
        
 Experienced 
participants (n = 9) 
 Less-experienced 
participants (n = 7) 
        
        
Statement type M (SD) Mdn Range  M (SD) Mdn Range 
        
        
Monitored eventa 6.78 (4.44) 7 0–14  5.71 (4.39) 3 2–13 
Evaluationa 2.22 (1.64) 2 0–5  1.43 (0.98) 1 0–3 
Inferencea 1.78 (0.97) 1 1–3  2.14 (1.68) 2 0–5 
Predictionb 0.78 (0.97) 1 0–3  1.00 (0.58) 1 0–2 
Actionb 1.00 (1.23) 1 0–3  0.43 (0.79) 0 0–2 
        
aNormally distributed variable. bNon-normally distributed variable. 
 
Independent samples t-tests revealed no significant effect of experience level on 
the number of cue, t(14) = 0.48, p = .640, d = 0.26, evaluation, t(14) = 1.13, p = .278, d = 
0.61, or inference, t(14) = −0.55, p = .592, d = −0.29, statements. Mann-Whitney tests 
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revealed no significant effect of experience level on the number of predictive inference, 
U = 23.00, z = −1.01, p = .313, r = −.25, or action, U = 22.50, z = −1.06, p = .289, r = 
−.27, statements.  
Analysis of the stimulated recall data (Domestic Punch scenario). On average, 
experienced participants (M = 4.89, SD = 0.78) stopped the video during the stimulated 
recall procedure more frequently than did the less-experienced participants (M = 4.29, SD 
= 1.38). This difference was not significant, t(14) = 1.11, p = .286; however, it did 
represent a medium-sized effect, d = 0.60.  
Quantitative analysis. Recall that the stimulated recall data were coded with 
respect to the probe questions, which were designed to elicit information about cues 
heeded, evaluations/inferences made, prediction/response options generated, and prior 
knowledge utilized. The median numbers of statements, by statement type and scenario 
phase, are described in Table 11.  
 
Table 11 
Median number of Statements, by Scenario Phase (with duration, in seconds), and 
Experience Level (Exp. = Experienced, Less-exp. = Less-experienced) for the Domestic 
Punch Scenario 
 
         
 Approach 
Phase (6.59 s) 
 Spousal dispute 
Phase (5.19 s) 
 Confrontation 
Phase (7.11 s) 
         
         
Statement type Exp. Less-exp.  Exp. Less-exp.  Exp. Less-exp. 
         
         
Cue heeded 2 2  2 1  3 2 
Evaluation 0 0  0 1  1 1 
Inference 3 2  1 1  0 0 
Prediction option 0 0  0 0  1 1 
Response option 1 1  1 1  2 2 
Prior knowledge 0 0  0 0  1 0 
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Overall, participants in each experience group reported similar numbers of each 
statement type. Note, however, that in the final, confrontation phase, experienced 
participants heeded more cues and reported more frequent use of prior knowledge than 
did less-experienced participants. 
Qualitative analysis. Recall that the goal of the qualitative analysis was to reveal 
information that could explain experienced participants’ superior ability to take the best 
response option. The option generation and rating data for the Domestic Punch scenario 
were used to categorize participants according to their ability to predict the culminating 
event (i.e., male punches officer) and take the best response option (i.e., strike the male 
pre-emptively using a punch, kick, or shove) (see Table 12).  
 
Table 12 
Categorization of Participants who Completed the Stimulated Recall Task for the 
Domestic Punch Scenario  
 
  Took the best response option 
     
Predicted the 
culminating event 
 
Yes 
 
No 
     
     
Yes  Experienced (n = 3) Less-experienced (n = 3) 
 Experienced (n = 5) 
Less-experienced (n = 4) 
     
No  -  Experienced (n = 1) Less-experienced (n = 0) 
     
 
In each phase of the scenario, the analysis attempted to identify themes that 
differentiated between: 
1. Experienced and less-experienced participants who predicted the culminating event 
and took the best response option.  
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2. Experienced and less-experienced participants who predicted the culminating event 
but did not take the best response option.  
3. Experienced participants who predicted the culminating event/took the best response 
option and less-experienced participants who predicted the culminating event/did not 
take the best response option.  
The qualitative analysis, therefore, focused on the 15 participants who predicted 
the culminating event and either did/did not take the best response option. Summaries of 
those participants’ statements during each phase of the Domestic Punch scenario are 
presented in Tables 13–15. The sole remaining participant—who did not predict the 
culminating event—was not included in the qualitative analysis, as their data did not offer 
any additional explanatory power, or serve as a representative point for comparison.  
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To support the goal of explaining experience-level differences in participants’ 
ability to take the best response option in the seconds following the occlusion point, the 
analysis worked backwards—from the Confrontation phase (3) to the Approach phase 
(1)—to identify experience-level differences in participants’ answers to the probe 
questions. However, for ease of interpretation, the results are presented in forward 
chronological order (i.e., starting with phase 1).  
Phase 1: Approach. There were no clear differences in participants’ answers to 
the probe questions that facilitated the experience-level comparisons of interest. In 
general, participants heeded the salient audible cues (e.g., verbal argument, slap, female 
crying out) and made at least one inference related to an assault-in-progress. 
Phase 2: Spousal Dispute. There were no clear differences in participants’ 
answers to the probe questions that facilitated the experience-level comparisons of 
interest. In general, participants heeded the salient visual cues (e.g., male standing over 
female, female leaving the room) and typically inferred that the male was aggressor in the 
situation. 
Phase 3: Confrontation. Both experienced and less-experienced participants’ 
ability to predict the culminating event was reflected in their similar responses to the 
probe questions: they typically heeded the male clenching his fist/raising his hand, and 
then predicted that the male would assault the officer. Similarities were also observed in 
the process that led both experienced and less-experienced participants to take the best 
response option; they all inferred the need for pre-emptive action. Verbatim quotes 
highlighting this response theme are presented in Table 16. 
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Table 16  
Inferences (underlined) and Response Options that Highlight the Similarity between 
Experienced and Less-Experienced Participants who Took the Best Response 
 
Experienced participants  Less-experienced participants 
 
E1: “I need to get to him before he gets a  
       chance to do anything further…get  
       him down and handcuffed…he should  
       be detained.” 
 
E2: “I have to take some kind of action  
       against him…either hit him first, or  
       [use a] double-hand shove.” 
 
E3: “[I’d] use whatever means  
       necessary…kick him in the crotch… 
       [I] need to get that compliance.” 
 
  LE1: “He wasn’t going down without a  
          fight…no other options…he was  
          going to put my life in danger.” 
 
LE2: “I can’t have that type of aggression  
          in a scene I’m trying to control…I  
          would have probably just clocked  
          him.”  
 
LE3: “That was a fight, right here… 
          [I’m] just taking him down and  
          handcuffing him. 
 
Note. Participants’ ID names (e.g., E4, LE7) match those reported in Tables 13-15.  
 
Some minor differences were observed in response mode when contrasting 
experienced and less-experienced participants who predicted the outcome correctly but 
did not take the best response. Experienced participants typically acknowledged that they 
may need to engage with the male, physically (i.e., without employing pepper spray, 
baton, or gun), in order to arrest/detain him. The less-experienced participants, on the 
other hand, indicated that they would respond using some form of weapon. Verbatim 
quotes highlighting these trends are presented in Table 17.   
Tables 16 and 17 permit a final comparison: A contrast between experienced 
participants who predicted the outcome correctly and took the best response option (see 
Table 16, left column), with less-experienced participants who also predicted the 
outcome correctly but did not take the best response option (see Table 17, right column). 
As indicated, experienced officers inferred the need to take pre-emptive action against the 
male, using a strike, or other method (e.g., shove) that did not involve the use of a 
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weapon. Less-experienced participants, on the other hand, chose to present a weapon 
(e.g., gun, pepper spray), but did not indicate that they would have used (e.g., shot, 
sprayed) that weapon. As two of the less-experienced participants reported that they 
would move backwards (i.e., try to disengage), it is possible that the less-experienced 
participants were reluctant to engage in a physical scuffle/fight with the male, and 
thought that presenting a weapon may have deterred him from actually attacking.  
 
Table 17 
Experience-based Differences in Response Options Reported by Participants who did not 
Take the Best Response 
 
Experienced participants  Less-experienced participants 
 
E4: “[I’d] turn him around and cuff  
       him…arrest him.” 
 
E5: “He needed to be arrested.” 
 
E7: “We’re going to be fighting… [I’m]    
       getting ready to go hands on.” 
 
E8: “We’re going to fight.” 
 
  LE4: “[I’d] step backwards, draw my  
         gun.” 
 
LE5: “[I’d] have my gun out already.” 
 
LE6: “I’d attempt to pull out my pepper  
          spray” 
 
LE7: “[I’d have my] hand on [my]  
          gun…[while] backing away.” 
 
Note. Participants’ ID names (e.g., E4, LE7) match those reported in Tables 13-15.  
 
Summary 
The goal of Study 2 was to further our understanding of the relationship between 
the situation assessment and response phases of decision making, and to investigate the 
extent to which this relationship is affected by skill level. An additional goal was to 
gather information that can be used, in the future, to design training based on the 
anticipation skills, decision strategies, and processes of experienced police officers.  
After viewing temporally-occluded versions of the discriminating scenarios 
identified in Study 1, participants completed option-generation tasks designed to elicit the 
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possible situational outcomes and personal courses of action that they were considering at 
the point of occlusion. These assessment and response “options”, along with their 
associated ratings (e.g., likelihood, threat) were used to test hypotheses regarding the 
effect of experience on outcome (i.e., anticipation and decision making) performance, 
and hypotheses—drawn from two complementary perspectives on option generation—
regarding the option-generation processes responsible for superior performance.  
With respect to outcome performance, it was expected that experienced 
participants would anticipate the actual outcome of the scenarios, and select the criterion 
response, more frequently than the less-experienced participants. The results indicated 
that although experienced and less-experienced participants did not differ in their ability 
to anticipate the outcome, experienced participants took the best response option on 
significantly more of the test trials.  
With respect to option-generation processes, it was expected, based on LTWM 
theory, that experienced participants would generate more task-relevant, and fewer task-
irrelevant, options than less-experienced participants. Although the results did not support 
the expected Experience Level × Information Type interaction, participants generated 
more task-relevant than task-irrelevant options, which is generally consistent with 
LTWM theory. Additionally, compared with less-experienced participants, the 
experience participants generated significantly fewer options in total during the response 
phase of decision making; this is consistent with RPD and TTF.  
With respect to the relationship between the number of options and outcome 
performance, LTWM theory posited that there would be a negative correlation between 
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the number of task-irrelevant options and performance; this relationship was, in fact, 
observed during both the assessment and response phases of decision making. It was also 
expected, based on LTWM theory, that the number of task-relevant options would be 
positively correlated with performance. However, the results revealed that during 
assessment, the number of task-relevant options was negatively—and not positively—
correlated with anticipation performance. During the response phase of decision making, 
the number of task-relevant options was not significantly correlated with the ability to 
take the best response option.  
Apart from testing the experimental hypotheses, additional analyses were 
conducted to examine sensitivity and bias in responding, and whether a measure of 
information uncertainty could differentiate between participants, based on their level of 
law enforcement experience. Overall, participants were sensitive to the different types of 
scenarios (i.e., escalating, de-escalating) and responded conservatively: they often did not 
draw/shoot their gun when they were justified in doing so. Although experienced and 
less-experienced participants did not differ in their level of information uncertainty 
during assessment, experienced participants displayed significantly greater certainty in 
their response options.   
To supplement the option-generation and rating data, two CTA techniques were 
used to provide possible explanations for experienced-based differences in performance, 
and to gather information that could inform the design of decision-making training in the 
future. The analysis of the CTA data did, in fact, reveal themes amongst participants’ 
responses that were useful for gaining a deeper insight into cognitive processes and 
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representations that might have contributed to superior performance. In the Domestic 
Punch scenario, participants who took the best response option inferred the need to take 
pre-emptive action (e.g., punch) the suspect. Although experienced participants who did 
not take the best response option did not infer the need for pre-emptive action, they still 
recognized that they would need to respond using physical force (i.e., fighting). Less-
experienced participants who did not take the best response option indicated that they 
would draw, but not necessarily use, a weapon. By failing to recognize that the male was 
not intimidated by the presence of police officers, the less-experienced participants who 
did not take the best response option placed themselves at a distinct disadvantage: they 
had drawn a weapon but were not prepared to use it. This left them ill-equipped to deal 
with the suspect’s impending physical attack.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
Collectively, the purpose of Studies 1 and 2 was to extend the work of Ward et al. 
(2011) by using a prediction and option-generation paradigm to investigate situation 
assessment and response selection in dynamic and complex law enforcement situations. 
Study 1, which was methodological in nature, employed converging approaches to 
identify video-based law enforcement scenarios that could discriminate between 
experienced and less-experienced police officers, in terms of their ability to anticipate the 
culminating event. Study 1 also served to identify a criterion occlusion point in each 
discriminating scenario: the point that maximized the experienced-based difference in 
anticipation performance. Study 2 then employed those discriminating scenarios, and 
their optimal occlusion points, to test hypotheses related to experience-based 
performance differences and the option generation processes proposed to be responsible 
for superior performance. Recall that two main perspectives on option generation were 
contrasted: LTWM theory, which has previously been tested during the situation 
assessment phase of decision making, and RPD/TTF, which focuses on the response 
selection phase of decision making.  
In general, LTWM theory posits that superior performers generate a detailed, up-
to-date, and accurate representation of the situation, and that this facilitates their ability to 
anticipate the situational outcome. Superior anticipation performance should, therefore, 
be associated with the generation of more task-relevant, but fewer task-irrelevant 
assessment options (Ward et al., 2012). Additionally, superior anticipation performance 
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should be associated with the ability to prioritize task-relevant assessment options 
according to the threat that they pose (Ward et al., 2012). Accordingly, LTWM theory 
suggests that when multiple task-relevant assessment options exist in dynamic, uncertain, 
and time-constrained environments, often times there should be a positive relationship 
between the number of those options generated and anticipation performance—
depending, of course, on the utility of that mechanism in that environment. In other 
words, perceiving more of the threatening options, while ignoring irrelevant information, 
should lead to better anticipation performance. As a corollary, Ward et al. (2011) 
expected that the ability to generate more task-relevant options during assessment that 
describe the semantic relations between situational information cues—to paint a detailed 
picture of the situation—should facilitate use of a TTF-like mechanism during response 
selection. That is, the ability to anticipate the situational outcome should enable skilled 
decision makers to generate, as their first response option, a satisfactory, if not a very 
good, response.  
With respect to the response phase of decision making, TTF posits that the 
number of response options generated is negatively correlated with the quality of the final 
decision. In other words, the ability to select a good response results from generating 
fewer, rather than more response options, which according to TTF would be better 
options, thus facilitating selection of one of the better, earlier options generated. 
However, while LTWM theory makes the distinction between task-relevant and task-
irrelevant options (i.e., during situation assessment), TTF makes no such distinction; the 
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hypothesized negative relationship is between the total number of response options 
generated, and the quality of the final decision. 
Outcome Performance 
Hypothesis 1 was that experienced participants would anticipate the culminating 
event more frequently than less-experienced participants. Although, on average, both 
experienced and less-experienced participants anticipated the culminating event in 
approximately four of the six test trials, they did not differ significantly in their 
anticipation ability. This was surprising, given that the stimuli and occlusion points 
employed were those identified as discriminating of experience level in Study 1. 
Furthermore, this finding failed to support one of the most consistent findings in the 
expertise literature: that superior anticipation skill is a hallmark of superior performance. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that despite their wealth of practical 
experience, the experienced participants in Study 2 had not developed reliably superior 
perceptual anticipation. Although this is concerning—in terms of officers’ safety—it does 
point to a need for improving police officers’ anticipation skills. In the sport domain, 
anticipation training based on the perceptual skills of expert performers has led to 
improvements in perceptual anticipation (e.g., Smeeton, Williams, Hodges, & Ward, 
2005). Similar evidence-based training could also prove effective in the law enforcement 
domain. An alternative explanation is that the scenarios used in the research were not 
representative of the knowledge structures that police officers develop. However, counter 
to this explanation, 50% of the lethal scenarios used in Study 2 have been shown to 
discriminate between highly trained SWAT officers and police recruits.  
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Hypothesis 2 was that experienced participants would take the best response 
option more frequently than less-experienced participants. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, experienced participants were better at generating the criterion response 
option, and then rating that option as the one they were most likely to pursue. It is 
interesting that experienced participants displayed superior response performance in the 
absence of superior anticipatory skills. One possible explanation for this is that 
experienced participants have better mapping between representative situations and 
optimal responses. For example, they may realize that, when faced with a suspect 
carrying an improvised explosive device (e.g., Blow Up scenario), the optimal solution is 
to shoot the suspect immediately, before the suspect can detonate the device. Although 
less-experienced participants may also consider this course of action, they typically 
pursue a different, but seemingly good, response (e.g., moving innocent bystanders away 
from the suspect) that will not actually resolve the problem at hand. The notion that 
experienced operators recognize familiar situations, and that recognition primes an 
associated, appropriate response, is one of the central tenets of the RPD model. However, 
it is worth noting that this is not a feature unique to the RPD model; consistent with 
LTWM theory, experienced operators’ ability to index information at encoding, in 
conjunction with their superior situation-model building skills, would also encompass 
appropriate responses. With respect to the issue of mapping responses to situations, RPD 
and LTWM theory differ in the number of task-relevant response options that are 
activated: a single, satisfactory option in the “optimized” version of RPD (see Johnson & 
Raab, 2003; Yates, 2001), versus all task-relevant response options (i.e., where more than 
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one exists), in the case of LTWM theory. To continue the Blow Up scenario example, a 
rich situation model may include the possible responses of “Shoot the suspect in the 
chest” and “Shoot the suspect in the head.” Although both responses are satisfactory, 
shooting the suspect in the head is the best option (i.e., when the situation allows), 
because it typically results in instant incapacitation, whereas a shot to the body may still 
allow the suspect to detonate the device. Having both options available—in the context of 
a rich situation model—would allow an officer to make the best decision given the 
specific circumstances (e.g., distance from suspect, the officer’s shooting accuracy, the 
possibility of hitting an innocent bystander if the shot misses). Clearly, a person’s ability 
to represent and act on the environmental structure dramatically influences their skill in 
making use of the most appropriate strategy. The importance of a systems perspective 
(i.e., consideration of person, process, and environment) when evaluating superior 
decision making has been discussed elsewhere (e.g., Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Ward et al., 
2011), and is likely applicable here.  
Option-Generation Measures 
Based on previous option-generation studies, Hypothesis 3 was that participants 
would generate few (i.e. less than 5) assessment and response options. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, participants generated, on average, slightly less than two assessment/ 
response options per trial.  
Hypothesis 4 was that the total numbers of assessment and response options 
would be negatively correlated. This was based on the notion that possessing a detailed 
situation model (i.e., quantified by the number of assessment options generated) would 
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facilitate a TTF-like mechanism during the response phase of decision making (see Ward 
et al., 2011). However, the data did not support this hypothesis. In fact, contrary to the 
hypothesis, experienced participants exhibited a positive correlation between the numbers 
of assessment and response options generated; no significant correlation—either negative 
or positive—was found for less-experienced participants. Note that this finding—
regarding the observed positive correlation—corresponds with the finding of Ward et al. 
(2011), and that both findings provide evidence against the hypothesized relationship. 
One possible reason for the experienced participants’ positive correlation is that they tend 
to match each assessment option with a single response. Such behavior would be 
advantageous in cases where the anticipated situational outcomes differ in terms of the 
level-of-threat they present. For example, perceived low-level threats could be dealt with 
by issuing strong verbal commands, whereas perceived high-level threats may necessitate 
the use of a weapon.  
Hypothesis 5 related to differences in the number of task-relevant and task-
irrelevant options generated. Recall that from the perspective of LTWM theory, skilled 
performers construct accurate and up-to-date situation models, which aid in identifying 
meaningful patterns of cues in the environment, while disregarding irrelevant 
information. Therefore, it was expected that experienced participants would generate 
more task-relevant than task-irrelevant assessment options, and that they would generate 
fewer task-irrelevant assessment options than less-experienced participants. The results of 
Study 2 provide partial support for this hypothesis. As expected, experienced and less-
experienced participants generated significantly more task-relevant than-irrelevant 
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assessment options; however, compared to the less-experienced participants, experienced 
participants did not generate significantly fewer task-irrelevant assessment options. 
Although this hypothesis, based on LTWM theory, primarily relates to assessment 
options, recall that Ward et al. (2011) also found the hypothesized relationship when they 
compared the numbers of task-relevant and task-irrelevant response options. Although 
the current study did not find a significant interaction between experience level and type 
of information (i.e., task-relevant versus task-irrelevant), experienced participants 
generated significantly fewer response options than less-experienced participants, and in 
general, participants generated more task-relevant than task-irrelevant response options.  
To summarize, consistent with LTWM theory, participants generated more task-
relevant than task-irrelevant options. There was, however, no evidence found to support 
the contention that experienced participants would demonstrate a greater reduction in the 
amount of task-irrelevant information generated, compared to less-experienced 
participants. Keeping in mind that relatively few task-irrelevant options were generated at 
all, it is possible that a key difference between skilled and less-skilled performers lies not 
in the number of task-irrelevant options generated, but in the way those options are 
contexualized within the set of options generated. For example, a skilled performer 
might—if they generate a task-irrelevant option—be better at discounting that option 
(e.g., rating it as an unlikely situational outcome/not a good course of action), whereas 
less-skilled performers may fail to recognize the same option as task-irrelevant, and 
could, therefore, fail to discount it. Given the dynamic and uncertain nature of law 
enforcement situations, generating some task-irrelevant options may be inevitable; the 
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ability to reduce any deterimental effect that those options have on perceptual 
anticipation and selecting a course of action could be an important determinant of skilled 
performance. 
 Based on LTWM theory, Hypothesis 6 was that experienced participants would 
be better than less-experienced participants at prioritizing their task-relevant assessment 
options. The results, however, showed that there was no significant experience-based 
difference in threat prioritization. This can be explained by considering several factors. 
First, on average, participants generated slightly more than one task-relevant assessment 
option per trial. Second, task-irrelevant options were typically rated by the SME as 
posing less (i.e., and not more) of a threat than the task-relevant options. Third, the 
culminating event was often the most threatening, task-relevant assessment option. 
Fourth, there was no significant difference between the groups in terms of their 
anticipation performance. In light of these factors, it appears that participants in both 
groups often predicted the culminating event (i.e., the most threatening task-relevant 
option) and recognized it as a highly threatening outcome. In this case, and in the absence 
of other task-relevant options, it appears that there was relatively little opportunity for the 
prioritization scores to vary. Experienced-based differences in participants’ ability to 
prioritize task-relevant options may only become apparent in situations with greater 
uncertainty in the situational outcome. Under such conditions, participants might generate 
more task-relevant options to cover the various, plausible outcomes, thus increasing the 
potential for variability when ranking those options by threat.  
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Hypothesis 7 was that the numbers of task-irrelevant and task-relevant assessment 
options would be negatively and positively correlated, respectively, with the ability to 
predict the culminating event. As expected, the number of task-irrelevant assessment 
options was negatively associated with the ability to predict the culminating event; 
participants who generated fewer task-irrelevant options across the six test trials 
predicted the culminating event in more of those trials. With respect to LTWM theory, 
this finding supports the contention that superior performers construct situation models 
that contain less irrelevant information. LTWM theory also posits that superior 
performers construct more detailed situation models. One way in which the level of detail 
contained within a situation model can be measured is via the number of task-relevant 
options generated. However, contrary to expectations, the number of task-relevant 
assessment options was negatively, rather than positively, correlated with the ability to 
predict the culminating event. Recall that for this analysis, the number of task-relevant 
assessment options did not include the culminating event if it was generated by 
participants. Therefore, the negative correlation observed between the number of task-
relevant options and the number of correct anticipations suggests that other than 
generating the culminating event, there was no benefit gained by generating additional 
task-relevant options.  
One explanation for this finding is that by the time the scenario was occluded, 
participants who predicting the culminating event envisioned very few, or even only one, 
way in which the scenario could culminate. If this was the case, a question can be asked: 
Do participants ever, in the evolution of a single scenario, generate more of the task-
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relevant options present in the environment, or do they typically only generate the task-
relevant option they perceive as the one most likely to occur?  Although Study 2 did not 
address this question directly, the stimulated recall data indicate that participants, 
typically, did not generate many predictions prior to the occlusion point and did not 
generate more than one prediction each time they stopped video playback. Such behavior 
during situation assessment is more consistent with Klein’s (1989) description of 
situation assessment, in which operators typically generate, and then consider, only one 
explanation (i.e., assessment) of the situation at any given time. Klein reported that in 
situations where multiple assessment options were generated, skilled operators generally 
evaluated those options in a serial manner; less-skilled operators were more inclined to 
evaluate multiple options concurrently (i.e., by contrasting/deliberating between options).  
Hypothesis 8 was related to response options: according to LTWM theory, it was 
expected that the numbers of task-irrelevant and task-relevant response options would be 
negatively and positively correlated, respectively, with the ability to take the best 
response. The results showed that, as expected, the number of task-irrelevant response 
options was negatively associated with the ability to take the best response option; 
participants who took the best response more frequently also generated fewer task-
relevant options. Therefore, it appears that reducing the amount of irrelevant information 
(i.e., task-irrelevant response options) facilitated superior decision making, just as 
reducing the amount of task-irrelevant information during assessment facilitated 
perceptual anticipation. This suggests that, at least to some degree, similar option-
generation mechanisms are at play during assessment and response.  
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However, contrary to the expected, positive relationship between the number of 
task-relevant response options and the number of times participants took the best 
response, no significant relationship—either positive or negative—was observed. This 
suggests that as long as participants generated the best response option, generating 
additional, task-relevant response options did not have a detrimental effect on their 
performance.      
Juxtaposed to LTWM theory’s predictions regarding the relationship between the 
number of response options and decision-making performance, TTF predicts an overall 
negative relationship between the total number of response options and the ability to take 
the best response option. The results supported this prediction: participants who took the 
best response more frequently also tended to generate fewer response options. In the 
absence of any significant relationship between the number of task-relevant response 
options and decision-making performance, it appears that the overall negative correlation 
was driven by the significant negative correlation observed for the number of task-
irrelevant options. Although this result—at face value—provides support for TTF, TTF 
posits that the negative relationship is due to a decrease in option quality with serial 
position. However, an alternative mechanism that could explain the negative relationship 
is an overall reduction in the amount of task-irrelevant information considered. This is 
consistent with Haider and Frensch (1996), who suggested that over time, operators learn 
to distinguish between task-relevant and task-irrelevant information, gradually becoming 
better at focusing on the relevant information while restricting the extent to which they 
process irrelevant information.  
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Supplementary Points 
Signal Detection Performance 
 To determine whether participants were sensitive to differences in the types of 
scenarios (i.e., whether a “draw gun” response was justified or unjustified), and whether 
they were biased to respond by drawing/shooting their gun, a signal detection analysis 
was performed. The analysis found that both experienced and less-experienced 
participants were highly sensitive to the different types of scenarios; there were 
exceedingly few instances in which a participant drew/shot their gun when they were not 
justified in doing so. This is good news for police departments, and for the public-at-
large. On the other hand, both experienced and less-experienced participants showed a 
strong conservative bias in using their gun: when officers were justified in 
drawing/shooting their gun, they often did not do so. This actually presents an officer-
safety problem, because there are some—albeit potentially low-frequency—situations in 
which an officer’s best chance of survival involves the use of lethal force. Although 
adopting a conservative response policy reflects a public-, rather than a self-, preservation 
strategy, ideally officers should be perfectly calibrated in terms of their response in order 
to maximize their effectiveness: they should draw their gun only when necessary, but 
they should also draw their gun every time it is necessary to do so. One potential way of 
reducing this conservative bias toward a more unbiased response policy is by exposing 
police officers, during training, to high-threat/low-frequency situations which demand a 
lethal response such that they can be exposed to, and could integrate, the full range of 
ecologically valid cues (see Brunswik, 1957) into their existing situational representation. 
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Of course, such training would need to ensure that officers attain an unbiased policy (i.e., 
that they do not overcompensate and adopt a liberal response bias).  
Taking the First-Generated Option 
Consistent with TTF, participants took their first-generated response option a 
majority of the time; participants also adopted a TTF strategy during assessment. Here, it 
is worth pointing out that both TTF and LTWM theory are both activation-based models, 
and therefore, both models would predict that better options are generated earlier in the 
option generation sequence (Johnson & Raab, 2003; Ward et al., 2012). Assuming that all 
else is equal with respect to the environment, one major difference between the two 
perspectives in the specific environment tested is that TTF holds the best decision will be 
made by taking the first-generated option; LTWM theory holds that the best option is 
likely to be amongst the first few options generated, but not necessarily the first.   
Entropy/Information Uncertainty 
Regarding information uncertainty, experienced participants displayed less 
uncertainty in their assessment options than did the less-experienced participants. 
Although the difference was not statistically significant, it constituted a medium-sized 
effect. Given that experienced and less-experienced participants generated similar 
numbers of assessment options, the difference in information uncertainty is attributable to 
differences in the weighting of assigned likelihood ratings. In other words, when 
experienced participants generated more than one assessment option, they rated one 
option as much more likely than the other (e.g., 90% versus 10%). Less-experienced 
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participants, on the other hand, tended to rate their assessment options more similarly 
(e.g., 60% versus 40%), thus displaying greater information uncertainty.  
Although experienced participants expressed significantly less information 
uncertainty for their response options than did less-experienced participants, another 
factor—other than the weighting of assigned likelihood ratings—may have influenced 
this effect. Recall that the analysis of task-relevant versus task-irrelevant response options 
found a main effect of experience level: experienced participants generated significantly 
fewer response options overall than did less-experienced participants. Recall too that 
information uncertainty is reduced by generating fewer options. Therefore, the reduction 
in information uncertainty for response options was also due, at least in part, to the 
reduction in the number of options generated.  
Although measures of information uncertainty could potentially be used to predict 
a participant’s experience level, care should be taken with regard to interpreting entropy.  
Based on the data from Study 2, it would appear that an absolute reduction in information 
uncertainty (i.e., toward H = 0) is associated with better performance. From the 
perspective of TTF, if the first option generated is typically the best option, then reducing 
uncertainty toward H = 0 makes sense: generate a single option that, by default, must be 
rated as 100% likely. However, from the perspective of LTWM theory, an absolute 
reduction in uncertainty is not advisable, since generating a single option means that 
other, task-relevant options will be omitted from the option set, potentially limiting the 
extent to which individuals could adapt their behavior on-the-fly. Therefore, from a 
LTWM-theory perspective, any reduction in information uncertainty should take place 
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within the context of the number of task-relevant options that could be generated in a 
given situation (i.e., a relative, rather than an absolute reduction). For example, consider a 
situation in which there are three task-relevant options, and where one of those options 
should be considered as “very likely” to occur next, while the other two are quite unlikely 
to occur next. A completely uncertain participant would rate all three options as equally 
uncertain (i.e., all 33.3% likely); the information score, H, would equal 1.58, and such 
behavior would not be indicative of skilled performance. On the other hand, rating one of 
the three options as very likely and the other two as unlikely (e.g., 90%, 8%, and 2%) 
results in H = 0.54. The second situation, representing greater certainty, is associated with 
a relatively low (i.e., to complete uncertainty, H = 1.58) entropy score, and would, in the 
situation described, represent skilled performance in terms assigning accurate likelihood 
ratings.   
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 The lack of support for a number of the hypotheses may, in part, be attributable to 
methodological issues. For example, the fact that there was no experience-based 
difference in anticipation performance may be due to sampling issues in Study 1. Recall 
that Study 1 was designed to identify occlusion points that maximized the difference 
between experienced and less-experienced participants, in terms of their ability to 
anticipate the culminating event. Although every attempt was made to ensure a 
substantial difference in experience between the groups within Studies 1A–C, the extent 
of this difference varied across the studies. It should also be noted that each study 
sampled participants from a different population (e.g., large, mainly urban department 
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versus small, mainly rural department); this is likely to have had some effect on the 
frequency and types of incidents that officers encounter and train for. Furthermore, the 
literature on expert performance highlights that measures such as level-of-experience, 
rank, and status, are not necessarily indicative of actual performance. Currently, there are 
no reliable methods for assessing the skill of police officers in complex and dynamic law 
enforcement situations. One potential avenue for further research is to first define what 
constitutes skilled performance in these situations, and then develop assessment and 
training tools that have criterion validity. Another avenue may be to examine the extent 
to which these domain-specific skills and processes have greater predictive validity than 
domain-general measures of cognitive ability (e.g., intelligence, working memory 
capacity, spatial ability, risk literacy) (see Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-
Retamero, 2012; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Peters, Laeng, Latham, Jackson, 
Zaiyouna, & Richardson, 1995; Raven, 2000). All this said, the current data may suggest 
that rather than being a consequence of superior prediction skills, the important source of 
skill differences in law enforcement may be related to how individuals interpret and 
translate situational information into an effective response. More research is needed to 
examine this further.  
Another factor that may have affected the results—in particular, the number of 
options generated—was the process via which options were elicited. First, it must be 
noted that in general, law enforcement training is typically centered on officers’ ability to 
respond correctly. Therefore, officers intuitively wanted to report a single response 
option: what they would do next, rather than what they could do next. Furthermore, some 
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participants found the assessment-option generation task quite challenging, because in 
their minds, they would have already taken action prior to the occlusion point that may 
have changed the outcome if they were in an actual, rather than a simulated, situation. In 
other words, their actions—carried out in their minds—may have constrained the 
situation, and impacted the number and type of options they generated.  
An alternative way of assessing theories related to option generation could be 
through the use of an option selection and ranking paradigm (e.g., Hintze, 2008). 
However, use of such a paradigm involves a tradeoff: The fact that participants select 
pre-specified options from a list may lead them to select more options than they would 
have otherwise generated, thus providing invalid results. The validity and utility of such a 
paradigm must be assessed empirically, and should be compared with data gathered via 
option-generation tasks.  
Recall that one of the goals of this dissertation was to gather information that 
could be used, in the future, to design training based on the anticipation skills, decision 
strategies, and processes of experienced officers. The fact that participants were able to 
anticipate the outcome in only four of the six test trials suggests that both experienced 
and less-experienced officers could benefit from perceptual anticipation training. 
Alternatively, training that is geared toward matching their encoding of the potential 
threats to the selection of better response options may prove equally, if not more, 
beneficial. Given that the number of task-irrelevant options was negatively correlated 
with anticipation and decision-making performance, officers may also benefit from 
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training that improves their ability to distinguish between task-relevant and task-
irrelevant options.  
In the USA, many states have developed training curricula that must be followed 
by all police academies. These curricula specify, in detail, the amount of time to be spent 
on each topic. As a result, there is often little, or no, opportunity to administer additional 
training beyond that which is mandated. In light of this, any anticipation and/or decision 
making training for law enforcement should aim to minimize the amount of time and 
resources needed for delivery. One possible way to overcome obstacles to delivering such 
training could involve the development of online learning and testing software that 
recruits can complete individually, at their own leisure. Such a system may also be of 
benefit to law enforcement departments, which typically have to cover many topics (i.e., 
legal updates, weapon requalification) during annual, in-service training.  
Summary 
 Studies 1 and 2 represent a principled approach to understanding situation 
assessment and decision making in law enforcement. In terms of outcome performance, 
experienced participants were significantly better than less-experienced participants at 
taking the best response option, but not at anticipating the situation outcome. It is not yet 
clear whether experienced-based differences in perceptual anticipation performance exist 
in the law enforcement domain. However, performance data from a previous study (Ward 
et al., 2011) suggests that such perceptual skill does exist. One challenge, then, is to 
identify the conditions under which this skill can be detected reliably. Once such skill is 
identified, future research can assess whether it can be improved through training.  
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 Two main perspectives regarding the option generation processes that lead to 
superior performance were examined: TTF and LTWM theory. In general, participants 
generated few assessment and response options, and consistent with TTF, typically rated 
their first-generated option as the most likely option. One major finding was that, 
consistent with LTWM theory, participants generated fewer task-irrelevant options than 
task-relevant options, and the number of task-irrelevant options generated was negatively 
associated with anticipation and decision-making performance. This suggests that 
training participants to distinguish task-relevant from task-irrelevant information could 
result in improved performance.  
However, contrary to the prediction made by LTWM theory, the number of task-
relevant assessment options was negatively, and not positively, correlated with 
anticipation performance. This result was more consistent with a TTF-like mechanism, 
and suggests that there are some situations in which it is advantageous to generate fewer, 
and not more, of the task-relevant options that are available in the environment. This 
finding highlights the importance of defining the boundary conditions under which 
different types of option generation behavior are likely to be adaptive.  
 In general, this research has increased our understanding of situation assessment 
and decision making in a dynamic and complex domain, and provides a foundation on 
which to continue investigating the basis of skilled performance in law enforcement, with 
a view to designing training that will save lives. The methods used here can be applied to 
deepen the understanding of these processes in other domains.    
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APPENDIX A 
List of Scenarios Included in Studies 1 and 2 
 
Table A1 
List of Scenarios Included in Studies 1 and 2 
 
       
Scenario  
Name 
Scenario 
Type 
Scenario 
Duration (s)a 
Study 
1A 
Study 
1B 
Study 
1C 
Study 
2 
       
       
Bar Escalating 56.81     
Blow up Escalating 43.71     
Blue dodgeb Escalating 32.33     
Bus lady De-escalating 56.48     
Convenience store Escalating 39.71     
Domestic baby Escalating 61.33     
Domestic punch Escalating 29.55     
Drunk Escalating 42.26     
Greenwood park Escalating 19.34     
Gun grab Escalating 45.84     
Hey Mr Wilson Escalating 67.75     
Hospital incident De-escalating 50.80     
Hotel De-escalating 65.91     
Larceny De-escalating 87.46     
Men in black Escalating 30.71     
Miami De-escalating 50.99     
Rock n roll Escalating 34.36     
School hostage Escalating 40.42     
School shooting Escalating 49.05     
Subway Escalating 34.46     
Suicide by cop Escalating 93.86     
Suicide waitress Escalating 42.17     
Video store De-escalating 38.36     
       
       
Number of escalating scenarios: 14 17 17 7 
Number of de-escalating scenarios: 6 6 6 3 
     
Total number of scenarios: 20 23 23 10 
      
aIncludes introductory radio message (see Appendix E). bThis trial was used for the practice trial. 
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APPENDIX B 
Exemplar Scenarios 
Blow Up 
Radio message/context. “You and your partner are responding to a call 
describing a disturbance outside of a school. A boy sitting on the grass directly in front of 
you has been acting suspiciously.” 
Scenario description. The participant arrives on scene with another officer. The 
fellow officer escorts students away from the suspect and asks the participant to take care 
of the suspect. As the participant approaches the suspect, the boy gets up and becomes 
verbally aggressive. The boy is wearing an untucked, partially buttoned shirt. A wire can 
be seen hanging down under the shirt. The boy opens his shirt to expose an improvised 
explosive device around his waist. A school bus approaches in the background. The boy 
removes the actuator from his waistline and holds it in his hand. He then gets flustered 
and drops the actuator on the ground. He bends down to pick it back up and then 
detonates the device just as the school bus pulls up next to him. 
Convenience Store 
Radio message/context. “While on patrol, you stop at the neighborhood 
convenience store for a cup of coffee. You are getting out of your car and going into the 
store.”  
Scenario description. The participant enters the store. The store manager greets 
him and nervously invites him to stay and have a cup of coffee. The camera pans to allow 
the participant to looking around the store (and away from the store manager). While 
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looking around, the sound of a round being chambered into a firearm can be heard. The 
camera pans back around to show the perpetrator holding the store manager hostage. 
After a few seconds, the perpetrator surrenders, puts his weapon down, and releases the 
store manager. Immediately afterwards, the perpetrator then draws a backup weapon and 
shoots in the direction of the participant. 
School Hostage 
Radio message/context. “You and your partner are responding to a call 
describing a possible hostage situation at a school. You are in the passenger seat and your 
partner is driving to the scene.”  
Scenario description. The officers drive into the school’s service (i.e., back) 
entrance. After entering this area, just as they stop and begin to get out of the car vehicle, 
a male suspect armed with an assault rifle becomes visible, close to the rear entrance to 
the school. The male immediately turns to run back into the school and appears surprised 
to see the police. The suspect opens the rear door and enters the school with the assault 
rifle. 
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Timeline of Blow Up Scenario with Description of Critical Cues and Timing of  
Occlusion Points 
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APPENDIX D 
List of Occlusion Point Times (in seconds) for Studies 1A–C 
 
Table D1 
List of Occlusion Point Times (in seconds) for Studies 1A–C 
 
      
 
Study 1A  Study 1B  Study 1C 
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
   
 
Occlusion  
point 
 Occlusion 
point 
 Occlusion 
point 
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
   
Scenario 1  1  1 2 3 
  
 
 
 
   
        
Bar 55.47  54.93  54.00 54.87 55.40 
Blow up 42.80  32.13  33.07 35.40 40.27 
Blue dodgea 29.60  29.60  29.60 n/a n/a 
Bus lady 54.13  54.20  48.33 53.73 54.20 
Convenience store 38.53  38.47  38.27 38.47 38.67 
Domestic baby 59.13  59.27  57.60 59.13 59.20 
Domestic punch 27.73  27.93  27.40 27.93 28.27 
Drunk 40.40  40.40  40.93 41.40 41.47 
Greenwood park –  15.87  13.53 13.93 15.93 
Gun grab 43.47  39.67  39.73 40.73 41.60 
Hey Mr Wilson –  66.73  62.89 63.80 66.20 
Hospital incident 38.27  38.27  38.33 38.60 39.80 
Hotel 54.07  54.07  52.27 54.47 55.20 
Larceny 61.93  59.67  52.20 53.67 59.47 
Men in black 29.53  29.73  28.60 29.00 29.73 
Miami 40.73  40.67  38.00 39.87 40.67 
Rock n roll 28.40  28.93  28.93 29.33 29.87 
School hostage 37.13  37.13  36.87 36.93 37.00 
School shooting 47.53  47.47  47.40 47.47 47.53 
Subway 31.60  31.60  31.60 31.67 31.73 
Suicide by cop 74.33  74.20  73.00 74.07 74.13 
Suicide waitress –  41.13  41.20 41.27 41.33 
Video store 33.20  34.20  33.93 34.00 34.07 
        
Note. Dashes indicate scenarios that were not included in Study 1A. n/a = not applicable. 
aThis trial was used as the practice trial in Studies 1 and 2; the same occlusion point was used across all 
studies. 
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APPENDIX E 
Radio Message/Contextual Introductions to the Video Scenarios 
 
Table E1 
Radio Message/Contextual Introductions to the Video Scenarios 
 
  
Scenario Radio message/context 
  
  
Bar “You have been called to a bar to deal with a patron.” 
  
Blow up “You and your partner are responding to a call describing a 
disturbance outside of a school. A boy sitting on the grass 
directly in front of you has been acting suspiciously.” 
  
Blue dodge “You make a traffic stop. You are walking to the car that you 
stopped.”  
  
Bus lady “You have been sent to a bus stop to deal with a passenger.” 
  
Convenience store “While on patrol, you stop at the neighborhood convenience 
store for a cup of coffee. You are getting out of your car and 
going into the store.” 
  
Domestic baby “You are answering a call to a domestic dispute and are about to 
enter the house.” 
  
Domestic punch “You are answering a call to a domestic dispute and are about to 
enter the house.” 
  
Drunk “You are standing in a parking lot. There is man standing 
directly in front of you, acting suspiciously.”  
  
Greenwood park “An undercover officer has called for backup to Greenwood 
Park.” 
  
Gun grab “You have been dispatched as a backup unit to a local hotel, 
where a suicidal man is threatening to jump from the building.” 
  
Hey Mr Wilson “You are answering a call to a domestic dispute.” 
  
Hospital incident “You are responding to the call of a disturbance at a local 
hospital. You are standing in the hospital waiting room.”  
  
Hotel “You and your partner are investigating a possible suspect with 
two arrest warrants. The suspect has long hair and is wearing 
boots and jeans. You are standing in an elevator, looking at your 
partner.” 
  
Larceny “You are responding to a call of possible larceny. You are 
walking towards a parked train.” 
  
(Table E1 continues) 
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 (Table E1 continued) 
 
  
Scenario Radio message/context 
  
  
Men in black “You have made a traffic stop. You are standing outside of 
your car with the suspect.” 
  
Miami “You are responding to a call of a suspicious car parked outside 
of a building. You are standing outside of the vehicle on the 
driver’s side.” 
  
Rock n roll “You have been dispatched to an industrial estate, where a male 
was reported to be loitering.” 
  
School hostage “You and your partner are responding to a call describing a 
possible hostage situation at a school. You are in the passenger 
seat and your partner is driving to the scene.” 
  
School shooting “You and your partner are responding to a call describing a 
disturbance at a school. You are running down the hallway 
inside the school.” 
  
Subway “You have been called to a reported disturbance at a subway 
station.”  
  
Suicide by cop “You are responding to a call describing a possible suicide 
attempt in progress. You are standing in a hallway. Directly in 
front of you is a woman.” 
  
Suicide waitress “You are responding to a report of a suicidal female at a 
restaurant.” 
  
Video store “You are responding to a call of a disturbance at a local video 
store.” 
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APPENDIX F 
G*Power Power Analysis Output 
 
[1] -- Monday, December 03, 2012 -- 16:34:49 
z tests – Proportions: Difference between two independent proportions 
Analysis:  A priori: Computer required sample size 
Input: Tails(s) = One 
 Effect size h = 0.75 
 Proportion p1 = .51 
 α err prob = 0.05 
 Power (1−β err prob) = 0.80 
 Allocation ratio N2/N1 = 1 
Output: Critical z = 1.6448536 
 Sample size group 1 = 23 
 Sample size group 2 = 23 
 Total sample size = 46 
 Actual power = 0.8078179 
 Proportion p2 = 0.8480681 
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APPENDIX G 
Thought Statement Types 
 
Table G1 
Thought Statement Types Used to Code Retrospective Verbal Reports 
 
Thought statement type  Description 
   
Monitor  Heeded information that was present in the current 
environment (e.g., “The suspect was standing in front of 
me”) 
   
Infer  Information that is inferred about some aspect of the 
current scenario, but where that information is not present 
in the current environment (excluding evaluative 
inferences; e.g., “If my partner doesn’t turn the siren off, 
the hostage takers will hear us approaching”) 
   
Evaluate  A relative value-based inference about some aspect of the 
past, current or future environment but where the inferred 
value or information is not present in the current 
environment (e.g., “The boy appeared to be depressed”) 
 
   
Predict  An anticipated future situational event (e.g., “I think he’s 
going to go back in the school”) 
   
Act  A verbal or physical action and/or execution of a decision 
(e.g., “I told him to release the store manager”) 
   
 
 
